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Abstract 
Academic literature has examined how change in a regional system of innovation involves 
interactions between various actors that participate in regional economic development. 
This thesis examines similar processes, but also explores the ways in which various factors 
characterize change in regional systems of innovation. Without making assumptions 
about the political nature of the interactions among actors and the contexts surrounding 
them, the thesis advances the idea of a non-economic approach to the processes of 
regional development and industrial policy. In this thesis, a strategic relational perspective 
to regional systems of innovation comprises the conceptual framework that provides an 
in-depth explanation of the analysis of experiences.  The single case study is employed for 
the operationalization of the strategic-relational perspective in the context of Gyeonggi 
province, South Korea, as a highly industrialized region in a post catching-up economy. 
The fieldwork is based on the collection and analysis of interviews and participant 
observation. The interpretation of empirical evidence through the strategic relational 
perspective reveals tension in the governance context, which has not met the interests of 
regional policy makers concerning regional development and industrial policy in Gyeonggi 
province. Thus, the thesis portrays the parts played by the provincial government in the 
innovation system affecting innovative capacity and performance, and identifies the 
political tensions that emerged and that seemed to be important in these processes. 
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1 Introduction 
This study is about the relationship between the nation state and the regions in the period 
of development often referred to as the post catching-up period in South Korea.1 The 
thesis highlights polycentric relationships and the emergence of regional development 
and industrial policies within a regional system of innovation (Cooke et al., 2004) that is 
undergoing change as the structure of the political economy evolves toward the 
devolution of centralised power to the regions within South Korea.2 Applying the strategic 
relational perspective proposed by Hay (2002) and Jessop (2008) to political interactions, 
industrial and regional development policies are conceptualized to be the result of 
strategic actions, and the change in these policies is examined through the interaction of 
regional and national actors. In particular, the thesis focuses on the technology 
development policies that are situated in South Korea’s regions. One of these regions, 
Gyeonggi province, is the focus of this thesis.  
The topic poses two challenges. One is the new challenge that collective groups (e.g. 
actors inside and outside national and regional policy organizations) are facing in relation 
to economic development processes, in the context of the knowledge economy and the 
political devolution. The other challenge for policy makers concerned with regional 
                                                          
1  The state, defined by Max Weber as a compulsory association claiming control over a 
territory and the people there in (cited in Evans, 1995: 5), is considered to be the structure 
of government (Wade, 1990: 8). In keeping with Wade, the term ‘nation state’ is used 
interchangeably with the term ‘central government’ in this study. 
2 There is no simple definition of a ‘region’ and the term is used differently in different national 
contexts (e.g. province and Länder). Region is often defined in terms of shared normative 
interest (cultural areas), economic specificity (mono-production systems) and administrative 
homogeneity (governance areas). This creates some difficulty in cross-national studies as 
participants attempt to understand the different meanings attached to the term ‘region’. 
European Commission (2004: 1) defines a region in its Guide to European Regional Statistics 
as “a tract of land with more or less definitely marked boundaries, which often serves as an 
administrative unit below the level of the nation state”. In this thesis, regions are understood 
to be located at the provincial level, i.e. between the local and national tiers of political 
economy. 
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development at national and regional levels is to incorporate actors with a wider range of 
interests than the traditional public sector actors, who played a central role in the 
catching-up period.  
The analysis requires an examination of government policies at national and regional 
levels regarding regional development and industrial policy and the influence of these 
policies located within such a devolved structure. This is the place to give more substance 
to the interaction between national and regional actors. Both regional development and 
industrial policy play an important role in supporting the technological development that 
firms conduct.  
Increasingly, provincial governments are seen to play a crucial role in the development of 
technology, particularly with regard to the provision of strategic services. However, there 
seem to be possible contradictions about the role of provincial government in industrial 
development processes. On the one hand, provincial government may be seen as an 
instrument of the centralised state charged with local implementation of policies 
determined at a national level. On the other hand, provincial government may represent 
interests that are not entirely aligned with these national policies. The mutually exclusive 
nature of these purposes creates a contradiction. In much of the literature on innovation 
and South Korea, the assumption is made that provincial government is part of the 
infrastructure of the national economy. Nevertheless, in practice, provincial government 
is seen to be difficult to coordinate as a partner in an industrial policy in a national strategy. 
This thesis aims to explain these contradictions by identifying the theoretical and policy 
assumptions made in the literature and by providing some empirical evidence highlighting 
the policy process unfolding in regional contexts with regard to the activities of provincial 
government.  
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This study examines the parts played by provincial government in the policies affecting 
innovative capacity and performance, and suggests what conflicts or tensions have 
emerged that seem to be important in these processes. The following chapters consider 
theoretical perspectives to investigate these points and highlight how provincial 
government reacts to this situation in relation to national government and policies.  
The chapter starts by setting out the background of the issues to be dealt with in this 
thesis. Next, the chapter goes on to identify key issues in the existing literature, followed 
by the presentation of the theoretical perspectives, which are developed further in 
Chapter 2. Finally, the key research proposition and questions are set out. The chapter 
concludes by presenting the outline of the rest of the thesis.  
 
 
1.1 Background context 
South Korea has often been compared with France (Zysman, 1983) and Japan (Okimoto, 
1989; Ozawa, 2001), which are seen as examples of centralized capitalism (Kohli, 2004: 
101; Levy et al., 2006: 93; Hancké et al., 2008: 24). Centralisation is associated with 
nationalism and a tolerance of localised democratic deficits because of pride in societal 
accomplishment (even if the benefits from these accomplishments are unequally 
distributed and their direction is set by a narrow elite). This insulation and autonomy of 
the nation state has created a political environment for policy consistency because 
economic conditions will not be greatly influenced by the electoral cycle (Zysman, 1983: 
298). 
The curve shown in Figure 1-1 indicates the change in GDP per capita of South Korea over 
the past one hundred years. During the pre-World War II (WWII) period, Korea (including 
North Korea) was under Japanese colonial rule. Economic growth declined sharply due to 
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the disruption from WWII, the division of the country in 1945, and the Korean War in 1950. 
However, in the mid-1960s, the economy began to grow rapidly. While economic growth 
was curbed by the economic crisis in the late 1990s, the growth rate over the first decade 
of the 2000s was about 5% on average. During this period, South Korea achieved 
economic modernization in a more compressed way than Japan in what is a short time 
span relative to the process of modernization in other countries (OECD, 2012: 32). 
 
Figure 1-1 GDP per capita in UK, US, Japan and South Korea (1800-2010) 
 
 
Source: Maddison Database (http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm) 
Note: GDP per capita in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars in the left axis.   
 
Rapid economic growth was evaluated as the result of the expansion of inputs, labour, 
and finance. These factors are not unrelated to each other; the input-driven policies, the 
investment in human capital, and the direct foreign investment were all important. In 
controlling the country, the central government has relied on several planned economy 
policy instruments, such as a series of the Five-Year Economic Development Plans (1962-
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1996) (Chung Young-Lob, 2007: 368).3 It has emphasized heavy industrialization, such as 
manufacturing and chemical production for the purpose of export; 10.7% of the 
government expenditure was invested in the transport infrastructure during the 1970s 
and 1980s. As a result of the continuous investment in roads, railways, seaports, and 
airports since the 1960s, the country’s transport network has been densely developed.4 
The national industrial districts were created in ‘the Comprehensive National Territorial 
Plan (1972-present)’. It aims to facilitate the development of the local economy and to 
raise local income from non-agricultural activities. In the 1970s, the national industrial 
districts were built, and these formed the industrial belt in the southeast coastal regions 
to support the heavy and chemical industries. The central government started the 
construction of industrial districts, focusing on export-driven industrial districts in several 
cities, for instance, ‘the Ulsan Industrial Complex’ in Ulsan, which is located in the 
southeast of Korea, and ‘the Korea Export Industrial Park’ in Guro-dong, Seoul. By the end 
of the first decade of the 21st century, these industrial conurbations accounted for over 
70% of all manufacturing exports, about 60% of production, and over 40% of employment 
in South Korea (KDI, 2012: 33-35).  
These plans were accompanied by large investments in education. There was a strong 
emphasis on vocational schools, which were supposed to meet the needs of the industrial 
sectors (Chung Young-lob, 2007: 72). The emphasis placed on technologically inclined 
human capital is another aspect of investment in education. The Ministry of Science and 
Technology, which was established in 1967, was responsible for research and 
development R&D), human resource development, and science and technology 
                                                          
3 As a rule, South Korean surnames precede the first name, and I adhere to this in this thesis 
in order to avoid confusion. 
4 Although the construction of railways started from the 1900s during the colonial period of 
Japan, railway investment continued after the independence in 1945 and at the end of the 
Korean War in 1953. 
 6 
 
improvement. During the 1970s, some specialized research institutes were established in 
areas such as electronics, shipbuilding, telecommunications, machinery, energy, and 
chemical bases, which were all well suited to rapid economic growth. Considerable capital 
accumulation and investment in primary education during this period allowed a gradual 
shift up the value-added chain toward more sophisticated commodities. Key to this shift 
was also the use of technologies obtained through foreign licensing and adapted for 
domestic production. 
It has very little importance in the developmental state context unless external actors are 
involved. Clearly, the stable policy framework was important in this respect prior to the 
1997 crisis after which, Direct Foreign Investment (DFI) surged (Kim June-Dong and Hwang 
Sang-In, 2000: 270; Chung Young-lob, 2007: 291). The number of foreign-invested 
companies in South Korea has increased over the three decades. Between 1962 and 1997, 
the total volume of DFI was 25 billion USD. Since then, between 1998 and 2000, the 
amount of DFI has been closer to 40 billion USD (Bank of Korea, Economic Statistic 
System)5. There were two key reasons for the increased DFI inflows after the 1997 crisis: 
1) the economic policy reform, including granting permission for merger and acquisitions, 
new taxation incentives, and the deregulation of foreign ownership; and 2) the 
depreciation of the Korean currency (KRW). At the end of 1997, the value of the KRW 
depreciated by 40.4 % against USD and by 33.2% against the Japanese Yen (JPY) compared 
with its value at the end of 1996.  
Although these kinds of input-driven growth policies contributed to the industrial 
development of South Korea, they reached their limit when the knowledge economy 
began to emerge. One indication of the limitations of manufacturing is the relatively low 
labour productivity (Guarini et al., 2006) and the total factor productivity (TFP) growth 
                                                          
5 http://ecos.bok.or.kr/flex/EasySearch_e.jsp 
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rate having been lower than that of other developed economies. For 25 years, from 1981 
to 2005, the TFP growth rate of South Korea was lower than that of other advanced 
countries (Table 1-1). The annual average growth rate of TFP was 0.25% in all industries 
compared with 0.40% of the US and 0.34% of EU-10 countries. The TFP contribution rate 
to the gross output growth was much lower than that of other advanced countries. 
 
Table 1-1 Annual average growth rate of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) (1981-2005) 
 
 TFP growth rate (%) TFP contribution rate (%) 
Manufactur
ing  
Service  All 
industries 
Manufactur
ing  
Service  All 
industries 
South Korea 0.74 -0.41  0.25 7.94 -5.84  3.18 
US 1.13 0.22 0.40 46.89 6.71 14.49 
Japan 0.38 0.10 0.17 19.59 3.24 7.33 
EU-10 0.55 0.16 0.34 31.61 5.35 14.35 
Note: TFP contribution rate = (TFP growth rate / Gross output growth rate) x 100 
Sources: Korea Industrial Productivity Database (http://www.kpc.or.kr/productivity/state_prod.asp) 
 
In particular, South Korea has experienced significant economic and political changes 
since an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan became necessary due to the lack of 
foreign currency liquidity in 1997; many South Koreans call the years the IMF period or, 
more interestingly, the IMF economic crisis (IMF, 1999; 2002).6 The GDP growth rate was 
5.8% in 1997 and fell to a record low of -5.8% in 1998 (Digital Chosun Ilbo, December 30, 
1997). The Korean won (KRW), which depreciated to 1,700 per USD in January 1998 from 
                                                          
6 In January 1997, the Hanbo Steel Manufacturing Company collapsed under a debt of 6 billion 
USD. This was followed by the collapse of Sami Steel Corporation and Kia Motor’s request 
for bankruptcy protection. On 2 July, 1997, the Bank of Thailand announced a managed float 
of the baht and called on the IMF for technical assistance. In October, the Hong Kong stock 
market crashed. These external shocks added to the impact on South Korean share markets 
for three reasons. First, South Korean financial organizations had lent a total of 173 million 
USD to Thailand’s finance companies by the end of August 1997, and 92 million USD could 
not be guaranteed by the Thai Government (Digital Chosun Ilbo, October 1, 1997). Second, 
since 34% of South Korean exports went to Southeast Asian countries, a significant decline 
in exports was expected (Digital Chosun Ilbo, June 4, 1999), and investors started selling their 
stocks. Third, foreign investors were concerned about the fallout from the export and 
financial relations with Southeast Asia (Digital Chosun Ilbo, April 10, 1998). 
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the pre-crisis level of 900 KRW, stabilized to the 1,300 level by the middle of 1998 (the 
Bank of Korea, 1999; 2004). The unemployment rate stood at roughly 420,000 at the end 
of 1997. By June 1998, that number had reached 1.41 million, representing a loss of nearly 
one million jobs in just six months. The majority of these were considered white-collar 
jobs, an unthinkable phenomenon in a culture based on life-long employment (Lee Sook-
Jong and Han Taejoon, 2006: 307). 
In 1998, South Korea experienced not only economic change, but also for the first time, a 
change of politics from conservatives to moderate progressives (Minns, 2001; Kihl Young-
Whan, 2005; Bae Yooil and Sellers, 2007). With the advent of democracy, the moderate 
progressive governments turned their attention to ironing out the inequities 
characteristic of the society, rather than seeking to overturn it. Thus, concepts such as 
‘privatization’ (Park Bae-Gyoon et al., 2012: 109), ‘free market economy’ (Crotty and Lee 
Kang-Kook, 2001: 1) or ‘small government’ (Choi Jang Jip, 1998) became key phrases of 
the discourse in the late-1990s. Such public sector reforms aimed to address the 
perceived problems in the state: over-centralization, lack of transparency, rigidity and low 
competitiveness.  
The administration of Kim Dae-Jung (1998-2003), that is, the first moderate progressive 
administration, established three goals for carrying out public sector reform: ‘a small 
government’, ‘a highly competitive government’, and ‘a customer-oriented government’ 
(Lim Hyun-Chin and Jang Jin-Ho, 2006: 445). 7  The reformers strongly urged the 
government to adopt measures to privatize key public corporations and to delegate 
                                                          
7 The Kim Dae-Jung administration (1998-2003) was inaugurated in February 1998. The new 
administration defined the economic situation as ‘the greatest national crisis since the 
Korean War’. It also charted an aggressive program of management reform, privatization, 
and downsizing to transform government policy, which made DJnomics in Korea as familiar 
as Reaganomics was in the United States and Rogernomics in New Zealand. In practice, in its 
first year (1998) of operation, the Committee scrapped about 5,326 of 11,125 administrative 
regulations, a reduction of 48%. One of the results was that foreigners can now purchase 
land under the same rules as Koreans to increase DFI.  
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responsibilities to the regions (Im Tobin, 2003a, 2003b; Kim Pan-Suk, 2000, 2003; 
Brandesen and Kim Sunhyuk, 2010).8 Since then, local government has been receiving 
increasing attention.  
The extent to which South Korea is converging to or diverging from the nation state-
directed economy model following the economic globalization, political change, and 
devolution in 1990s remains uncertain. If South Korea’s political economy has undergone 
a fundamental transformation in its political system and economic practices, is the 
country still a developmental state either in the 20th century sense or in the 21st century 
sense suggested by Evans (2008), or has it become a different kind of nation state? A 
stable policy framework has also been seen as more credible to economic agents and is 
considered to have improved economic outcomes, given that the nation state ultimately 
guaranteed low costs of production and the control of economic development.  
While the role of the nation state historically was unambiguous, there is little agreement 
on what type of state is appropriate for today’s post catching-up society. Among those 
contributing to this discussion is Evans (2008: 13-15); he recently defined what he calls 
the 21st century developmental state and discussed the differences between this and the 
developmental states of the 20th century including a different set of prescriptions for 
states wishing to assume this activist role. Some studies have argued that since South 
Korea moved to a deregulated economy and devolved politics, the state has been 
transformed into a neo-liberal economy (Hundt, 2005; Pirie, 2005; 2008; Hill et al., 2012) 
and into a devolved state (Rozman, 2002; Bae Yooil and Sellers, 2007; Bae Yooil, 2009). 
                                                          
8 There are eight cases of privitisation of public firms. The Pohang Iron and Steel Company 
(POSCO) case is emblematic of the economic crisis. The economic crisis buffeted the central 
government, which ratcheted up its schedule to privatize POSCO (formerly Pohang Iron and 
Steel Company Ltd.). In order to raise foreign currency and help satisfy IMF-imposed criteria 
for the release of 57 billion USD in much needed stabilization loans, the government sold off 
an additional 3.14 percent stake in POSCO in 1998. The following year, the government sold 
an additional 13 percent stake. Privatization was fully completed in 2001, when the 
government divested its final shares (Nam Il Chong, 2004: 98). 
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Conversely, there are arguments regarding how the nation state still plays a crucial role 
in some of the landmark innovations (Mazzucato, 2013). For example, Mazzucato (2013) 
describes in detail how the central government has financed essential technological 
innovations.9 
The result has been a complex array of policy and political experiments across major 
public policy fields, including economic development, social, cultural, environmental, and 
welfare policies (Kim Jin Wook, 2005). Although this package of policy initiatives has been 
proven to be ephemeral in many areas, it has had a lasting imprint on the nation state’s 
role with respect to the regions. After political devolution was secured in 1995, conflicts 
became policy issues due to the growth of regional society. Recent academic literature 
about the political science discipline includes numerous claims that the centrality of the 
state is increasingly being challenged by a new form of political mobilization, conflict, and 
struggle (Koo, 2001; Peng and Wong, 2004; Kim Jungbu, 2013). Such conflicts have 
ushered in a society that has become more involved in the decision making related to 
regional and industrial development. 
 
  
1.2 Theoretical context  
This thesis aims to contribute to the understanding of the linkage between nation state 
and regions to regional development and industrial policy. The nature and extent of the 
interactions in regional development and industrial policy have been questioned in the 
literature by both geographers and economists. Indeed, in debates about economic 
development, recent theories have emphasized the importance of region.  
                                                          
9 For example, she argues that much of the technology underlying the Apple smartphone was 
created in public research and development organizaton in US (see Mazzucato, 2013: 88).   
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These ideas are a revival of earlier theoretical ideas, such as those of Marshall (1920), 
about the relevance of locality to processes of economic development – localities are 
where knowledge is exchanged, labour markets are better integrated, and tight vertical 
production relationships can be organized. Sub-national governments can play an 
important role in regional economic development through the remedy of imperfections 
in the local market. Provincial governments can create a favourable context for local 
development through land use policies and the provision of infrastructural investments 
(in energy, transport, and communications). Furthermore, they can proactively seek to 
improve relationships between local business and public sector institutions, such as 
schools and universities. Once all these things have been achieved, it is possible that the 
provincial government might proactively encourage the location of domestic and foreign 
enterprise, thus remedying thin local markets for important inputs to a developing 
industry. In other words, the argument regarding remedying market imperfections is at 
the end rather than the beginning of the list of desirable actions. More recently, others 
have drawn attention to the role of local communities in policy making (Andersson and 
Karlsson, 2004; Pike, 2007; Foray et al., 2009). In addition, the interest in the regions is 
further stimulated by a general criticism of neoliberal economic views that assume the 
markets are ‘flat’ and ‘perfect’, and have no structure or locality (Gualini, 2004; Lajendijk, 
2007). 
This thesis draws upon the insights of the regional system of innovation (RSI) approach, 
one of the approaches that highlight the importance of locality and the localisation of 
innovation and learning. The RSI approach highlights the systemic aspects of economic 
development. Its fundamental focus is the interactions between different actors in 
economic activities, particularly the interaction between users and producers, but also 
between business and the community. The RSI approach goes beyond economics by 
focussing on non-market as well as market interactions.   
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While the RSI approach has emerged as an independent domain of theory and practice in 
Europe, it was introduced in South Korea around the beginning of the 1990s (Chung 
Sunyang, 1999; Park Sam Ock, 2000; Cooke et al., 2004; Hassink and Shin Dong-Ho, 2005; 
Cho Myung-Rae and Hassink, 2009; Regional Science, 2011). These studies introduced the 
idea that regional development and industrial policy have changed and have shifted away 
from the 'top-down' regional policies that were implemented in the 1970s (mainly large-
scale heavy industrial complexes in the central and particularly south-eastern parts of 
South Korea) and 1980s (mainly public research establishments at Daedeok science park 
in Daejeon). Instead, in the late-1990s, they moved towards nation state-led 
decentralization policies to develop endogenous potentials (mainly SMEs) in regions.  
While many of the relations dealt with in the RSI literature are concerned with local actors, 
there has been a growing acknowledgement that political relations between the nation 
state and the region in the economic process is of fundamental importance, and this 
relationship can play a critical role in shaping RSI (Pike, 2007: 1265). The political nature 
of this relation stems from the recognition that the distribution of powers may not match 
formal provisions. Neither the nation state nor the region has exclusive control over 
actions that may be taken in furtherance of development. Thus, actions may be taken at 
either the level of the nation state or that of the region, and such actions elicit responses 
not only from regional actors but also from different levels of constitutive power – the 
nation state and the region. This ensemble shapes the relations among actors and 
ultimately affects the flows of resources. In countries such as South Korea, which have a 
tradition of a strong nation state, the power relationship is asymmetric rather than 
symmetric in general (Pike, 2007: 1145; Castells, 2009: 10).   
The recognition of overlapping authority and possibilities for action raises the question of 
how to manage the process to avoid duplicative or conflicting action.  One approach to 
the management of responsibilities is a formal consideration of ‘devolution.’ Devolution 
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means a “delegation of power to a lower level, especially by central government to local 
or regional administration” (the Oxford Dictionary). Viewed in this way, devolution is a 
process initiated by the nation state with the ‘local or regional administration’ being the 
passive recipient of new powers or authority.  Devolution may or may not be seen as 
favourable by regions. For example, it is possible for the state to delegate responsibility 
without providing the resources or the taxation authority necessary to raise the resources 
to fulfil the responsibility. Devolution may help to increase the interconnectedness 
between nation state and regions, with the nation state increasingly influenced by events 
and decisions made outside of its direct administrative control. At the same time, 
decisions taken by the nation state will have consequences that differ across regions or 
localities creating diverse responses and increasing the demand for political cooperation 
between nation state and regions (Hill et al., 2012: 14). ?
The rise of regional policy actors, regardless of whether it stems from local activism or 
from processes of devolution, will inevitably lead to tensions and conflicts regarding views 
of development (Counsell and Haughton, 2003: 231). In South Korea, political tensions 
between the nation state and the regions, and conflicts between a region and its 
neighbouring regions, have been increasing rapidly over the span of the last decades (Kim 
Jungbu, 2013: 121). This makes the traditional ‘planning’ approach to regional policy 
vulnerable, as it creates serious delays when it comes to taking united action and contests 
the ‘relegation’ of implementation to the level of the region. A number of conflicts, largely 
concerned with land–use planning and upgrading local industries, have emerged in the 
field of regional policies and development.  
This thesis investigates the change in regional development and industrial policy resulting 
from the move from nation state-centric to polycentric (the nation state and multiple 
regions) sources and processes of implementation. It may be expected that the imbalance 
of power between nation state and regions will continue to be a significant source of 
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tension and a defining feature of the political economy in South Korea. This move toward 
polycentric relationships is an increasingly important issue in the recent industrial 
development in South Korea. In the past, such a subject would have been relatively 
uncontroversial. South Korea has long been seen as embodying the possibilities for nation 
state-led and/or nation state-business economic development. In the post-Korean war 
period, the country experienced rapid growth and convergence in an economy guided by 
state technocrats.  
In this thesis, our particular focus is on how a region achieves a growing voice and capacity 
to initiate as well as manage regional development and industrial policies. So, it is 
necessary to deconstruct the state by investigating sources of power autonomous from 
the state and the resistance to this autonomous power. Thus, although it is evident that 
a nation state’s role is deeply connected to its relationship with its regions, little research 
has considered case studies of South Korea’s regional power that could verify, illustrate, 
and develop the theoretical possibility of an emerging polycentrism in industrial policy.  
This is the lacuna that the current research will address.  
  
 
1.3 Research proposition and research questions  
To address the polycentric relationship in RSI, there is a need to consider what could 
explain the change processes and behaviour, which can then complement insights into 
the post catching-up economy in South Korea.  
One crucial assumption in this thesis is that the nation state is restricted to using uniform 
regional economic policies in the regions. Even if the central government could 
simultaneously implement distinct policies, due to information limits, it may be difficult 
for it to monitor or appropriately evaluate the results. This stems from limitations in the 
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capacity of central government, which should diminish rather than increase over time 
with the growing wealth of the country.  
We then consider two important interpretations of the change in relations between the 
nation state and the regions. The first interprets the change as a monocentric state 
‘directed’ process, and the second views it as involving the emergence of a polycentric 
dynamic in which local regional autonomy competes with the role of the nation state with 
regard to initiation and implementation. The ‘directed’ process implies that the central 
government needs to choose one of the available blueprints or pathways for moving 
forward in development.  
An emergent process might be driven by one or more of several causes: 1) it might occur 
because of indecision by or weakening of the central state, which impels autonomous 
action; 2) it might be the result of a process of deliberate ‘devolution’ – in this case, the 
initiation might be from the nation state, but the subsequent process becomes emergent 
as regions take up their devolved powers in different ways; or 3) it might result from the 
process of polycentric growth in which regions accumulate greater wealth and power and 
thus demand greater autonomy and use whatever autonomy they have to increase the 
scope of their local agency. In all of these cases, the nature of industrial policy can no 
longer be considered to be ‘directed’ by the nation state as a central actor but is emergent 
from a polycentric process. The underlying overall questions of this study can be 
expressed as follows:  
How can a major change in the regional system of innovation be identified and 
characterized? Is it possible to distinguish between change as an emergent process (not 
attributable to any specific actor) and change as being “directed” (principally controlled 
by a single actor or groups of actors)?  
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When considering the past legacy, it would be difficult to answer the above questions in 
a definitive way. Therefore, the overarching question has been broken down into specific 
research questions; these will be referred to as the research questions throughout the 
thesis.  
In particular, the term ‘conflict’ is useful in explaining the process of emergence and 
contestation. ‘Conflict’ is defined in this thesis as “the existence of tension, annoyance, 
and animosity between two or more separate organizations that are not necessarily 
involved in any collaborative activities” (Simons and Peterson, 2000: 102). Thus, conflict 
among actors is mainly due to diverging perceptions and preferences. Actors may disagree 
about the need for a regulation or intervention, argue about the causes of a political 
problem, or have different ideas on how best to solve a problem. If the preferences of 
coalitions are based on fundamentally different views, values, and problem definitions, 
the conflict is supposed to be more intense. If preferences differ due to material interests 
or technical details, conflict is lower, and the actors find it easier to reach a solution.  
When the nation state and the regions have different or opposing priorities, their 
interaction pattern will more likely be one of conflict. Research is needed to identify the 
different perspectives and apply them in a different way, raising questions about the 
extent to which specific aspects of the context produce different relationships between 
regional characteristics and behaviours during a conflict situation. There may exist 
bottlenecks, blockages, or conflicts in the course of the change process. In addition, a 
region may resist or facilitate change in order to maximize individual or collective interests. 
In order to examine this relationship, the following empirical research questions are 
useful:  
First, what was the relative importance of the different factors that may cause changes in 
the regional system of innovation in the case study at hand?  
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Second, are the initiating actors trying to change towards a more regionally networked 
system in a coherent way, or are contests over purpose and method protracted?  
Third, what conflicts has the initiating actor (either central or regional) encountered in the 
course of change, and why do these arise?  
Fourth, how have these conflicts persisted or been overcome in the regional system of 
innovation to date? 
 
These are important questions, and even partial answers to them would further aid an 
understanding of industrial development in South Korea. A theoretical explanation of the 
emergence of new initiatives must be able to explain how competing actors and their 
philosophies are resolved to permit the initiative to go forward. Such a study requires 
more consideration of the processes of accommodation and compromise than a regional 
economy development study would usually offer. In other words, it is more oriented 
towards the processes by which change occurs than the specific pathway that emerges or 
that is planned.   
Obviously, the guiding principle is not only the research questions but also the theoretical 
perspectives, which are discussed in the next chapter. Providing answers to these 
questions may lead us to a greater understanding of the change phenomenon as well as 
inform learning interventions related to regional change management for policy makers 
in the region. 
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1.4 Thesis layout 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. This chapter, Chapter 1, has explained the 
motivation, objectives and limitations of earlier research. It has defined the research 
questions and illustrated the expected contributions.  
Chapter 2 provides the background to the discussion by looking at how (geographical) 
economists and political scientists understand the regional economic development and 
political economy. The first is the RSI approach. The purpose of the review is not to 
provide an exhaustive overview of the literature of RSI. Instead, the aim is to examine the 
background literature with an open-minded attitude towards the possibility of combining 
different studies and to implement different views in explaining the rich in-depth data 
collected in the context of South Korea, as one single theory cannot achieve this task. The 
chapter continues to explore varieties of insights of capitalism into the processes of state 
transformation. This leads us to discuss the main debates in the current literature on 
political economy and to derive some key criteria that are relevant to the South Korean 
context. The chapter then turns to discuss the relational perspectives as developed by Hay 
(2002) and Jessop (2008) as the main inspiration for the theoretical approach of this study; 
it aims to apply these perspectives to the case study. The result of this is illustrated in a 
conceptual framework. 
Chapter 3 discusses the methodology and the rationale behind the case selection. While 
this thesis consists of a single qualitative case study, the empirical analysis is guided by 
the theoretically grounded constructs in this chapter and the preceding chapter.  
Chapter 4 provides a more complete examination of the historical context of South Korea, 
complementing the previous introduction of the literature regarding the studies of South 
Korea considered in Chapter 1.  
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Chapter 5 gives a brief overview and identifies the characteristics of the case region 
analysed in the study. In doing so, it aims to address the question of how and why regional 
development plans are, or can be, changed according to the political ambitions of the new 
regime.  
Chapter 6 is dedicated to explaining the current policy initiatives of Gyeonggi province. 
This chapter provides evidence of policy change in one particular provincial government 
in response to the introduction of recent central government reforms, and it identifies the 
strategic actions of the provincial government. This action is conditioned by the region’s 
history and resources and by central government’s policies, which influence the provincial 
government’s strategic options. The main structural background provided earlier in 
Chapters 4 and 5 is supplemented here by a more detailed analysis of the process at the 
provincial level. A key aim of this chapter is to elucidate the different perceptions of the 
regional actors with regard to industrial policy. Thus, this chapter helps to explain the 
particular characteristics and articulations of the development of specific strategic actions. 
Since Chapter 6 is particularly concerned with changes in which politics play an important 
role, this chapter considers the ‘blossoming’ of the regional actions, and the next chapter 
will consider the ‘direction of travel’ and ‘changes’ in the story described in this chapter.   
Chapter 7 examines the change of the RSI in Gyeonggi province. We bring together the 
insights on the strategic-relational perspective into RSI in a discussion of the potential, 
difficulties, and limits to provincial government as an agent of change and examine how 
it thus limits the growth of a polycentric governance of industrial policy. Initially, we 
highlight the main issues from the debates on change concerning a regionally networked 
system, where national interventions imbue the RSI with a ‘planning’ character. We 
introduce national agencies’ responses to actions taken at the regional level. We then 
identify the sources of continuing tensions. The chapter concludes by questioning 
whether in a structure- and agent-based context of continuity and change, provincial 
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government is emerging as a new source of initiative (hence indicating the emergence of 
polycentrism) or whether provincial government continues to be subordinate to the 
initiative of central government, experiencing relegated responsibilities rather than 
exercising devolved or autonomous powers of initiative and implementation.   
As a way of conclusion, the final chapter, Chapter 8, responds to the main research 
proposition and research questions. The chapter uses the outcomes of the fieldwork of 
this research to reflect upon and respond to the theoretical approaches and insights 
presented in Chapter 2 to highlight the theoretical understandings of the region’s 
engagement in the processes of industrial policy and socio-political transformation. 
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2 Theoretical perspectives and framework to understand changes in the 
regional system of innovation in South Korea? 
This chapter briefly outlines the theoretical perspectives on economic development at a 
national and regional level. Economic development represents one of the central 
questions for nation state actors and for actors that are situated within regions. Economic 
development is a field of study in which economists have brought in understandings from 
associated disciplines, such as geography, political science, and sociology, with the 
disciplinary boundaries between geographical and political science often being blurred in 
answering questions about regional development.       
First, we consider the theoretical perspective on economic development at the regional 
level. This involves introducing the various schools of thought concerned with economic 
development and growth in general and policy making in particular. Different theories are 
introduced to provide a background to economic development and growth. Despite the 
criticisms of the system of innovation approach, the RSI approach is still a very useful 
approach in identifying an empirically driven set of relations and explaining the existence 
of continuity of interactions using systemic reasoning.  
Second, we consider the literature on political economy. The emergence of a regionally 
networked system cannot be explained simply by the occurrence of a new structure; it 
also depends on the change of actors, the relationship, and the new order. The political 
economy perspective covers the interplay of these changes at the national and the 
regional level. This in turn allows us to develop a number of theoretically grounded issues 
regarding the change to a regionally networked system.  
Third, we advance a political perspective that might be used to grasp the interaction in 
the process of moving to a regionally networked system. We introduce a strategic-
relational approach to the interaction between a nation state and the regions. Its 
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strengths as well as its weaknesses are discussed, and an attempt is made to extend RSI 
beyond its original temporal and spatial limits.  
?
2.1 Perspectives on regional economy and growth   
A fundamental aspect of regional studies is understanding the dynamic of regions as they 
are influenced by the rapidly changing global capitalist economy (Storper, 1997: 181). The 
importance of this concern has intensified since the 1980s with neo-liberalism and its 
emphasis on the primacy of markets, which has pervaded economic thinking and policy 
making (Dunford and Greco, 2006: 58-61). Despite the strong forces of the globalization 
of knowledge flows, empirical evidence shows that the “geographic or location-specific 
sources of competitive advantage will tend to become more, not less, important” (Enright, 
2000: 117).  
The reasons for this increasing importance of local-specific sources of competitive 
advantage are closely related to the recognition that knowledge and learning have a 
regional character and often involve ‘social’ and ‘cultural’ issues, such as the formation of 
a consensus and the development of institutional supports to the economy (Lundvall, 
1992; Asheim and Dunford, 1997; Maskell et al., 1998). Particularly, ‘regional 
competitiveness’ as a determinant of economic performance has increased the 
importance of knowledge creation and transfer in regional economies (Storper, 1997; 
Camagni, 2003; Porter, 2003; Moulaert and Sekia, 2003; Malecki, 2004).  
Currently, there are two sets of theories on regional economy, both of which have focused 
mainly on the context of developed country, though they have been applied far more 
widely (Amin, 1999; Boschma and Martin, 2010): the endogenous growth theory of 
economics and the institutional theories of economic geography.  
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On the one hand, endogenous regional growth theory seeks to explain growth in terms of 
agglomeration and externalities (Cantwell and Iammarino, 2003; Dawkins, 2003; Boschma, 
2005; Frenken and Boschma, 2007). On the other hand, the concept of embeddedness 
and path-dependency, which emphasises the role of relations in institutions, has given 
rise to the powerful approach of regional economic development that draws on a range 
of complementary literature on industrial districts (Becattini, 1989, 1992; Scott, 1988), 
local productive systems (Lombardi, 2003), industrial clusters (Porter, 1998; Martin and 
Sunley, 2003), new industrial spaces (Scott, 1988), regional worlds (Storper, 1997), 
technopoles or science parks (Simmie, 1994; Castells and Hall, 1994), milieux innovateurs 
(Camagni, 2002), learning regions (Grabher, 1993; Florida, 1995; Morgan, 1997)10, the 
triple helix theory (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000), and regional systems of innovation 
(RSI) (Cooke et al., 1992).  
All of the authors cited in the previous paragraph claim that the interactions of local actors 
create agglomeration phenomena within a territorial system (see Figure 2-1). They offer 
complementary insights into the forces shaping public attitudes in contemporary modern 
regional economies.  
 
 
  
                                                          
10 ‘Leaning region’ is informative for understanding collective resources. The whole region is 
able to systemically create synergy in sharing knowledge and ideas and generating actions, 
which contributes to the interests of the whole. The progress is self-reinforcing, as managers 
objectively review their progress. Olbertz (2002) looks at the attributes of a learning region 
in the context of the Aachen region of Germany; the region was relatively small in size and 
it must be appreciated that creating a learning region is not an easy task. However, wherever 
it can be achieved to some degree, the literature noted suggests that there are likely to be 
substantial benefits. 
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Figure 2-1 Spatial structures and causal processes in the new economic geography   
 
 
Source: Dunford and Greco (2006: 28) 
 
The RSI approach is clearly neither an endogenous economic growth theory nor an 
institutional theory of economic geography (in part, because the RSI concept is employed 
by economists). Rooted in an evolutionary perspective of socio-economic change, the RSI 
approach highlights the influence of institutions on the economic development process 
(Hollingsworth, 2000; Malmberg and Maskell, 2010) and the importance of integration 
between actors, spanning the public and private sectors to the creation, diffusion, and 
embedding of knowledge within regions (Simmie, 2003; Malerba, 2005; Mowery and 
Sampat, 2005; Asheim et al., 2011: 878). Thus, it emphasizes social capital, networking, 
and learning as involving evolutionary processes, and it can be contrasted with previous 
approaches to localisation, such as the concept of the ‘cluster’, which emphasises the 
relatively static ideas of endowments and the articulation of localised industrial structures. 
The main critique of the ‘cluster’ approach is that it focuses too narrowly on the 
specialised activities associated with particular outputs and often ignores or bypasses 
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efforts to explain the complementary factors necessary for these specialised activities to 
succeed. The consequence is that while clusters may be identified, their identification 
provides little insight into how they may be created and may even lead to inappropriate 
policies, such as attempting to increase the number of firms engaged in the specialised 
activity. 
We take the RSI approach as the theoretical starting point, focusing on the dynamics of 
the reconfiguration of RSI rather than just describing the existence of actors and their 
inter-connections at the regional level.  
 
2.2 Regional system of innovation  
The RSI approach provides a useful way to observe regions where certain regional 
characteristics play an important role in the economic process. The approach has 
attracted increasing attention from academics and policy makers (particularly in 
supranational organizations such as the OECD). Despite the popularity of the RSI approach 
in the academic literature and in policy practice, multiple interpretations and uses of the 
term co-exist. This is because the theory has no way to order the relative importance of 
the actors and the relations; this importance is likely to vary according to the situated 
context, and thus it is difficult to make generalisations. Instead, the RSI approach 
constitutes a diagnostic heuristic, a guide to making situated analyses. In addition, there 
is still ambiguity in the RSI concept; we still need to define in a pragmatic way what it is 
considered to be an RSI in this study. 
 
2.2.1 The concept 
The concept of RSI originated from the national system of innovation (NSI) (Howells, 1999: 
78; Iammarino, 2005: 499). Since the concept of NSI was first used by Freeman (1982) and 
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Lundvall (1985), it has become a substantial field of research (Freeman, 2002: 194; 
Cantwell and Iammarino, 2003: 10-11).  
The national systems of innovation (NSI) literature made enormous strides in 
defining innovation, correcting the perceived wisdom about innovation processes 
by ‘showing them to be interactive’, non-linear, and introducing the important 
concept of ‘institutional learning’ into this more systemic analysis of innovation. 
(Cooke et al., 2004: 17) 
 
The NSI approach focuses on the commonalities applied at a national level, while the RSI 
approach focuses on the heterogeneity and distinguishing features of regions. Just as the 
boundaries of the NSI can be indistinct (e.g. because many industries are situated in global 
structures of knowledge and production), so too are the boundaries of the RSI, which 
draws upon national institutions as well as the national language and culture.   
An important reference in the debate on technology is the work of neo-Schumpeterian 
economists, who were interested in the long-term dynamics of capitalist economies, 
including the incidence of cycles, both short and long. One of their most important 
contributions to the examination of economic cycles is that of techno-economic 
paradigms, that is, technological systems that have such deep impacts on the way the 
economy behaves that they alter the prevailing paradigm of economic activity (Freeman 
and Perez, 1988: 47). In this sense, the evolution of technological systems could be 
described as a process of emergence, acceleration, and deceleration of new techno-
economic paradigms.  
With the development of the system of innovation, economic geographers found that 
studies of systems of innovation at a regional level were also important. Their 
investigation of the regional level flowed from the idea that knowledge, skills, and 
capabilities are not freely available, as might be suggested by a neoliberal global market 
perspective. Cooke et al. (1997: 476) introduced the appropriateness of the regional level 
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as a starting point for the analysis.11  Lundvall (2007: 99) himself, in a paper on NSI, 
indicates that “there is a need to study not only the national level but also networks at, 
for instance, the local and regional level”. Similar arguments can be found in Freeman 
(2002: 196-198).   
Cooke et al. are seen here to form the core of the RSI debate. Although there are often 
subtle differences in definitions, they give an initial summary of the prevailing definitions 
(Cooke et al. 2004: 331) as “systems in which firms and other organizations such as 
research institutes, universities, innovation support agencies, chambers of commerce, 
banks, government department are systematically engaged in interactive learning 
through an institutional milieu characterised by embeddedness”.   
Cooke’s definition conceptualises a region as an area that comprises “a production 
structure” embedded in an “institutional structure” in which firms and other actors are 
systemically engaged in interactive learning (Cooke, 2001: 953-954). The concept was 
developed in the contexts of the consolidation of high-tech areas (e.g., Silicon Valley, 1985) 
and the revitalization of areas with a manufacturing tradition (e.g., Emilia-Romagna 
(1996), Baden-Württemberg (1994) and more European regions (1992, 2000)). Case 
studies explained the success of those regions due to their flexible production systems, 
learning capacity, innovation potential, and networking ability. Thus, his concept provides 
a broad picture of what an RSI study might actually focus on, though generally based on 
Western contexts.    
The apparent differences here are the consequence of a) different foci in analysis, b) 
different empirical grounding, and c) the flexibility of the English language, which makes 
it possible to use different words to describe the same basic idea. Many eminent authors 
                                                          
11 For a detailed review of the development of the RSI concept, see Cooke (2008), D’Allura et 
al. (2012), Uyarra and Flanagan (2013), and Teixeira (2013). 
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have highlighted the clear and precise definitions in various aspects (Table 2-1). Other 
concepts are relatively narrower than Cooke’s concept, but on another level, are more 
complex, since they seek to produce a descriptive account of the multi-dimensional 
character of regional innovation. They do not look at all at the features of the system, or 
related interactions, which are relevant to regional economic performance. 
 
Table 2-1 Different understandings of RSI  
 
Aspect Understanding Authors 
Spatial and 
Institutional 
element 
The interaction between structure and actors is bidirectional … Howells (1999: 78) 
RISs and their characteristics, including the institutional set-up, 
evolve through time to be distinctive to that certain region … 
Cooke et al. (1997: 
479) 
An open system interacting beyond its boundaries … Schienstock and 
Hämäläinen (2001) 
a set of interacting private and public interests, formal 
institutions and other organizations that function according to 
organizational and institutional arrangements and 
relationships conducive to the generation, use and 
dissemination of knowledge.  
Doloreux (2004) 
Knowledge 
and network 
two separate subsystems that constitute the main building 
blocks of regional systems of innovation  
Autio (1998: 113) 
the innovating firms surrounded by a number of actors who are 
all in one way or another linked to the innovation process of a 
local firm and to each actor 
Meesus et al. (1999: 
9) 
all important economic and social diffusion, and use of 
innovation  
Edquist (2005: 182) 
crucial arenas for localized learning and tacit know-how sharing Vertova (2006: 8) 
Encompassing these processes a regional milieu for continuous 
learning may emerge, which includes an efficient and 
embedded culture of knowledge sharing and circulation 
Kautonen (2006:  
270) 
Source: author’s own creation  
 
Before it is possible to analyse to what extent RSI are able to account for regions, we need 
to explore the specific characteristics of an RSI. According to Doloreux and Parto (2005: 
134), theoretical aspects underpin the frame of the RSI approach: 1) interaction between 
different actors, and 2) the role of institutions. We consider each in turn.  
First, implicit in the concept of the RSI is an emphasis on ensembles of related actors and 
on their economic interactions. These are considered to be nurtured by a “number of 
institutions of a private, semi-public, and public nature which act as a ‘life-support’ system, 
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especially for SMEs” (Cooke and Morgan, 1993: 555). That understanding of the approach 
does not lead to predictive theory but to a process of analysis, which has evaluative 
content and can suggest policy, but at a very micro level, that is, improving the 
connections and relationships. 
Autio’s (1998) classical framework helps to explain what actors might be considered to 
interact in the RSI. He points out that an RSI is a social system comprising two interacting 
subsystems: the knowledge generation and diffusion subsystem and the application and 
exploitation subsystem (see Figure 2-2). 
 
Figure 2-2 Overview of regional system of innovation  
 
 
Source: Tödtling and Trippl (2005: 1206), originally from Autio (1998: 134).  
 
The knowledge application and exploitation subsystem refers to the knowledge flows of 
firms and universities, whereas the knowledge generation and diffusion subsystem refers 
to the supporting actors, such as research institutions and the government. Universities, 
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technological laboratories, and public research organizations providing funding for 
technological projects would be, among others, part of the institutional infrastructure, 
while firms would be the main actors in the production structure. Ideally, there should be 
horizontal and vertical linkages among them. Most importantly, each subsystem provides 
support for the other subsystem. The knowledge generation and diffusion subsystem is 
clearly dependent on the application and exploitation subsystem to provide the resources 
with which to function.  
Second, RSI studies are associated with an institutional aspect, whereas Asheim and 
Gertler (2005: 299) highlight the view of an RSI as “the institutional infrastructure 
supporting innovation within the production structure of a region”. Cooke et al. (1997) 
specify the institutional infrastructures that are crucial for an RSI. An RSI needs an 
effective infrastructure for learning and cooperation (productive culture), and financial 
sources for economic activities through which different players within the region can 
exchange knowledge, find collaboration partners, and obtain access to investment. In a 
later study (Cooke, 2001), the institutional dimension is redefined as cooperative culture, 
interactive learning, and associative consensus, while financial sources are discussed as a 
separate characteristic of RSI.  
Amin and Thrift (1995: 104) observed the differences between thin and thick institutional 
infrastructures. Institutionally thin RSI are usually to be found in less urbanized regions 
and are characterized by the dominance of SMEs with limited innovative capacity, lack of 
support organizations, and low level of agglomeration compared to thick regions. 
Institutionally thick regions, in comparison, are often located in metropolitan areas. Thick 
RSI tend to play a more significant role globally than thin RSI. Amin and Thrift (1995) 
emphasized several elements that indicate the institutional thickness of a region: a strong 
organizational infrastructure, high levels of interaction, a culture of collective 
representation, and shared norms and values that serve to constitute the social identity 
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of a particular locality. The institutional thickness of a particular region also influences the 
geography of the knowledge linkages, or in other words, how different regions engage in 
global, domestic, or regional networks. 
The institutional approach provides a wider scope for policy intervention because it is 
capable of establishing norms and rules that align with or coordinate the behaviour of the 
actors. Thus, institutional infrastructures play a key role in the RSI approach, where they 
are associated with historically grown professional competencies, shared cultural 
orientations, a prevalence of high levels of trust and collaborative practices, specific 
market structures, or even relatively autonomous regulatory institutions. All of these 
features are part of the perspective generally associated with the French ‘regulation’ 
school, which emphasises that the context in which economic structures emerge is deeply 
influenced by the surrounding institutions governing interactions; the market is only one 
of the institutions and is often the least important.  
In summary, the RSI approach suggests that the interactions among firms, research 
institutions, and national and regional policy actors are essential for understanding 
innovation. During the innovation process, economic actors do not act in isolation, as they 
jointly contribute to the production, diffusion, and use of knowledge. Innovation 
represents the true engine for structural change, with a direct influence on productivity 
improvements, and firms play a central role in both creating and diffusing innovation. It 
is the specific characteristics of a region, its specific assets and networks, and not only the 
economies of scale or endowments allowed by geography, that influence a region’s 
innovation performance. It needs to be stressed that the process of creation and 
strengthening of a ‘proper’ RSI does not cancel previously existing arrangements but 
rather empowers them with additional elements and interactions. 
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This poses several complex questions about how to change the reciprocal and often 
delicate relationships between autonomous actors. Because no actor alone can decisively 
influence the decision-making processes, coalitions of actors should be the main elements 
in an RSI. Hence, the focus is the ‘polycentrism’ of the regional policy process, as we 
discussed in the introductory chapter. Relations are not only the most important element 
of an RSI, but are also some of the most basic concepts in political science and public 
policy. A proper RSI results from the intersection of relations and illustrates the object of 
analysis of this thesis.    
  
2.2.2 Change of RSIs  
Having introduced the theoretical elements in the previous sub-section, we can see that 
the RSI literature provides a clear theory of heterogeneity and institutions but lacks a clear 
theory of change. This sub-section reviews several theories of change related to the RSI 
approach. 
Regarding the governance dimension of RSI, Cooke et al.’s (2004: 11-13) distinction 
between grassroots, networked, and dirigiste12, underlines the fact that a region could 
possibly belong simultaneously in more than one of these characteristic categories (see 
Figure 2-3). More precisely, for instance, it has been claimed that particular regions are 
moving from a dirigiste to a network or grassroots kind of RSI. In the dirigiste structure, 
firms are mainly connected by vertical supplier-customer relationships. Hassink (2001) 
and Cooke et al. (2004) employ the term dirigiste in their research about Korea. In a 
country operating with a high degree of dirigisme, central government regulations and 
                                                          
12  The French word dirigiste comprises the tradition of central state intervention in the 
economy in French historical development. Dirigiste was first used positively to denote 
internentionist state policy in the French Fourth (1946-1958) and early Firth Republics. 
However, it is now negatively used to indicate excessive intervention (Schmidt, 1996: 376-
377). 
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control are a significant part of current economies. This reflects a linear innovation 
concept, in which basic research, applied research, development, and production can still 
be decoupled, and system relations can be achieved with minimal regional cooperation. 
In contrast, a networked RSI is “more likely to occur when the institutional support 
encompasses local, regional, federal and supranational levels, and funding is often guided 
by agreements among banks, government agencies and firms” (Cooke, 2006: 8).  
 
Figure 2-3 Regional systems of innovation: typology and evolution 
 
 
Note: Arrow indicates direction of RSI movement 1995-2003. 
Sources: Cooke et al. (2004: 15).  
 
Similarly, Asheim and Gertler (2005: 300-303) developed the typology of RSI based on the 
links between the ‘institutional set-up’ and ‘patterns of knowledge production and 
production structure in regions’ using qualitative case studies. They distinguish between 
‘territorially embedded RSI’, ‘regional networked innovation systems’ and ‘regionalized 
RSI’.13 Tödtling and Trippl (2005) identify a typology based on three main barriers: lack of 
                                                          
13 Analytical factors are a) the extent to which they are internally and externally integrated: 
the location of knowledge organisations (locally or outside the region), b) the knowledge 
flow (interactive or more linear), and c) the stimulus for cooperation (geographical, social, 
and cultural proximity; planned, systematic networking; and the sharing of the same 
education and common experience by people). 
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organisational thinness (lack of relevant local actors due to low clustering and a weak 
endowment of relevant institutions), fragmentation (lack of interaction and networks), 
and lock-in effect (industrial specialisation in traditional industries and outdated 
technologies). They describe three types of regions in accordance with problem areas and 
regional innovation deficiencies: ‘peripheral region (organisational thinness)’, ‘old 
industrial regions (lock-in)’, and ‘fragmented metropolitan regions’ (Tödtling and Trippl, 
2005: 1209). Recently, in order to deal with this caveat and generate an RSI typology 
applicable to a broader number of regions, quantitative methods have also been used 
(Aguado et al., 2008; Muller et al., 2008; Navarro and Gibaja, 2009; Zygiaris, 2009; Ajmone 
Marsan and Maguire, 2011; Nauwelaers et al., 2013).  
According to typology studies in both methodologies, RSI may possess different 
knowledge bases and technological capabilities so their influences on knowledge flows 
crossing regions are different. Some regions are in a vertical network, in which national 
actors play a dominant role for knowledge interaction, while others are in more horizontal 
relationships. These typological studies can be summarized in the following points: 
different types of RSI can be identified based on the following points: first, the degree of 
interaction between actors is a dependent variable for a typology, and second, such 
different degrees of interaction are achieved through clustering.  
Furthermore, evolutionary economic geographers have the potential to explain more 
realistic and dynamic processes (Fuchs and Shapira, 2004; Iammarino, 2005; Journal of 
Economic Geography, 2007; Martin and Simmie 2008; Boschma and Frenken, 2009; 
Boschma and Martin, 2010; Cooke, 2012). Considering the economy as a dynamic, 
irreversible, and self-transformational system, evolutionary approaches are concerned 
with processes of adaptation, resilience, and changes in the system configurations. While 
some struggle with economic development, others are able to sustain or increase their 
competiveness. 
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Regional and local economic development is far from a smooth and incremental 
process but is subject to all sorts of interruptions and disruptions: periodic 
economic recession, the unpredictable rise of major competitors elsewhere, 
unexpected plant closures, the challenges arising from technological change and 
the like. (Simmie and Martin, 2010: 27) 
 
Fuchs and Shapira (2004) are not particularly interested in why regional economic 
activities remain stable, but rather consider why they change. According to them, actors’ 
behaviour is guided by regional conditions, and these conditions exist because of the 
constant confirmation in relations. They distinguish between two levels of regional 
change, namely, localized change and structural change. Localized change is “shaped and 
constrained by its past (structural inertia may cause lock-in), it is systemic and 
interdependent, it involves (interactive) learning, it is of an incremental, cumulative and 
localized nature, and it tends to flow certain trajectories (defined in technical, economic 
and spatial terms)” (Fuchs and Shapira, 2004: 251); however, structural change is more 
radical.   
Consequently, the process of transition involves dealing with structural change and 
complex interactions. The latter are characterized by various reinforcement mechanisms, 
which may be an important source of regional ‘path-dependency’ and lock-in.14 Martin 
and Simmie (2008: 186) argue that “new paths do not emerge in a vacuum, but always in 
the context of existing structures and paths of technology, industry and institutional 
arrangements”. Change can be seen as an evolutionary process, during which the system 
                                                          
14  The term ‘path-dependency’ is seen to either enable or constrain regional economic 
adaption in response to a shock and the development over time. In the presence of bounded 
rationality, an actor’s behaviour is guided by the routines through which they create, and 
adapt to, novelty through learning. Routines can be understood as decision rules or as 
regular and predictable behavioural patterns (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 17-18). The way 
these evolutionary trajectories unfold would therefore be path dependent. Sub-national 
entities and path-dependence are therefore clearly linked. ‘Path’ refers to an actor or group 
of actors’ previous behaviour and repertoire of routines and how these constrain the 
actor/group’s future. Path-dependency, therefore, refers to the function of a region’s 
current position, the history of the strategic decisions it has taken, and the strategic 
alternatives in the future.  
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sustains its adaptive capacity. The evolution of socioeconomic systems entails trend 
breaks, cycles, moments of instability and discontinuity, and qualitative change. As 
Boschma and Martin (2007: 545) note, “Path dependent processes have a quintessential 
‘place-dependent’ character, so that it is not simply a case of arguing that path 
dependence produces places, but equally that places produce path dependence.” In 
addition, the emergence of the new industrial activities is stimulated or enabled “by pre-
existing resources, competence, skills and experiences inherited from previous regional 
paths and patterns of economic development” (Simmie and Martin, 2010: 6). Lock-in of a 
dominant technology explains why it may be very difficult to alter the structure of a 
system and the direction in which changes in the system are unfolding. 
A limitation of previous theories to change is their analytical focus on the aggregate above 
the regional level of pre-existing actors and dominant interactions. At the regional level, 
however, there are many change processes that are worthy of further consideration. 
These include the entry and exit of actors, changes in the types of products and services 
firms in the region produce as well as changes in the type of inputs they require, and the 
changing supply of labour with different education profiles, skills, and competences. 
These intra-regional change processes may suggest that overall changes in the RSI are 
regional in scope. In this context, the balance of power between central and regional 
actors may appear rather abstract. However, it is precisely because of the importance of 
change within the region that the balance of power between the state and the region may 
matter because, at its heart, the challenge of improving the RSI may improve the 
capability of firms, universities, and other actors, and many decisions regarding these 
capabilities are taken at a local level.   
It can be concluded that analysing change in RSI requires a consideration of non-economic 
factors. For example, as Dunford (1998) underlines, economic circumstance cannot be 
created simply by policy or law. The change to a new process depends on several other 
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parameters that are not the same among different countries or even within a state. These 
differences arise because of differences in the previous regime’s nature; structural 
adjustment processes in regions and the capacities, both present and future, of 
institutional arrangements.  
In the emergence of such a regional development regime, power relationships are 
involved in balancing the contradictory demands of regional learning processes 
(Heidenreich, 2005: 743). More specifically, concerning changes in RSI, two diverging 
arguments may exist on relations regarding the change process. On the one hand, low 
conflict or tension among actors facilitates the change process. A widespread agreement 
on goals and the way a policy output should be designed facilitates the common 
elaboration of important changes in the respective policy. Converging preferences alone 
might not be sufficient, but on a basic level, they allow change to occur. If, on the other 
hand, actors are in conflict about the problem definition or the best policy output for the 
solution of a problem, it is probable that the policy output will be the lowest common 
denominator solution and one that is close to the status quo. Conflict over policy goals 
and design stimulates the search for new solutions and therefore may support more 
fundamental change. Hence, conflictual relations have the potential to lead to rapid shifts 
in policy outputs or sustained deadlock, whereas consensual networks foster the status 
quo. The reasoning behind this argument is that a low level of conflict means that most 
actors agree with the existing policy. Therefore, there is a high chance that the actors will 
simply renew the existing path.  
Before proceeding to articulate the conceptual framework employed in this thesis for 
examining RSI change, it is useful to look at the literature on the political economy of 
South Korea with a particular focus on the articulation of the nation state and regional 
relations (Rhodes, 1981). Regional development and industrial policies cannot be linked 
solely with national factors and nor can they be separated from the global context (Hettne, 
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1999: 2). It is evident from the political economy literature that the political dimension 
plays an important role, particularly in the context of capitalism in South Korea, as is 
illustrated in the next section.  
 
 
2.3 Political perspective of economic development in South Korea  
There are two broad views of South Korea’s economic development for the purposes of 
this thesis. The first is that South Korea was able to develop successfully because it 
pursued market-oriented policies, such as free trade, with interventions by the 
government being largely irrelevant to the sources of success, which are attributed to 
firms. According to this explanation, South Korea encountered a crisis because of the 
immature state of capitalism in the country, including collusion between politicians and 
the business sector. The second explanation is that active state intervention was the cause 
of economic growth but that crises were precipitated by the liberalization of the market 
and the relaxation of regulations. This is referred to as a theoretical debate about East 
Asian development.  
 
2.3.1 The East Asia development  
As was mentioned in the introductory chapter, South Korea was initially discussed in 
terms of a centrally planned economy. It is closely tied to a larger consideration of the 
politics as an object of research, which emerged within the work of a number of influential 
economists and political scientists (Johnson, 1982; Zysman, 1983; Cumings, 1987; Amsden, 
1989; Wade, 1990; Woo-Cumings, 1999; Kong, 2000; Pirie, 2008; Hundt, 2009).  
A defining characteristic of the economy in South Korea is the high degree of state 
intervention in the economy, exemplified through terms such as “governed markets” 
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(Wade, 1990), “governed interdependence” (Weiss and Hobson, 1995), “embedded 
autonomy” (Evans, 1995), “newly industrial countries (NICs)” (Pack and Westphal, 1986; 
Balassa and Williamson, 1987), “bureaucratic authoritarian industrializing regimes” 
(Cumings, 1987:81), “crony capitalism” (Kang, 2001), “catching-up”15 (Hobday, 1995; Kim 
Linsu, 1997; Kim Linsu and Nelson, 2000; Fagerberg and Godinho, 2005), “neo-
Schumpeterian contribution” (Freeman and Perez, 1988; Malerba and Nelson, 2007), and 
“Korea Inc.” (Shin Jang-Sup and Chang Ha-Joon, 2003; Lee Sook-Jong and Han Taejoon, 
2006).  
Although employing different terminologies, the above authors portray development as 
a process in which in East Asia, the state had been an important actor during the post-
WWII period (Skocpol, 1979; Evans et al., 1985).16  The state is portrayed as ubiquitous in 
both the economy and society, and as being penetrating, comprehensive, highly 
articulated, and autonomous of particular groups and classes. According to Johnson, rapid 
growth in South Korea has been due mainly to the adoption of a degree of government 
authoritarianism based on the example of Japan (Johnson, 1987: 143). Johnson’s central 
contention is that much of South Korea’s industrial development between the 1960s and 
1980s was achieved due to the role of the state’s leadership in the process. South Korea 
has adopted the interventionist style of the Japanese state in 1930s and 1950s, but it takes 
a more direct role in the market. The role for central government is facilitated by a strong 
                                                          
15 The point technology-oriented views make is that South Korea had further established and 
upgraded capabilities before moving toward more marketization since the mid-1980s. 
Scholars argue that technology developments in Korea seem to follow a “reverse order” of 
the A-U model (Utterback and Abernathy, 1975), a model of acquisition, assimilation, and 
improvement (Kim Linsu, 1997), as it started by obtaining mature technology from 
developed countries. Hobday (1995) confirms this general reversal process at firm-level as 
follows: assembly skills, incremental process changes for quality and speed, full production 
skills, R&D for products and processes, and competitive R&D capabilities. This process is 
analysed in terms of interacting technology and market transition from OEM, to ODM and 
OBM.  
16 Some studies (Chang Ha-Joon, 2002, 2006) emphasise that the government’s role in East 
Asia need not suggest that it was unimportant elsewhere. 
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public-private agreement on what is beneficial for the country and by a widespread 
nationalist brand of team spirit (Johnson, 1987: 144). The core argument is that a late-
industrializing economy should be a developmental state with the government 
intervening in economic activities to resolve various problems at the nascent stage of 
development (Johnson, 1987: 145). Johnson’s interpretation has been widely accepted, 
and many of the studies that have employed the mainstream economic standpoint define 
South Korea as a state-led economy, although regime categorization has been used at 
times. 
Evans’s (1995) analysis of late development in South Korea is a notable articulation of the 
state-led development thesis, as he considers that “embedded autonomy” is 
accompanied by the development of close relationships between central government and 
major firms (Evans, 1995: 49). He argues that the state could be embedded in societal 
interests but in such a way as to also secure them a guaranteed high degree of autonomy. 
The close relationship between bureaucrats and the private sector has been an aspect of 
the state’s ability to control and co-ordinate the private sector with the aim of achieving 
growth (Evans, 1995: 12).  One of the key elements of the relationship has been the capital 
(often as credit) that the state had available and that it could use to invest selectively and 
strategically in sectors in a capital-scarce environment (Evans, 1995: 53). Central 
government picked specific sectors, such as semi-conductors, automobiles, and 
telecommunications, and specific private players, such as Samsung, Hyundai, LG, and SK 
(so-called Chaebol 17 ), that is, multi-national corporations, were appointed as South 
Korea’s engines in the global economy. The government constructed Chaebol through a 
                                                          
17 Etymologically, the term Chaebol comes from the roots chae, meaning wealth, and bol, 
meaning clan or faction. The four largest chaebols (Samsung, Hyundai, LG, and SK) are strong 
in a wide range of activities, including automobiles, shipping, banking, tourism, and life 
insurance. For example, SK is composed of 92 subsidiary and affiliate companies (e.g., SK 
Global, SK Chemical, SKC and SK Hynix) that share the SK brand and culture (Jang Sea-Jin, 
2003: 168).  
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series of government-forced mergers.18 When Chaebol lacked capital, the government 
financed them through guaranteed domestic market. When Chaebol were deficient in 
technology capability, public research institutions helped them (Jang Sae-Jin, 2003). In a 
similar vein, Cumings (1987: 71) describes the “bureaucratic authoritarian industrializing 
regimes” of South Korea and Taiwan. The state is ubiquitous in both the economy and 
society, penetrating, comprehensive, highly articulated, and autonomous of particular 
groups and classes.  
In contrast, Chang Ha-Joon (2002: 1-6) argues that the state-led economy is not a 
particular response that happened in specific historical contexts in East Asia, but instead 
is a universal feature common to all successful economies at an early stage of their 
industrialisation, including western countries, currently hailed by liberal market advocates 
as a paragon of success. 
While the political economy in South Korea historically is thus relatively unambiguous, 
there is little agreement on what type of capitalism it should be classified as having today. 
There were important reforms in the 1990s, which were aimed at devolution as well as a 
neo-liberal economy (Hill et al., 2012: 4). The reform objective became to simplify the 
public administration. In addition, hierarchical governance lost some of its attraction in 
the 2000s when the market governance movement and new public management (NPM) 
became the focus of reform.   
While recent debate has discussed the phenomena associated with the withdrawal of the 
state as a ‘director’ of products, this decline in direct state intervention has been matched 
by an increase in the state’s indirect influence via growth in the regulatory apparatus. The 
                                                          
18 For instance, Hyundai Mipo Dockyad (HMD) is now one of the biggest shipbuilders in the 
world. The government was much involved in Hyeonai’s shipbuilding industry in 1975 (for 
further details, see Jones and Sakong, 1980). See also ‘The Chaebol conundrum’ (The 
Economist, 31 March 2010) or ‘Heavy metal: life at the world’s largest shipyard (BBC news, 
30 May, 2015). 
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nature of these transitions nevertheless has conformed to existing institutional traditions 
that have tended to preserve power for the status quo. What are these existing traditions, 
and how have existing directors implemented rules that enhance, rather than hinder, 
competitiveness? 
 
2.3.2 Varieties of Capitalism perspective 
The above questions have emerged among political scientists working on the transition of 
political economies. Scholars have started to ask whether transition has led to multiple 
varieties of capitalism (Amable, 2003; Boyer, 2004; Coates, 2005; Schneider and 
Paunescu, 2012).19 Particularly, this debate is mostly inspired by the seminal volume on 
varieties of capitalism edited by Hall and Soskice (2009). Their perspective argues that 
there is a deep web of intertwined government institutions that have been shaped over 
decades and centuries by each individual country's culture. 
The perspective goes beyond developmental state studies in examining the several 
domains underlying the variation between types of capitalism. The perspective of the 
varieties of capitalism can be characterized as a firm-centric and institutional approach to 
capitalism (Hancké, 2009). It views firms as the main actors of a capitalist system, and the 
main goal is to understand how institutions shape their operations (Hall and Soskice, 
2001: 6). It focuses on firms’ activities in four domains, namely, 1) industrial relations, 2) 
corporate governance, 3) education and training, and 4) inter-firm relations as crucial to 
understand the competitiveness of a particular economy. A great strength of the varieties 
                                                          
19 For example, Boyer (2004) proposes four types of capitalism by highlighting how countries 
use a variety of regulatory institutions to deal with the instability of capitalism: state 
capitalism, meso-corporatist capitalism, social-partner capitalism, and market capitalism. In 
addition, Amable (2003), who performed a strictly quantitative and open outcome analysis 
with a wide range of statistical indicators, offers five regime types: Liberal, Social democratic, 
Asian, Mediterranean, and Continental European. 
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of capitalism literature is that it specifies the institutional components of economic 
systems and their interdependencies.  
This perspective suggests that activities can be managed in two ways: market 
coordination or strategic coordination. Market coordination means that key relationships 
are managed by means of market transactions and formal contracts. In contrast, strategic 
coordination implies that firms rely more heavily on long-term negotiated relationships 
and implicit contracts with workers, creditors, and suppliers. As a result of synergies 
between activities or “institutional complementarities”, a particular mode of coordination 
tends to be predominant in any given economy. Firms rely on market coordination in 
liberal market economies and on strategic coordination in coordinated market economies 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001: 27). 
In specific, in liberal market economies (LMEs), industrial relations are decentralized and 
individualized. Both employers’ associations and trade unions tend to be relatively weak. 
If there is any collective bargaining, it typically occurs at the firm level. Corporate 
governance is based primarily on the discipline imposed by stock markets, which means 
that firms seek to maximize shareholder value in order to maintain the confidence of 
footloose investors. Institutions are associated with a comparative advantage in rapid 
innovation, including new medical and information technologies. The key examples of 
liberal market economies in the OECD include the US, the UK, Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand.  
In contrast, in coordinated market economies (CMEs), where strategic coordination 
predominates, corporatist collective bargaining or negotiated agreements tend to play an 
important role. Corporate governance is based on long-term relationships between firms 
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and creditors, who provide “patient capital”,20 that is, credit on a long-term basis, which 
also enables them to exercise a voice rather than just exist, as many portfolio investors 
holding shares might do in times of crisis. Given the emphasis on long-termism, workers 
are also more willing to invest in firm- or industry-specific skills, which are insured by a 
generous welfare state in the case of redundancies or the obsolescence of these skills. 
Such long-termism is also viewed as being associated with a comparative institutional 
advantage in skill-intensive manufacturing and sectors characterized by incremental 
innovation, such as the car industry. Examples of coordinated economies include 
Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, and the Nordic countries. In Central and Eastern 
Europe, Slovenia has been classified as a coordinated market economy as well (Crowley 
and Stanojevic, 2001; Feldmann, 2006). 
Moreover South Korea specifically, the crucial point is that even though each of these 
varieties of modern capitalism has analysed capitalist diversity from a distinct angle and 
has identified a different number of regime types, there is no consensus in the literature 
about whether the case of South Korea should be classified as a LME or as a CME (Lee Soo 
Hee and Yoo Taeyoung, 2007; Carney et al., 2009; Steier, 2009; Terjesen and Hessels, 
2009; Carney, 2015).  
Increasing numbers of scholars have in recent years highlighted the existence of a third 
variety of capitalism as one in which the state plays a crucial role. While Witt (2012) and 
Witt and Redding (2013) sees South Korea as “plutocratic state-led capitalism” rather than 
as a CME, Thiberghien (2007) calls it an “entrepreneurial state” along with France and 
Japan. Schneider and Paunescu (2012) identifies a “hybrid economies” of capitalism 
associated with Japan and Norway.  
                                                          
20 The classic example of such creditors who provide patient capital and exercise influence on 
firm governance are the traditional “Hausbanken” of German and the “main bank” of Japan 
(Smith and Walter, 1993: 44).  
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Kang (2001, 2002) proposes the term “crony capitalism” to indicate that South Korea had 
neither a more autonomous or coherent state and nor was it subject to any less corruption 
but that corruption had different effects on development. While cronyism can be viewed 
as a species of “rent seeking”, not all rent seeking is based on cronyism. In Kang’s view, 
the term ‘cronyism’ is rarely defined formally, but it is understood as referring to a pattern 
of business-government relations in which select business people who are very close to 
key policymakers receive highly preferential treatment that enables them to capture 
spectacular profits – even to the point that they dominate the corporate landscape. Kil 
Soong-Hoom and Moon Chung-In’s (2001) description of South Korea’s growth as 
“mercantilist” signifies that the state model is now being reviewed in relation to the 
regime model. They observe that the South Korean industrialization pattern was 
determined by a reformist leadership of a strong neo-mercantilist state. In other words, 
a powerful government was imperative to promote the preconditions of economic 
growth, such as trade liberalization, land reform, and the efficient distribution of limited 
resources, and South Korea’s peculiar presence in East Asia and being under a neo-liberal 
hegemony helped to meet these requirements. As such crony capitalism, or mercantilist 
does not feature in the literature as a varieties of capitalism.  
At another nation-state level of analysis, Park Hun Joo (2002, 2004) provides a competing 
explanation that better captures why South Korea has gone through different types of 
capitalism that have led the country to maintain widely different industrial structures. He 
characterises South Korea as ‘diseased dirigisme’ and points out that a different form of 
deficient government intervention continued after democratisation. Taking a political 
perspective, he emphasises that dirigisme as a way of policy making and implementation 
is not, in and of itself, a problem, but the nature of dirigisme that the Korean authorities 
chose to practise (lopsided power structure and dirigiste institutional context) was a 
problem.   
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South Korean economy traverses the boundaries of Varieties of Capiltalism’s dichotomy 
of liberal and coordinated economies. While the coordinated form is also characterized 
by intensive ex-market interaction between corporation and state, the normative 
egalitarian orientation and extensive institutionalized mechanisms for inter-constituent 
bargaining found within the German system bear but little resemblance to the admixtures 
of meritocratic principles, and bureaucratic controls and economic incentives that 
characterize South Korea’s political economy.  
Some approaches may help to understand emergence and transition of South Korea. 
Schmidt (2009), for instance, argues that France cannot and should not be considered as 
CMEs because of a number of political characteristics they retain. Culpepper et al. (2006) 
and their contributors tackle the difficult task of highlighting and explaining the multiple 
changes that have taken place in France in the past two decade. They have the long term 
understanding the profound changes that have taken place in the French political 
economy in the quarter century since the election of Mitterrand and the arrival of the Left 
in government.  
Thus, South Korea’s political economy is at the stages of emergence and transition and 
does not easily fit into binary approach because the bureaucratic capacity essential to the 
operation of a CME is not easily developed. Nationalist leaders have articulated an 
ambitious developmental rhetoric that has often exceeded their bureaucratic capacity, 
consequently hampering industrialization due to an administrative capacity constraint.  
 
 
2.4 The strategic relational perspective and a conceptual scheme  
Arguably, a problem in the RSI approach is that it does not address the fundamental cause 
of such political relations. It is necessary to understand the political dimension, which 
 47 
 
reveals not only the inherent potential for conflict that exists in RSI, but also how power 
is embedded in the relationships. In the analytical framework employed in this thesis, we 
will consider how political relations are involved in the practice and analysis of change of 
RSI.  
Increasingly, the relationship between state and regions (or between state and firms) is a 
communicative process based on dialogue, argument, negotiation, and persuasion, rather 
than a technocratic or information-driven process. Thus, it is to questions of discourse and 
power that we turn as part of further consideration of how studies in the literature have 
conceptualized power to date. This has been of key interest to political scientists, who 
have invested substantial effort in showing how power and conflict affect decision making. 
This section argues for the relevance of power as a relational concept and for the utility 
of the strategic relational perspective formulated by Hay and Jessop as an analytical tool 
in RSI.  
 
2.4.1 Relational concept of power  
What are power and relation analytically and conceptually? This question has long been 
debated in social science, especially in the fields of politics (Riker, 1964; Schott, 1984) and 
sociology (Lukes, 1974; Clegg, 1989; Haugaard, 2002). However, conceptions of power 
based on relations are a relatively recent trend in political analysis.  
This thesis examines power as a relational attribute and a relational effect of social 
interaction. This aspect of power is heavily influenced by the work of Poulantzas, Foucault, 
and Gramsci, each of whom points to the ways in which power is not always something 
that can be held and deployed in a hierarchical sense. Rather, power emerges through 
social and economic activities, which construct power where it might not already exist. 
 48 
 
Recently, the political literature on state and governance has tended to draw more heavily 
on the relational state theory developed in the work of Jessop.  
Jessop (1990: 160) comments that power is “a form-determined social relation”. This 
means that we must consider not only the distinctive institutional form of the politics but 
also how the balance of political forces is determined by factors located beyond political 
relationships. Power is the site of strategies insofar as “a given state form, a given form of 
regime, will be more accessible to some forces than others according to the strategies 
they adopt to gain state power” and the nation state operates as “the site, generator and 
the product of strategies” (Jessop, 1990: 260). The state is the generator of strategies 
because it may play an essential role in enabling societal forces to mobilize particular 
accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects. The state is the product of strategies 
because its own organizational structures and modes of socio-economic intervention are 
inherited from earlier political strategies (Jessop, 1990: 261). 
Hay (1995) outlines a more analytical conception of power while unfolding the dialectical 
interplay of actors. Power is not concentrated in and possessed by solely one actor or 
organization over another; rather, it is experienced through the capacity of actors to 
“have an effect upon the structures which set contexts and define the range of 
possibilities of others” (Hay, 1995: 191). Hay assumes that power is about achieving policy 
goals on the basis of organizational resources and perceptions about outcomes. 
Thus, power can be understood not as being subsumed exclusively into zero-sum games 
but as involving the achievement of collective targets. Relations, then, among actors who 
possess resources and develop actions, are seen through the lenses of strategic 
orientations, institutional properties, and policy discourses. 
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2.4.2 Strategic relational perspective in RSI   
Power deals within RSI indicate a growing acknowledgement that central government’s 
leadership in process of policy development is not uncommon, and such politics can play 
an important role in shaping such policy process. Our study examines RSI from the political 
perspective formulated by Hay and Jessop.21 Both scholars developed a political approach 
that helps decompose the processes of policy making, in which structural contexts, actors’ 
interests and strategic choices, and various forms of interaction between those actors are 
embedded.  
They define their approach as a strategic-relational perspective, whereby “the complex 
form of the state as an institutional ensemble shapes and conditions the whole political 
process. But it also directs attention to the differential condition of the various forces 
engaged in struggle within, as well as outside the state and to the diverse structural and 
conjectural factors that determine their relative weight” (Jessop, 1990: 49). This 
perspective is based on a dialectical interpretation of the relations. It outlines the 
conception of power relations while unfolding the dialectical interplay of strategic actors 
(Hay, 2002: 126).  
The framework of the strategic-relational approach builds on both the critical realism and 
the structuration theory of the interconnectedness of structure and agency, and aims to 
go beyond a more dualist perception of structure and agency (Jessop, 2008: 42). By re-
formulating Giddens’ (1984) structuration theory and Bhaskar’s (1989) critical realism, 
and the related concepts of structure and agency, the strategic-relational approach tries 
to understand the relationship between “structures” and “agency” (or conduct), and sees 
this as a dialectical relationship (Hay, 2002: 127).  
                                                          
21 Hay (1995; 2002), Jessop (1990, 2008) and Hay and Jessop (1995).  
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“Structure” refers to context and to the fact that institutions, practices, and routines 
appear to show some regularity or structure over time. “Agency” implies not only political 
action or conduct, but also a sense of free will, linked to concepts such as reflexivity, 
rationality, and motivation. Jessop and Hay aim to bring agency into structure – producing 
a “structured context” – and to bring structure into agency – producing a “contextualised 
actor” or “situated agent” (Hay, 2002: 94-96). This “structured context” is also explained 
as being a “strategically selective environment”, which favours certain strategies over 
others. Moreover, “strategy”, in the sense of “intentional conduct oriented towards the 
environment in which it is to occur […] the intention to realize certain outcomes and 
objectives which motivate action” (Hay, 2002: 129), is thus a central concept to the 
approach. 
With the outcome of this interaction being considered recursively contingent from the 
perspectives of both structure and agency, the concept of strategy makes possible the 
identification of power in different behavioural patterns (Hay, 2002: 131). It can be either 
the crude display of direct coercive power, where certain actors get other actors to 
behave in a particular manner, or to provide a more positive exercise of power. In the 
latter case, actors assess both the potential effects of various strategies and the capacities 
of other actors to outline a more effective course of action.  
Change arises out of the dialectical interaction between strategic conduct and strategic 
context (Hay, 2002: 127). It is about the capacity of actors to shape their environment and 
about the ability of actors to make a difference. Both contextual and agential factors are 
central to explanations about social and political change, which is reflected in the design 
of this study. Actors face an uneven distribution of opportunities and constraints in their 
contexts; thus the different forms of access to strategic resources (e.g. human and 
financial capital) may be a significant determinant of the capacity of actors to realise 
opportunities. Agents acting in a routine manner are more likely to reproduce existing 
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structures of social and political relations over time, while actors that resist norms and 
conventions will most probably transform existing institutions and practices (Hay, 2002: 
166; Jessop, 2008: 133). Particularly, during moments of political economic change, “new 
initiatives” are important and interesting to analyse because of their potential political 
impact. 
When applying the strategic relational approach to our study, we should see regional 
policy actors as strategic actors that act according to their reflexivity, rationality, and 
motivations, and that are embedded in a strategically selective context that creates both 
opportunities for and constraints to a region’s level of agency. The strategic-relational 
approach offers a useful lens through which to analyse the political process of policy 
making. This approach, reflecting the dialectic of structure and strategy, theorizes the 
regional development as form-determined social relations or the materialized cohesion 
of power relations, rather than reducing it to an apparatus of class domination or a neutral 
mediator.   
The scope of regional policy has evolved from taking a delegated role in national industrial 
policy, that is, the setting of an institutional framework, to a very ambitious list of possible 
contributions for devolved provincial government. In terms of political expectations, the 
decentralisation of power has variously been seen as having the potential to increase 
political participation (Maki, 2006), improve accountability (Seabright, 1996), offer policy 
innovation (Galle and Leahy, 2009), improve democratic stability and address democratic 
deficits (Faguet, 2011), and reduce the incidence of human rights abuse (Thede, 2011). 
Specifically in line with these expectations, provincial government has been given 
increased RSI-related responsibilities for the implementation of regional industrial 
support programmes, research grants, training, and a variety of industrial development 
funding. 
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From a strategic relational perspective, we can view provincial governments as active 
subjects who have a choice and can develop their own strategies. Using the strategic-
relational approach’s terminology, regional actors are knowledgeable and reflexive 
individuals who monitor the outcomes of their actions. These outcomes can be effects 
producing either a transformation of what Jessop calls the structured context or strategic 
learning on the part of regional actors, thus raising awareness of the opportunities and 
obstacles of the structured context and informing possible future strategic actions. These 
relationships and effects are illustrated in the adapted version of Hay’s framework, which 
is presented in the next sub-section. 
 
2.4.3 A conceptual scheme  
The literature reviewed in the previous sections regarding the relational constitution of 
power and the role of such relational power in RSI suggests an analytical framework that 
is adapted from the strategic-relational approach developed by Hay (2002) and Jessop 
(2008). As shown at the lower left of Figure 2-4, understanding and explaining structural 
factors or the context of the governance of regional development and industrial policy is 
the core aim of Chapters 4 and 5, while understanding agential factors or regional actors 
as strategic actors is taken up in Chapter 6. Two arrows show the influence of both the 
structural and agential factors on a region’s agency. Chapters 6 and 7 then combine all of 
these insights and examine the formulation of strategies as well as the strategic action for 
or against change that, in turn, will contribute to processes of RSI change, as is shown on 
the right-hand side of the figure. Considering the developing nature of current RSI in the 
context of new industrial policies, it is perhaps too early to make any definitive statement 
about the effect of these strategic actions, which is why these boxes and arrows have 
dotted lines.      
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Figure 2-4 A conceptual scheme 
 
 
Sources: adapted from Hay (2002: 131) 
 
The conceptual scheme utilizes a political economy approach based on the concepts of 
structures, actors, and dynamics, and on how they interact to produce tension and conflict. 
The analysis of the structures emphasizes the long-term factors underlying conflicts, while 
the analysis of actors focuses on the shorter-term incentives and interests among key 
players that may produce violent conflict. Finally, ‘dynamics’ refers to institutions, 
processes, and the interplay between long-term trends and short-term triggers that may 
lead to escalation of the conflict.  
Regional development and industrial policy are produced in an interaction between the 
actor’s own strategy and context. Because actors are understood to be goal oriented, they 
must take the goals of others into account, too. The only way to really understand actors 
and their interactions is to analyse them in relation to their proper context. Context 
always exists in relation to something, which suggests that both internal preferences and 
external constraints are at play most of the time. Therefore, we need to focus on the 
interaction between constraints and preferences. 
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2.5 Summary 
This chapter has discussed the theoretical perspectives that would explain regional 
economic development and political relations. The literature regarding the notions of RSI 
and of political economy provides several considerations about the key concept of 
regional economic development. The strategic-relational perspective has offered useful 
insights into the process of creating collective resources and has highlighted areas for 
further research to contribute to the RSI literature. Despite the numerous different 
approaches that emphasise particular aspects of the concept, the understanding of the 
regional level can be summarised in two points.  
First, an RSI is an active process that enables the various actors to negotiate power and 
have a conversation. Politics frames the region as another active actor that takes part in 
the negotiation of industrial development policies. Such a view of the region has two 
major implications. One is that the political stances, beliefs, and prejudices of the regional 
actors are inescapably woven into the RSI; such an acknowledgement helps us to put a 
critical distance between regional actors and the RSI. Another implication is that the 
regional actors are viewed as another actor in the power mesh and not as a teleological 
creator of the RSI. This implication is crucial because it does not pin the onus of 
responsibility for the RSI solely onto one set of actors, and it acknowledges the influence 
of other actors as active and volitional players.  
Second, the power perspective would help to view the mundane activities of interactions 
as an active negotiation of power rather than as just another step in a task sequence. 
From the strategic-relational perspective, regions are active agents rather than passive 
external parts of an RSI. This shift in attitude helps us to reconceptualise not only the 
regions but also the role that the regions play in power relations. Viewing the actor not 
just as oppressed entities but also as political agents who constantly negotiate for power, 
helps us to gain a nuanced perspective, which might otherwise be lost. While a traditional 
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view of power as just constraining and repressing would have discarded emergent 
behaviours as anomalous and errant, the relational approach helps us to account for 
emergent relationships and behaviours as a constant performance and contestation of 
power relations in the RSI amongst the various actors.  
Having already presented the conceptualization of RSI as well as politics in western 
countries, that is, mainly Europe, the main theoretical challenge concerning the study of 
the policies of regional industrial development in South Korea is whether this theorising 
of regional changes is actually related to the East Asian experiences. 
Interdisciplinary theoretical perspectives can contribute both to an understanding of the 
actors play in the dynamic change and to an analysis of the conditions that determine 
both their participation and the strategic choices they face to further their objectives. The 
empirical chapters will demonstrate that these perspectives help us to gain a better 
understanding of the mechanisms through which spatially concentrated demands for 
regional autonomy influence the shape of the industrial policy.  
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3 Research design and selection of case  
It is important that we are able to establish an appropriate fit between the research 
questions asked in Chapter 1 and the research method proposed in this chapter. It is 
suggested in this chapter that a qualitative case study allows rich findings to emerge from 
the data and to combine relevant literature without being limited to a certain ‘school’, 
and hence it can more completely reveal the processes that are unfolding in the central 
and regional interactions about development processes and goals and that are expected 
to uncover the ‘gap’ between the existing literature and the practices revealed by the 
studied case.  
Several research strategies were considered initially regarding reliability to ascertain how 
their strengths and weakness might best help to address the stated research questions. 
The need to follow processes more closely meant that a research strategy involving close 
proximity to these processes was desirable. Since few of the processes considered are 
codified in minutes, transcripts, or other documentary material, direct interaction with 
the participants was found to be necessary.  
In order to gain appropriate access to these participants, the only practical approach was 
for the researcher to actively participate, and becoming a participant provided an 
appropriate status from which to observe the processes under study and to interact with 
the actors in these processes for the purpose for this research. Thus, a participant 
observer-based research design was selected; this was to be complemented by interviews 
in order to construct a case study. The following sections elaborate upon the logic of this 
research design and explain its implementation. 
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3.1 Methodological approach 
The most basic and formal distinction in any research design is between extensive (e.g. 
questionnaires, surveys, and statistical analysis) and intensive approaches (e.g. case study 
and ethnography) (Sayer, 1992: 243; Clifford and Valentine, 2003: 10-12). On the one 
hand, the distinctive characteristic of an extensive approach is the different concerns 
about the relationship between observations and the ability to produce generalisations 
based on these observations. On the other hand, in an intensive research design, the 
causes are elucidated through in-depth examination and interpretation, whilst in 
extensive research, repeated studies or large samples produce representative 
generalisations. The two approaches can be separated to a certain degree according to 
their philosophical underpinnings and their practical requirements.  
This study follows an intensive approach, as it provides a full understanding of the ways 
that industrial policy, regional development policy, and political relations have been 
articulated within particular socio-political circumstances. The use of the extensive 
approach (quantitative method and statistical data) can capture changes in production 
processes and various inputs and outputs, but researchers should not rely on such 
approaches to tell them the whole story because significant changes may be taking place 
that are not readily observable and that would certainly elude a quantitative method of 
research. These are changes in actors’ behaviours and the rich interactions of others’ 
responses. The dynamics of change are created by activity, as feedback amplifies and 
reverberates across the web of the actors. A single-loop process may be easily identified, 
but a double-loop process is not so readily detected, especially if quantitative methods 
are employed. We need to examine flows of initiatives, responses, tensions, and conflicts, 
to look for flows of new initiatives and for flows of ideas practice. All these flows indicate 
the presence of deep and significant processes.  
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This thesis seeks to contribute to understanding and explanation of change of RSI, 
focusing on power relations in South Korea and historically conditioned context. By 
investigating power relations, this study can still conclude whether there are indeed 
important change dynamics in the case study.  
A single case study method was chosen to scrutinize the region with regard to the 
propositions concerning the innovation activities of dynamics. The strength of the single 
case study is the systematic exploration of one case through identifying patterns and 
reoccurrences. According to George and Bennett (2005: 8), “interest in theory-oriented 
case studies has increased substantially in recent years”. George and Bannett (2005: 17) 
defins a case study as “the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to 
develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events.” George 
and Bannett (2005: 32-33) argue that “several kinds of no-variance research designs can 
be quite useful in theory development and tesing using multifle observation from a single 
case”.   
Yin and Flyvbjerg, particularly, considered single case study. In Yin’s point of view, the 
single case study is suitable when dealing with a critical, common, revelatory, extreme, or 
longitudinal case (Yin, 2003: 51-53). Single case study specialises in researching deeply 
and intensively into one or a small group of subjects, exploring and understanding as 
much as possible about the specific subject. The strength of the single case study is its 
almost microscopic attention to detail of the case which allows for greater understanding 
of relations. Flyvbjerg (2011: 311) argues that it should not be essential and worthwhile 
for scholars to aim towards a summary and generalization of their studies, because a 
narrative case can also be meaningful for scientific disciplines and practitioners. 
As a research design, one of the main advantage of the case study approach is that it 
offers the opportunity to study a single unit in great depth and simultaneously explore 
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generalizable inferences that apply to a largest set of units. Gerring (2004: 348) argues 
that well-established case studies can identify causal mechanisms that “allow one to peer 
into the box of causality to the intermediate causes lying between some cause and its 
purposrted effect”. Thus, a ‘thick’ single case study has been conducted in order to 
contribute empirical findings to the theory (Yin, 2003: 47) and theory development 
(Eisenhardt, 1989: 534).  
Another important channel of information gathering was through events such as 
conferences, workshops, seminars, and other related events. These provided 
opportunities to meet delegates and to observe tensions or conflicts from a position 
approximating as closely as possible to the subjects of this study (Kawulich, 2005). The 
method combines “participation in the lives of the people being studied with maintenance 
of a professional distance that allows adequate observation and recording of data” 
(Fetterman, 1998:34-35). The method needed to be intensive to help probe deeply rather 
than superficially into how actors interact; it also needed to be flexible to allow a varied 
use of methods for data collection, and so it helps to explain how key actors interact from 
a study of a specific innovation process. These objectives led to the suitability and choice 
of participant observation as the primary research method (Gray, 2004:241-243; Burnham 
et al., 2004:221).    
Although participant observation is a unique and underused technique for gathering data 
in research, it does pose problems for the researcher. The role to adopt during fieldwork 
and the extent to which participants are fully informed are somewhat intertwined. Social 
scientists have created a classical typology of the researcher’s role (Gold, 1958; Gill and 
Johnson, 2002): complete participant, participant observer, observer as participant, and 
complete observer. As an observer, we have only minimal involvement in the activities of 
the regional actor being studied. There is a small connection to the actions, but an 
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observer is not naturally and normally part of the activities (see ‘Observer as participant’ 
or ‘non-participant observer as shown in Figure 3-1) (Burnham et al., 2004: 231-232).22 
 
Figure 3-1 Types of participant observation 
 
Researcher takes part in activity 
Researcher’s 
identity is 
revealed 
Participant as observer:  
Who undertakes prolonged 
observation and involved in all 
the central activities and whose 
role is known. 
Complete participant:  
Who interacts within the social 
situation, but whose role is 
concealed. Researcher’s 
identity is 
concealed Observer as participant:  Who undertakes intermittent 
observation alongside 
interviewing, but whose role is 
known. 
Complete observer: 
 Who maintains some distance, 
does not interact and whose role is 
concealed. 
Researcher observes activity 
Source: Sauders et al. (2009: 293), originally from Gill and Johnson (2002: 149).  
 
The appropriateness of participant observation was also justified by matching the 
research questions: the ways in which regional actors behave and interact with each other 
in a region are important to the research, and researching the change and what happens 
during the process is of interest. These circumstances matched the research questions. As 
such, fieldwork is probably most related to the method of participant observation. 
Participant observation was important in opening up particular areas of investigation, 
while the sources of evidence for the case study include primary documents, secondary 
documents, and in-depth interviewing through participant observation.  
Lastly, the document analysis enabled to us to obtain fundamental data on the work tasks 
and the amount of collaborative working between actors. These data were backed up by 
personal observations and by interviews. Qualitative evidence plays a central role in the 
                                                          
22 Although participatory observation gave the researcher some insights, it was decided that 
the this study should not to take the form of ethnographic research presentation. Instead, 
the presentation of the study follows the conceptual scheme as depicted above. 
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research design; some part of this evidence (better than data) was from the participant 
observer process and another part of the evidence was from in-depth interviews. Each of 
these sources of evidence was used to help draw conclusions about the actions of regional 
actors and their perceptions of and attitudes to these actions. 
 
 
3.2 The selection of case  
Coming nearly two decades after the political devolution and economic crisis in South 
Korea, the study of change on the regional policy in South Korea is well timed. Although 
it is obviously too early to test the effectiveness of the regional politics, it is considered an 
appropriate time to examine their impact on regional policy. Moreover, because of the 
incorporation of an evolutionary approach to the theoretical perspectives, this thesis may 
put the emphasis on the post catching-up period, but it simultaneously conducts a 
retrospective analysis of the nature, the type, and the form of the political economy by 
exploring the legacies of the change.  
Our understanding of the change was based on observations of the political interactions 
in ‘Gyeonggi province’ in South Korea.23 The selection of Gyeonggi province was based on 
a comparison of South Korea’s provinces subject to the processes of the change outline 
(see Figure 3.2).  
 
                                                          
23  Province can be tranlated as do in Korean. The term do means the region has an 
administrative legitimacy to develop policies to support the region. 
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Figure 3-2 Geographical location of Gyeonggi Province 
 
 
 
At the outset, it seemed likely that this region would represent rich practices and dynamic 
changes of regional innovation process experiences than other provinces. Gyeonggi 
province has already been cited in the academic literature as an example of an RSI 
(Hassink, 2001, 2002; Cooke et al., 2004). In the book Regional innovation systems: The 
role of governances in a globalized world, Cooke et al. (2004: 384-385) praise Gyeonggi 
province for embarking on a regionalization of innovation activities, and attempting to 
transform itself into a learning region. In this respect, he states the following:  
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The example of the South Korean region of Gyeonggi additionally demonstrates 
the strengths of regional variety in the context of a dirigiste innovation system. 
Also this region was strongly hit by the Asian crisis in 1998. However, according to 
Hassink in Chapter 12, ‘the Gyeonggi economy has quickly recovered … firms in 
Gyeonggi are increasingly internationally active, foreign direct investment has 
been strongly increasing after the economic crisis at the end of the 1990s and 
even if their customers relocate to other regions, they tend to stay in Gyeonggi 
due to agglomeration advantages. 
 
Cooke et al. (2004: 386) also note that the movement of the economic structure was 
captured using network-type systems. In Cooke et al.’s account, the region’s industrial 
policy process has been changed from a top-down process to a bottom-up dynamic and 
strategic process based on a perceived need to enhance the research and development 
infrastructure. In particular, this transformation is linked to core policy initiatives.  
Given Gyeonggi province’s unique contexts described earlier, this single case study is 
holistic, incorporating an examination of the complexities of the issue, and intrinsic, 
seeking to provide insight into and refine theoretical frameworks. Gyenggi province was 
also chosen because the researcher knows the region well.24   
Organising and completing a field trip in Gyeonggi province constituted an additional 
challenge for this thesis. The fact that much of this study has been conducted in a familiar 
country in the researcher’s native language and with personal contacts, adds a specific 
additional interest to this study. On the one hand, there were existing expectations, but 
on the other hand, several practical concerns and considerations emerged. 
The methodology strategy described in the previous section included conducting 
interviews with a broad range of participants who represented local interests and 
expectations. The involvement of Gyeonggi Institute for Science and Technology 
Promotion (GSTEP) was due to the invaluable contribution of Lee Won-Young 
                                                          
24 Provincial governments generally refer to sub-national governments. In this thesis, lower-
level sub-national governments are called city governments while upper-level ones are 
called provincial governments. 
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(Interviewee 1 and Appendix 3), chairman of the GSTEP and responsible for the region’s 
science and technology policies, and Yim Deok-Soon (Interviewee 2), a senior researcher 
in the Science and Technology Policy Institute (STEPI). The former introduced me to 
several participants of the industrial policy process, whilst the latter managed to put me 
in contact with staff members of the Gyeonggi Technopark, especially of the Strategy and 
Planning Division.  
After several contacts had been established at the regional level, an initial schedule of 
interviews was formulated and a pilot visit to the field was organized for January 2010. 
The initial visit to the GSTEP and Gyeonggi Research Institute (GRI) and the consequent 
familiarisation with the environment made possible the application of sampling and 
snowballing techniques from the first contact.  
 
Table 3-1 Fieldworks  
 
Fieldwork Preliminary investigation Participant observation and interview 
Period 1 to 22 January 2010 (three weeks) 
1 September 2010 to 6 February 2011 
(five months) 
Activities 
The preliminary investigation mainly involved 
the use of unstructured interviews and 
documentary analysis. Generally, in research, 
the literature review provides a basic scheme 
of things to look for, but in this research, the 
main purpose of the approach to 
interviewing was to allow the respondents 
themselves to focus on what they felt was 
important in relation to regional innovation. 
Thus, the use of open-ended interview 
questions was meant to allow the regional 
actors to discuss issues from their own point 
of view over the three-week period. The 
national level was also looked at to give 
contextualization of the idiosyncrasies of the 
overall regional policies. 
The researcher was employed by the 
GSTEP of Gyeonggi Province for the 
duration of the key activities and worked 
with them, in order to observe the 
interaction with other actors. During this 
time, the researcher directly observed and 
assisted the regional authority in their 
work. The researcher collected both 
formal and informal types of data. 
Source: author’s own creation.  
 
The review of the relevant literature and the insights gleaned from the pilot study led to 
identification of the institutions that actually have been or theoretically should have been 
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engaged in these policies, which in turn, led to a careful selection of the people who would 
best be interviewed. The main objective was to interview high-ranking individuals from 
each organization who would have a sound knowledge base and were in a position of 
responsibility. Fortunately, the researcher was appointed as a part-time researcher for 
the GSTEP from 1 September 2010 to the end of December 2010.  
We followed the development of the GSTEP and the Gyeonggi provincial government over 
a six-month period. During this time, we conducted several formal interviews with key 
persons to discuss and refine the research findings. We conducted interviews with 42 
interviewees including the chief officers and experts in provincial government, agencies, 
policy makers, members of firms, and academics. Hence, the interviewees’ corresponding 
organizations included regional authorities as regional technology support units, and 
SMEs provided a business dimension. A limited number of additional interviewees were 
added from the interviewees that represented the academics. The following table gives 
an overview of the interviewees; a list of interviewees can be found in Appendix 1 while 
Appendix 4 provides the list of the events attended as part of the research. These regional 
events provided opportunities for participatory observation to understand the regional 
agenda and regional issues and the way strategic action is promoted.  
 
Table 3-2 The number of interviewees 
 
Actor Number Actor Number 
Gyeonggi Technopark 3 Provincial government 4 
GSTEP 7 GRI 4 
IICC members (firms, universities) 7 Public research Institutions 5 
Firms in Gyeonggi Technopark 4 Academic, policy experts 7 
Provincial council 1 Total 42 
Source: author’s own creation 
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It is important to maintain confidentiality when interviewees are asked about their 
personal opinions and perceptions as well as conflictive or uncooperative inter-actors’ 
behaviours. In order to gain personal opinions, the purpose of the research was explained 
at the start of interview, and the sensitive questions regarding conflictive relationships 
were asked at the end of the interview. The interviews were not recorded due to the 
sensitive nature of the research topic. Nor did we take field notes while acting as a 
participant observer. Instead, we wrote up notes each day after leaving the field. In line 
with the exploratory character of this thesis, an “interview topic guide” was followed 
(Appendix 2). Interview topic guide was designed to engage subjects in substantive 
discussions around the policy process, and to obtain information that would help explain 
how and why policy initiative emerged as a prominent issue. Specifically, it contained 
questions corresponding to the dimensions of the study’s theoretical framework, focusing 
on: 1) the political, economic conditions that contributed to the emergence of regional 
and industial development policy; 2) regional development governanceand the 
characteristics of the RSI; 3) the identification of the main policy actors (new initiative 
actors and pre-existing actors) and their perceived motivations, principles and objectives; 
and 4) political and policy dynamics attening the issue’s advancedment on the regional 
policy. Interviewees were asked the same questions, often in different wording and 
usually in different sequencing.    
 
3.3 Operationalization of the main concepts of the conceptual scheme 
To recap, the strategic relational perspective allows an evolutionary approach to be 
implemented; this provides a broader context to analyse the relationship between central 
government and regional policy makers in an RSI. Strategic actions influence both the 
structures and the actors in the dialectical processes of change. The dialectical 
relationship between the structural context and the actor in the context yields a new 
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inter-related conceptual pairing: a strategic actor within a strategically selective context. 
There is always interaction between structural and agency factors. Whilst the conceptual 
analysis starts by distinguishing core elements in both categories, the analysis 
immediately seeks to reveal the relational aspects that link structure and agency.    
In the context of this thesis, the structural factors include actors, an account of the recent 
history of the region, and information about the political economy and efforts to build 
industrial policies. There are also more agency factors to consider, such as the roles played 
by particular regional actors and the awareness of the opportunities perceived by agents 
to form and develop industrial policy.  
To recap, “structure” basically means context and refers to the setting within which 
political and economic events occur and acquire meaning with some regularity or 
structure over time. “Agency” refers to action, in particular, actor conduct; it can be 
defined as “the ability or capacity of an actor to act consciously and, in so doing, to 
attempt to realise his or her intentions” (Hay, 2002: 94). The link between structural and 
agency factors through strategic contexts and strategic actions is also clarified where 
necessary. In the light of the strategic-relational perspective, the provincial government 
can be seen as one of the key strategic actors within the region, which is a strategically 
selective context for the strategic actors, whereby they form networks and partnerships 
defined as strategic alliances. The strategic actions within the regional policy context 
comprise a new strategic organisational field. 
  
 
3.4 Limitation of the single case study approach 
The qualitative single case study design of this study, coupled with researcher’s role as 
“observer-as-participant”, had many benefits, including the ability to understand more 
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clearly the complex relationships and the differing perceptions of regional development. 
This case study was explanatory, showing how the feelings and perceptions of staff at the 
GSTEP had an effect on their involvement with the RSI and the building of their knowledge 
networks and collaborative processes.  
However, at times, it was difficult to represent simply the complexity examined, and the 
data did not lend themselves to numerical representations, which might otherwise have 
provided clarity. This study is based on one six-month period of observation and data 
collection. During this time, the initial actors were emerging to start the process. The 
contextual nature of this case study research means it could have benefited from more 
long-term participation and observation on our part, which would have led to deeper 
insight into RSI as a political interaction. Additional time spent with the study may have 
elucidated deeper results showing how such an RSI changes.  
In addition, this single case study is limited by the simple fact that one regional 
phenomenon, in this case Gyeonggi province, is observed, albeit in depth. For these 
reasons, this case does not lead to generalizable results. The case of Gyeonggi province 
cannot be considered representative of other RSI. However, the results of this study still 
add to the body of knowledge regarding these types of RSI, and it was possible to offer 
some suggestions that may apply to other RSI with similar goals or structures.  
The primary aim of this study was to develop a theoretically grounded approach to 
regional development and regionalist accommodation that could be applied to a variety 
of contexts. Therefore, the logical extension of this work would be to demonstrate that 
this approach can also help us to make sense of contemporary developments in other 
regions and democratic countries.  
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3.5 Concluding reflections  
The adaptation of a qualitative approach that is based on a mixed set of methodologies is 
in complete agreement with the central aim of this study. It was decided that the intention 
of this thesis would be better served by intensive research, which was achieved with the 
help of an in-depth case study of Gyeonggi province.  
The core element of the applied methodology is the participant observation element of 
this thesis. The theoretical grounds were presented in the previous chapter, where the 
analysis of issues regarding regional economic development and transition on the one 
hand and politics on the other are discussed more thoroughly. 
Although the scope of this research is limited in the sense that it cannot present a 
generalizable picture of the whole of South Korea’s regional system of innovation, as it 
only includes one region in South Korea, it does aspire to contribute to a better 
understanding of this under-researched field.  
The following chapters examine the impact on South Korea’s regional politics of a broader 
range of socio-political and economic factors. Thus, Chapter 4 analyses how the transition 
from a central planning to free market system and the devolution process has exercised 
various powers that have influenced the way local and regional politics have been 
formulated and managed in South Korea. In this way, we investigate the ways that 
historical legacies have affected regional autonomy in South Korea. 
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4 Regional politics in South Korea: historical antecedents of 
contemporary process  
The previous two chapters outlined the theoretical perspectives and methodology that 
underpin this study. This chapter investigates the national legacies of South Korea as a set 
of structural factors that shape the current form of regional politics in South Korea. The 
current form of relationships is related to regional autonomy. While many countries have 
several different forms of regional autonomy, currently, South Korea has a form referred 
to as “the mayor-council” form, which is similar to that of the US. The mayor-council form 
consists of the governor (province), the mayor (city), and the council members. When was 
this form introduced and how has it developed in the South Korean context? Where does 
commitment come from, and under what circumstances? 
Historical legacies can be decisive for the forms and relations of recent policy initiatives. 
Thus, history matters, and in the case of South Korea, a brief historical review regarding 
the regional autonomy formation procedures is considered necessary, as it can offer 
useful insights regarding the understanding of the development patterns of nation and 
regional relations (Livingstone, 1992: 7). The incorporation of historic legacies into the 
analysis of the changing political relations of regional policy in South Korea is directly 
related to the theoretical perspectives followed in this research.     
As a basic aim is to explore how state building processes have affected regional 
development, this chapter begins by considering the historical development of the 
creation of modern regional politics in South Korea. Thus, a brief historical overview of 
state formation in South Korea is provided to demonstrate how it came to be so 
centralized in terms of how it is perceived and of its actual reach. This chapter then 
describes the changes that devolution policy brought. 
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4.1 Earlier history  
Interestingly, South Korea has a long history of local cooperative communities for the 
purpose of increasing mutual help among people. Gye, Du-rae and Hyang-Yak were 
traditional activities of self-government among rural communities, and they helped 
economic growth at the local level (Goh Kun, 2010: 6; KDI, 2013: 358).25 These three 
activities have prevailed in the local community since the Korae (935-1392) and Choseon 
dynasties (1392-1910) (KDI, 2013: 362-363).   
Despite the existence of such local communities, the country has been highly centralized 
since late 19 century. For the 36 years of the Japanese colonial period (1910-1945), the 
central government exercised absolute power over the country and its communities. All 
the important local communities were directly or indirectly appointed by the central 
government. Traditional Du-rae, Hyang-Yak and Gye remained, but they were restricted 
to the form of agricultural communities. It was not until the restoration of independence 
that a modern concept of regional autonomy was introduced in South Korea.  
Immediately following the end of World War II (WWII), the American Military 
administration (1945-1948) made an effort to create a political, economic, social, and 
administrative order that would establish democracy in South Korea. South Korea was 
regarded as one of the showcases for the adoption of western market economies and 
democratic practices. Regional autonomy, as an institutional concept underpinning 
democracy, aroused great interest among the people. In November 1946, Military 
Administration Order No. 126 stated that governors and council members of the provinces 
and cities were to be directly elected by residents.  
                                                          
25 Gye is a mutual aid association by which local residents help each other. Usually in a Gye, 
people will collect money or other goods for a certain objective and then give it to a member 
in need. Du-rae is a traditional cooperative agricultural group. Hyang-Yak is an agreement in 
local communities that residents voluntarily set up to encourage good and punish evil and 
also to help and support each other (The Observer, December 6, 2012). 
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Figure 4-1 Main political events related to regional autonomy in South Korea 
 
 
Source: author’s own creation   
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4.2 Nation rebuilding between 1948 and 1995  
 
4.2.1 Building the regional autonomy   
Regional autonomy as an institutional underpinning for democracy aroused great interest 
among the political leaders in the immediate post-war and post-occupation period. The 
Rhee Syngman administration of the First Republic (1948-1960) promoted a constitutional 
mandate for the establishment of regional autonomy. Indeed, regional autonomy was 
guaranteed as a basic tenet of democracy under the Republic’s first Constitution in 1948 
(Moon Chang-Soo, 1999: 29-33).  
The Constitution devotes an entire chapter to regional autonomy; it contains two articles, 
namely, Articles 96 and 97 (KLRI, 2012). Article 96 states that “local autonomous entities 
shall, within law and ordinance, deal with matters pertaining to local autonomy and 
matters delegated by the central government, and manage their own properties.” This 
article is considered as not only vesting sub-national entities with rights of autonomy, but 
also as giving them a basic constitutional guarantee of local autonomy. Thus, the 
constitution apparently allows the provincial governments to have a degree of political 
power. However, Article 96 limits the nature of regional autonomy power by stating that 
“local autonomous entities shall, within law and ordinance”. The “law and ordinance” 
phrase implies that the power of the expected regional autonomy should follow and 
comply with executive ordinances as well as national laws (Constitutional Court of Korea, 
1948, 1988; KRILA, 2012). 
Thus, according to the Constitution, provincial governments deal with matters pertaining 
to the welfare of residents and property issues, and they establish, within the limit of 
national laws, rules and regulations regarding regional autonomy. Regions are also 
required to have a council. Meanwhile, laws at the national level determine the 
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organisation and powers of the council. The governor/mayors and council members are 
elected by direct vote for four-year terms.  
 
Figure 4-2 Two-tier public administrative structure in South Korea 
 
 
Source: OECD (2012: 100)  
Note: As a result of rural-urban mergers and consolidation among cities, total number comprises 17 provincial 
governments and 227 municipal governments in 2014. All of the regional and local governments are classified 
as autonomous bodies with elected councils and governments. Sejong special autonomous city is not included 
in this map. Roh Moo-Hyun administration created a special administrative district from parts of Chungnam 
and Chungbuk provinces, near Daejeon, to relocate nine ministries and four national agencies from Seoul. The 
city opened on July 2012.  
 
Based upon the constitutional mandate, the Rhee Syngman administration enacted the 
Local Autonomy Act in 1949. Regional politics in South Korea in the modern sense have 
been derived from the provisions of this Act. As shown in Figure 4-2, the Local Autonomy 
Act designed a formal central-provincial relation composed of a two-tier political and 
administrative structure26: the upper-level (Kwang-Yuk-Ja-Chi-Dan-Chye, i.e. provinces) is 
                                                          
26 The two-tier structure represents a legacy of Japanese colonialism. During this period, Japan 
imposed this administrative structure for the purpose of resource-management and military 
control. Against this historical background, debate continues today over how to simplify 
structure (Hermanns, 2004: 11). 
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the autonomous region, with a relatively broad territorial jurisdiction27, and the lower-
level (Ki-Cho-Ja-Chi-Dan-Che, i.e. cities, towns, and townships) is the basic level of local 
authorities.28  
However, the Local Autonomy Act was damaged by the Rhee Syngman administration and 
the Korean War (1950-1953) (Kim Byung-Joon, 2009). Rhee Syngman took advantage of 
several amendments to the Local Autonomy Act and of initial local elections during his 
administration to expand and extend his political power. In the fourth amendment of the 
Act, he changed the direct election of mayor of lower-level governments into an 
appointment by the central government. 
The Student Revolution on April 19, 1960 was a pivotal event for the politics of the country. 
It provided a cornerstone for the construction of a democratic society (Kil Soong-Hoom 
and Moon Chung-In, 2001: 38). The Democratic Party, which grasped political power 
through the Revolution, passed a fifth amendment to the Local Autonomy Act on 
November 1, 1960. This amendment allowed local residents to participate in the direct 
election of council members as well as of the governor/mayors. It aimed to establish a 
grassroots democracy and realize some degree of regional autonomy. Under this reform, 
local elections took place in December in 1960 when council members and governors of 
both the upper and the lower level were voted into office.  
 
                                                          
27 The upper-level includes Seoul Metropolitan City, Sejong City, six metropolitan cities (Busan, 
Incheon, Daegu, Gwangju, Daejeon, Ulsan), eight provinces (Gyeonggi, Gangwon, Chungnam, 
Chungbuk, Jeonnam, Jeonbuk, Gyeongnam, Gyeongbuk), and Jeju Province. 
28 The lower level consists of city (si), county (kun) and district (ku) governments. The units are 
further divided into eup, myon, and dong for purely administrative purposes. At the lower-
level local governments, there are 80 counties, 73 cities, and 69 autonomous districts. 
Among them, all of the autonomous districts and cities belong to metropolitan cities and 
provinces respectively. Cities have a population of 50,000 or more, and counties, 50,000 or 
less. Self-districts are municipalities under big cities. Seoul and metropolitan self-district are 
autonomous and their heads are elected. Other cities whose populations are over 500,000 
can have a non-autonomous district as the administrative arm.  
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4.2.2 The authoritarian regime  
However, regional autonomy in South Korea was delayed again by the authoritarian 
regime of the Park Chung-Hee administration (1963-1979) and the Chun Doo-Hwan 
administration (1980-1987) (Hermanns, 2004: 11; Choi Yoo-Sung and Wright, 2004: 6).  
As Cotton (1992) says, the authoritarian regime of the Park Chung-Hee administration 
practised a dictatorship and a military-based government. 29  Regional autonomy was 
suspended again by the Military Revolution on May 16, 1961. The authoritarian regime 
maintained an autocratic stable political system and focused on economic growth. The 
Military Revolutionary Committee, led by Park Chung-Hee, suspended regional autonomy. 
According to Decree No.4, the Military Commission dissolved all provincial councils. 
Internal political strife at the highest levels of government prevailed at the time and 
effectively negated all progress toward regional autonomy. The functions of provincial 
government were assigned to the central governments.30 
In 1963, the political situation returned to partial normalcy with the formation of the Third 
republic. However, although the Constitution in 1962 provided an appropriate time for 
the restoration of the local elections, the military government had no intention of 
initiating the necessary process for their enactment. This policy was followed during the 
fourth republic (1972-1979) as well. The suspension was formalized by the Yushin 
(revitalization) Constitution (1972), which stated that regional autonomy was suspended 
                                                          
29 In his research, Cotton (1992: 512) identified four phases of the authoritarian regime in 
South Korea: military regime (1961-1963), quasi-competitive political system (1963-1972), 
dictatorial system (1972-1979), and disputed quasi-dictatorial system (1980-1987). 
30 More specifically, military measures concentrated on fortifying national political power. 
They modified the structure of local administration, changing Eup (towns) and Myun 
(townships) from autonomous entities to Kun (counties). In practice, this reversed local 
autonomy by depriving the basic units of regions of any discretionary power. Additionally, 
instead of elections, governors/mayors were appointed by central government. The Minister 
of Home Affairs was authorized to approve all resolutions of upper-level councils. 
Furthermore, the resolutions of lower-level local councils needed the executive approval of 
upper-level local governments. Seoul was put under the direct control of the Prime Minister. 
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until the country was reunified and that administrative efficiency in state affairs took first 
priority (Cotton, 1992: 517; Oh Kie-Chiang, 1999: 103; Berman et al., 2010: 380).  
In the days of the dictatorship in the 1970s, in order to ensure the legitimacy of the 
authoritarian regime, a policy of rapid industrialization was necessary. Autocracies 
obviously avoid immense expense by avoiding local autonomy. The Park Chung-Hee 
administration31 and the later Chun Doo-Hwan administration (1980-1987) were swift in 
abolishing local autonomy and suppressing its development. 32  In particular, the 
Constitution specified in an additional clause that “the appropriate timing for restoring 
the local councils based on this Constitution will be specified separately by another law.” 
Since a separate law was not enacted until 1988, the local autonomy was never 
operational. As a result, regional politics was virtually shelved during a quarter-century of 
military rule.  
In 1987, South Korea made progress in procedural social democratization (Oh Kie-Chiang, 
1999:91-93; Steinberg and Shin Myung, 2005:11-12). Considerable attention has been 
paid to the resurgence of the political economic landscapes. During the authoritarian 
regime, there had been increasing demands for social democratization.33 In response to 
                                                          
31 Park Chung-Hee controlled the country from 1961 until his assassination in October 1979. 
The Prime Minister Choi Kyu-Ha had to automatically assume the presidency. Choi Kyu-Ha 
kept the  presidential position until May 1981. During his short presidency, he did not have 
much influence on the political economy, acting merely as a care-taker during a transitional 
period. General Chun Doo-Hwan held the reins of power during President Choi‘s presidency. 
32  The Chun Doo-Hwan administration took a slightly different attitude toward regional 
autonomy; it declared that it would soon reinstate the local councils. The new Constitution 
instituted in 1980 stated that local councils should be restored step by step, based on the 
degree of financial self-sufficiency. It also indicated that the timetable for the restoration of 
local councils would be decided by the enactment of law. The Chun Doo-Hwan 
administration nevertheless further postponed the introduction of local councils. The 
rationale was the need to take local financial self-support into consideration and harmonize 
the efficiency of local administration with the requirements of democracy. Once again, 
action was deferred until a later and more appropriate date. 
33 During two decades, South Korea was ruled by three different military generals turned 
politicians. It was against this political and economic backdrop that South Korea’s democracy 
movement emerged. Accepting the democrization protest on June for the direct election of 
the president, the next administrations limited the presidency to a single five-year term and 
a four-year term for the National Assembly (Steinberg, 1998). 
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public and popular pressures, the government attempted reform, not only at the national 
level, but also at the local level. Throughout the presidential elections in 1987, the 
restoration of the local autonomy was one of the biggest campaign pledges of the ruling 
party (i.e. Democratic Justice Party).34 
As domestic demands for democracy grew stronger, the government felt the need to 
introduce further amendments to the Local Autonomy Act, as the demands of the pro-
democracy movement included greater regional autonomy. In April 1988, the Roh Tae-
Woo administration (1988-1992) made sweeping revisions to the Local Autonomy Act for 
the revival of regional politics (Berman et al., 2010: 381). Indeed, the Roh Tae-Woo 
administration made a public commitment to grant regional power. The pledge of the Roh 
Tae-Woo administration and the election was a contributing factor to the progress toward 
local autonomy and democratization in South Korea.  
In addition, the repeal of the conditional (unification) article on regional autonomy 
facilitated this progress. This was an indicator of the sentiment that had produced a 
revival of interest in regional politics. An amendment to the Constitution that restricted 
the timing for creating local councils was also removed. The removal of this provision led 
to the creation of elected local councils across the nation in 1991 (Kim Pan-Suk, 1993; Lee 
Jong Soo, 1996). 
 
4.2.3 Revisiting the Local Autonomy Act 
The Local Autonomy Act was further amended in 1990 to arrange for the election of 
provincial council members during the first half of 1991 (see Appendix 5). For the first 
                                                          
34 This does mean that the pro-democracy movement was the important determinant of 
South Korea’s political democratization with other variables, such as political leadership and 
international factors, also playing important roles. 
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time since the Military Revolution in 1960, council elections were held in 1991. In the 
elections, 866 council members for the upper-level governments and 4,303 council 
members for lower-level governments were elected (Oh Kie-Chiang, 1999: 130-162). This 
replanted the elected local legislative tree almost 30 years after the suspension of regional 
autonomy by the military regime (Choi Yoo-Sung and Wright, 2004: 7).  
However, local elections were again postponed until 1995. The rhetoric and rationale for 
the delay was to ensure a more stable and gradual installation of regional autonomy. To 
prepare for, discuss, and promote local autonomy, a formal national commission was 
established in 1991. The Ministry of Government Administration (now the Ministry of 
Administration and Home Security) created the joint committee for devolution. This 
committee had a life span of seven years and was a further favourable indicator of 
evolving devolution. The committee was composed of civilian scholars, other experts, and 
both national and local officials. The committee also deliberated on matters regarding the 
devolution of functions and authority to local governments.35 Since 1991, the committee 
has devolved 908 functions, which corresponds to 7.9% of functions of the central 
government. 
In accordance with the revision of the Local Autonomy Act, the Kim Young-Sam 
administration (1993-1998) held elections for both local council members and the 
governors/mayors in June 1995 (Bae Yooil and Kim Sunhyuk, 2012: 268). This progress 
resulted in two important developments that were favourable to stronger and more 
advanced devolution reform in the 2000s. The full-scale elections selected 245 governors 
and mayors of local government. There were 15 upper-level (provincial level) governors 
                                                          
35  However, this committee had no legal authority to compel the adoption of the 
recommendations to the relevant agencies in the central government. 
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and 230 lower-level mayors elected. Also elected were 972 upper-level council members 
and 4,541 lower-level local council members.  
Governors/mayors and local council members are normally elected for a four-year term 
of office. However, terms of the first set of governors/mayors and local council members 
commenced on 1 July 1995, and expired on 30 June 1998. This exception was made for 
staggered terms to avoid clashes with the National Assembly election cycle (in 1996, 2000, 
and 2004). As a result, subsequent local elections were held in 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 
and 2014. 
This established the potential for an operational decentralized and modern nation state-
province structure in South Korea. The local elections since 1995 have created a regional 
political arena, which in effect have opened up the public sphere to civil society and 
regions. Regional authorities have gradually strengthened their power to manage public 
policies dealing with locality, and the financial discretion of regions has increased steadily 
(OECD, 2001: 42).  
 
 
4.3 Rising conflicts on uneven development since 1995  
Although the Kim Young-Sam administration heralded a new era of interaction between 
central and provincial government after the long authoritarian regime, relations remained 
confined to a procedural process of providing a free and fair election and the 
constitutional guarantee of local participation. The fundamental tenets of the political 
economy of the Kim Young-Sam administration remained similar to those of the preceding 
authoritarian regimes (i.e., they were committed to a “growth-first” strategy without 
 81 
 
undertaking meaningful economic redistribution). 36  This may refer to the central 
government’s role in “directing” the economy despite all of the central government’s 
initiatives in shaping decisions and setting priorities.  
However, the Kim Young-Sam administration failed to undertake further institutional 
reforms other than introducing the real name deposit system, and it ended in financial 
crisis. The presidential election in 1997 was an important event in the path toward 
democratic consolidation, as it was the first peaceful transfer of political power to the 
opposition party (from the conservative party to the democratic party) in fifty years (Choi 
Yoo-Sung and Wright, 2004: 8). For South Korea, it represents the first civilian transfer of 
power democratically by election. 
The controversy over the authenticity of South Korea’s democracy virtually disappeared 
during the Kim Dae-Jung administration (1998-2003) and the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration (2003-2008), that is, the so-called Minju Jeongkwon (Democratic 
Administration).37 However, these two left-wing administrations, which together lasted 
10 years, were relatively more progressive than the other administrations, but were also 
confronted by other controversies.38   
To relieve the country from the humiliating IMF bailout in 1997, the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration endeavoured to remove barriers to liberalization of the economy. 
                                                          
36 For example, the Kim Young-Sam administration announced “the New Economy 100 Day 
Plan” to quickly boost the Korean economy. The Plan emphasized globalization, 
industrialization, technological advancement, and social overhead capital (Kong, 2000: 146). 
37 The Kim Dae-Jung administration included life-long opposition leaders with strong support 
from specific regions. Kim Dae-Jung also offered democracy activities. The administration 
began with high expectations as a “Government of the People”. The Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration was unexpectedly elected and thereby provided a different kind of president. 
Roh Moo-Hyun was long portrayed as a maverick politician who struggled against corruption, 
social polarization, and institutions characterised by regional antagonism (Hahm Sung Deuk 
and Lee Dong Seong, 2007: 7-10). The Roh Moo-Hyun administration is also known as a 
“Participatory government”. 
38 The imprecise use of various terms, such as “left-wing”, “reformist”, and “progressive” to 
describe the moderate, non-communist left of the political spectrum no doubt causes 
concerns among those who wish for greater precision in delineation. 
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Although the IMF did not directly pinpoint the devolution issue, the bailout and the wave 
of “reinventing government” movement prompted intellectuals and policy makers to 
ponder the cost of a highly centralized system and to devise a strategic plan for devolution 
(BBC news, August 18, 2009).  
This changed circumstance also provided a political opportunity for making progress 
regarding regional autonomy. The Kim Dae-Jung administration vigorously pursued an 
institutional restructuring (Haggard et al., 2003; Lim Hyun-Chin and Jang Jin-Ho, 2006). To 
make the government smaller and more competitive, neo-liberal reformers strongly 
urged the government to adopt measures to privatize key public corporations and to 
delegate responsibilities to the regions (Im Tobin, 2003a, 2003b; Kim Pan-Seok, 2000). The 
ideology of neo-liberalism holds that “open, competitive, and unregulated markets, 
liberated from all forms of state interference, represent the optimal mechanism for 
economic development” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002: 2). South Korea positioned itself 
in accordance with the neo-liberal principle of limited central government intervention in 
labour markets and related infrastructure arrangements, preferring instead that market 
forces be considered the fundamental drivers of regional development (Bae Yooil, 2009: 
466).  
Delegating responsibilities to the regions has highlighted that devolved regions might 
affect not only the substance and intensity of the nation state’s interests, but also the 
region’s style of interaction with the nation state. There are two distinct possible styles: 
first, a devolution of power that increases cooperative interaction, and second, a 
devolution of power that increases conflicting interaction. It is not easy to decide whether 
it is the process that leads to the divergence of relations, or if it is the other way around, 
namely, that issue differences boost the devolution process. Rather, we might expect that 
such a public policy would be more complicated and contentious when state and regions 
are led by different interests. Under such conditions, regional policy is not part of a state-
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wide policy, and consequently, polices may not be more readily shared across territorial 
boundaries.  
This was found to be especially so in South Korea, where central government maintained 
a regional policy. Before 1995, the regional policy had a centralised process, so state-
region conflicts did not occur as they do today. Even if conflicts occurred, central 
government could play a powerful role in their solution. When regions were granted 
autonomy, many complicated and contentious issues emerged in terms of policy conflicts. 
Indeed, after the introduction of local autonomy in 1995, more than two hundred conflicts 
related to regional development were identified, which was four times the number 
identified in 1994. In particular, large-scale development policies, such as the location of 
the knowledge infrastructure, and high-technology clusters, were delayed or changed 
because of conflict (Park Bae-Gyoon, 2003; 2008). 
The selection of the country’s nuclear waste disposal site was an example of such conflict. 
Ten years passed in attempts to select a nuclear waste disposal site before Gyeong-ju city  
was selected as the location in 2005. The government’s choice of various sites had been 
opposed by the regional authorities of the target areas. Finally, in 2005, a special act 
providing for a residents’ poll in Gyeong-ju city completed the site selection process with 
an approval rate of 89.5% of the residents’ votes. Another popular example is the 
Saemangeum Reclamation project, which involved the building of a 33km tide 
embankment between Gunsan and Buan cities; there had been severe conflicts between 
central government, environmental NGOs, and regional politicians since the 1990s. Even 
though this policy had been suspended twice by 2005, it was resumed in 2006 following 
a decision of the Supreme Court. These conflicts increased and, indeed, they continue to 
delay the implementation of important national development projects. Nonetheless, 
despite these cases, an appropriate method for conflict resolution in decision making 
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about the implementation of large-scale policy has yet to be provided (Park Bae-Gyoon, 
2008: 50).  
Regional autonomy, in addition, has triggered one particular debate: uneven 
development. This concerns the issue of expanding devolution to make it an asymmetrical 
process, particularly the Seoul Metropolitan Area and the other regions. The region 
became frustrated with the central government’s development policies and blamed state 
centralism as a main cause of the gap between the capital region and the rest of the 
country. Local politicians and governments began to criticize the government over the 
centralized regulation.  
As a result, the conflicts and tensions on uneven development intensified, and devolution 
became one of the most important political issues during the presidential electoral 
campaign in 2002. Then, in the 2002 presidential election, the Millennium Democratic 
Party’s candidate Roh Moo-Hyun won with 48.9 % of the vote.  
 
 
4.4 The politics of devolution in the 2000s   
 
4.4.1 The asymmetric devolution of the left-wing administrations  
On June 12, 2003, four months after his inauguration in February of that year, President 
Roh Moo-hyun made public the so-called “Daegu initiative”, which said that the central 
government would pursue a comprehensive approach to territorial development policy, 
innovation-driven economic strategy, and management of the region first, and the capital 
region later. It is no exaggeration to say that all specific policies stemmed from these three 
principles of the BNDP (Jeon Kyoung-Gu, 2012: 9-10). 
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The Roh Moo-Hyun administration (2003-2008) employed an unprecedented devolution 
policy as one of the top priorities of its political agenda (OECD, 2001:12; Choi Yoo-Sung 
and Wright, 2004: 9). In its policy of devolution, the administration had to decide whether 
to adopt a symmetric devolution policy, which would confer an equal degree of 
devolution on the regions, or to implement an asymmetric devolution policy, which would 
grant differing degrees of autonomy between regions. It opted for the asymmetric 
devolution policies in an attempt to respond to claims about uneven development and to 
react to balanced development between regions. Thus, “balanced development” became 
the most important political mantra in the 2000s (MOGAHA, 2005:  17-18).39    
The Roh Moo-Hyun administration claimed that the problem with South Korea’s economy 
was a result of the inefficient distribution of resources between the Seoul metropolitan 
area (Sudogwon)40 and the other regions (Seong Kyong Ryung, 1995: 48-49).41 Under the 
administration, which was more favourable to devolution, local authorities and civil 
                                                          
39 Each administration sets the rhetoric of its own under the name of a policy target. The target 
of the Park Chung-Hee administration was “modernization of fatherland”; the Chun Doo-
Hwan administration advocated “social justice”; the Kim Young-Sam administration pursued 
“globalization”; the Kim Dae-Jung administration was geared for “parallel development of 
democracy and the market economy”; the Roh Moo-Hyun administration sought “balanced 
national development”; the Lee Myung-Bak administration places top policy priority on 
“green growth”; and currently, the target of the Park Geun-Hye administration is “creative 
economy”.  
40 Seoul Metropolitan Area is the economic boundary of the urban form rather than the 
administrative boundary. Seoul, Gyeonggi province, and Incheon are the regions making up 
the Seoul metropolitan area. It represents the labour markets (the area from which people 
commute to the urban area) and thus includes both the urban area and the surrounding 
economically attached rural and exurban areas (OECD, 2000: 25).  
41 Roh Moo-Hyun’s administration’s recognition of the input-driven economy being linked 
with unbalanced development was implied in the above remark. President Roh Moo-Hyun’s 
separate public address at the 17th National Assembly Opening Celebration showed his views 
on the problem of the Korean economy being trapped in an income of 10,000 USD and the 
alternative way to resolve the issue: “The input-driven economy of concentrated capital and 
labour disclosed its limit by the IMF financial crisis. We should transform it into an 
innovation-driven economy, which uses technology and human resources as the power for 
growth.” (Office of the President, 2005: 194) 
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society became important negotiating partners for the reform (The Korea Times, May 24, 
2005).42 
Regional development in South Korea has benefited the Seoul metropolitan area, which 
has been in the ascendancy. This ascendant status of the area has been reinforced by the 
nation’s industrial policy of promoting knowledge-based industries to bolster national 
competitiveness. To improve national competitiveness in the global economy, the central 
government has gradually relaxed some of the regulations restricting industrial activities 
in the Seoul metropolitan area.  
 
Table 4-1 Comparison between Metropolitan areas  
 
 Area (km²) Inhabitants (1000s) Population change 1995 (A) 2000 (B) B-A A/B 
Seoul  11,754 (11.8) 20,189 (45.3) 22,767 (48.2) 2,582 1.13 
Tokyo 13,282 ( 3.5) 32,577 (25.9) 34,472 (27.0) 1,895 1.06 
Paris 12,001 ( 2.2) 11,072 (18.9) 11,130 (18.1) 103 1.01 
London 20,590 ( 8.5) 14,854 (25.5) 15,490 (25.6) 636 1.04 
Note: Seoul, Tokyo, Paris (Il de France) and London (Greater London) include metropolitan region. Bracket ( ) 
includes national ratio. Source: Kim, Yong-Woong et al. (2009: 417).  
 
Compared to other advanced economies, as seen in Table 4-1, it is argued that the 
concentration of power in the Seoul metropolitan area is excessively high and 
unprecedented than other areas. When Gravier (1947) wrote the book Paris and the 
French Desert, the concentration of population and industries in Paris was far less than 
that of Seoul. No metropolitan region in the UK, Japan, or France has as many of the 
political, social, and economic resources and opportunities as the metropolitan area of 
South Korea has. Indeed, the rest of the country is dependent upon the important 
decision making and resources of the metropolitan area. They have been deprived of 
                                                          
42  President Roh Moo-Hyun, since the early 1990s, had expressed his great interest in 
decentralization, de-concentration, and balanced development policies, and had even 
established a private research institute by himself, namely, the Centre for Local Autonomy 
in 1993.  
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central decision-making functions as represented by the main offices of the government, 
leading businesses, public organizations, and private agencies. Therefore, regional 
inequality has attracted considerable policy interest from central government.  
From 1962 to 2002, South Korea established five-year economic development plans as an 
upper level plan for national development. Replacing this, the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration (2003-2008) established the Special Act for Balanced National 
Development (SABND) and formulated the Balanced National Development Plan (BNDP) 
for five years (2004-2008).43 President Roh Moo-Hyun’s inaugural speech on 25 February 
2003 explicitly symbolised the ideology and line of the BNDP: 
For the future of the country, the centralisation and concentration in the Seoul 
metropolitan area can no longer be left unattended. Devolution of power to the 
provinces and balanced national development have become tasks that cannot be 
put off any longer. The central and the provincial parts of the country should be 
developed in a harmonious and balanced manner. (16th Presidential Transition 
Team, 2003: 441) 
 
The BNDP is distinguished from the past development paradigm in many respects. Past 
regional-development policies were usually planned and executed by the central 
government without proper coordination, which led to a lack of consistency and 
inefficiency due to overlapping investment. To resolve these problems, the Roh Moo-
Hyun administration changed the execution system completely so that each regional 
policy could be planned and enforced for each province. That is, each province became a 
unit for the planning and execution of regional policy (Kim Dong-Ju, 2004; Kim Dong-Ju 
and Moon Jeong Ho, 2012). 
                                                          
43 President Roh, and the Participation Government established the Government Innovation 
and Decentralization Committee to promote fiscal decentralization under the presidential 
committee. 
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In addition, “the Presidential Committee on Balanced National Development (PCBND)44 
was founded as a control tower, and Special Accounting for Balanced National 
Development was established to manage balanced development policy independently 
and systematically” (Lee Yong-Sook, 2009: 358). The aim was  
to create a balanced society where all the people in the nation can enjoy a high-
quality of life, maintaining their characteristics by promoting independent 
localisation where each reason can develop based on innovation-oriented growth 
strategies, while still maintaining its own characteristics. (PCBND, 2005: 20)45 
 
The Roh Moo-Hyun administration that followed similarly pursued strategies that were 
intended to boost the global competitiveness of South Korea’s regions and the country’s 
effective adaptation to neo-liberal globalization. The dilemma between growth and 
spatial equity constitutes the core decision about the character of regional development 
policies throughout different times and places. As far as the process of regional 
development policies and institutions is concerned, there are certain policy changes at 
the state level (Hermanns, 2009a; 2009b). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
44 The PCBND was established in 2003. Its model was France’s DIACT (the Interministerial 
Agency for Spatial Planning and Competitiveness) (PCPP, 2008: 33). The council is organized 
under the direct authority of the President, involving twelve related ministries and fewer 
than 30 experts from the private sector. For the institutional settings, the Participatory 
Government enacted the Special Act for Balanced National Development in January, 2004. 
The committee finalized the first BNDP in August, 2004. In order to mobilize financial 
resources for the implementation of the BNDP, the central government established Special 
Accounting for Balanced National Development. The special accounting is for funding 
development projects that agree with the guidelines for several types of policies announced 
by the committee. This first BDNP covers a broad sphere of action beyond physical spatial 
policy. It has an innovation policy, industrial policy, balance policy, spatial policy, and quality 
policy. These five policies are implemented by multi-sector annual programs.  
45 Seong Gyeong Ryung, the leader of the BNDP and the first chairman of the PCBND had 
previously argued that “regional hegemony and centralism are two obstacles against historic 
transformation in Korea” (Seong Kyong Ryung, 1995: 48-9). He continued his critical view on 
a regional problem, especially concentration on the capital region, by commenting that 
interlinked imbalances “formulated the structure of privilege, discrimination and exclusion” 
(Seong Kyong Ryung, 2003: 6). 
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Table 4-2 Devolution plans since 1998   
 
Administration Plans Key contents 
The Kim Dae-Jung 
administration 
(1998-2003) 
Law for the 
Promotion of 
Transfer of Central 
Authorities (1999) 
Delegation of Central Affairs to Local Governments 
Delegation of the Authority of Public Security (Police) 
and Creation of Local Police 
Delegation of the Authority of Public Education to 
Local Governments (Educational Autonomy) 
Abolition of Special Administrative Agencies (SAA – 
Local offices of central ministries) 
Rationalization of National and Local Tax System 
(Raising the Rate of Local Allocation Tax) 
Enhancement of Authority of Local Councils 
(Strengthening the Authority of Local Legislation) 
The Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration 
(2004-2008) 
Decentralization 
Roadmaps (2003); 
Special Law on 
Decentralization 
Promotion (2004) 
Source: Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs (MOGAHA, 2005: 45) 
 
In 2003, the central government announced that the BNDP sought to classify 234 districts 
(including locals in Gyeonggi Province) into four categories (underdeveloped, stagnant, 
developing, and developed) and to impose varying levels of corporate tax incentives and 
health insurance fees depending on their status (KRILA, 2012: 52-53). For example, 
underdeveloped regions would get a 70% discount in corporate taxes, stagnant districts 
50%, and developing districts 30%. Developed districts would have to pay the full tax. If a 
large firm based in a developed districts were to move to an underdeveloped one, it would 
get a 70% discount in corporate income tax for the first 10 years and a 35% cut over the 
next five years. 
This was based on a regional system of innovation practices and cluster theory, which 
advocated a shift from state-driven development policies to multiple actor-centred 
development policies (Seong Kyong Ryung, 2003: 9-10). Their models were the Cambridge 
Science Park in the UK, Silicon Valley in the USA, and the Third Italy in Italy, where the 
region’s industry, government, research institute, and university created value-added 
when together (Seong Kyong Ryung, 2008: 17).  
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4.4.2 The Capital relocation  
In 2003, balanced development had been on the national agenda for the previous four 
decades, as the excessive concentration of political economy in the Seoul metropolitan 
area continued to exacerbate stagnation in the rest of the country. While the area 
occupies only 11.8% of the country’s territory, its population had increased from 20.8% 
of the nation’s total in 1960 to nearly half in 2013. In 2005, the capital area accounted for 
more than two-thirds of the central management functions in the public and private 
sector.46 
Based on the legal grounds provided by the SABND, which took effect in 2004, the 
government decided to promote relocation policies: building of the New Multifunctional 
Administrative City, relocation of public institutions, and the creation of what they called 
“innovation cities” (Kim Kwang-Ho, 2010: 75-76).  
At first, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration planned to initiate, before his term expired, 
the movement of the new administrative City from Seoul to Choongchung province near 
Yeongi-Kongju, about 120 km south of Seoul, although it would take much longer than 
this to accomplish (BBC News, 11 August, 2004).47   
Although in the 1980s, a part of the administration of the executive branch had already 
moved south to Gwachon, about 30 km south of Seoul, the aim of the latest move was to 
balance national development and mitigate the excessive concentration of wealth in the 
capital and the surrounding Gyeonggi province. The aim of this attempt may have been 
                                                          
46 A total of 410 public agencies including the central administrative organizations that exist 
at present, and 85% (346) out of 410 total, are concentrated in the Seoul metropolitan area. 
For details, see http://innocity.mltm.go.kr/eng/public/public03.jsp. 
47 President Roh Moo-Hyun declared himself a decentralist. He showed strong intent to carry 
out decentralization, de-concentration, and balanced development policies during his 
presidency. Surprisingly, even when he was a maverick politician and National Assemblyman, 
he expressed his great interests in decentralization and de-concentration, had a connection 
with prominent scholars, and established a private research institute by himself, namely, the 
Center for Local Autonomy in 1993. 
 91 
 
to not only decentralize the national administration and increase provincial wealth, but 
also to affect income distribution more generally. The capital relocation plan has been 
widely discussed in the media and in the National Assembly, and some have called for a 
national plebiscite on this issue. This clearly is motivated by an attempt to break up the 
intellectual elite that has dominated South Korea for several decades.  
 
Figure 4-3 New capital site 
 
 
Source: http://en.starafrica.com/news/s-korea-to-open-controversial-new-mini-240406.html 
 
The new administrative city (named Sejong) has been designated as a special autonomous 
city in which nine central government ministries, related government agencies, and 
government research institutes are slated to be relocated. This is similar to Washington, 
D.C., in the US (The Washington Post, 17 August, 2012). Seoul is like New York as centre 
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of finance and business and the new administrative city (SeJong) is similar to Washington 
D.C. as centre of administrations and politics in the US.48 
Second, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration planned to move 176 public institutions and 
state-run organizations from the Seoul metropolitan area to other areas and to encourage 
the private sector to seek new homes outside the Seoul metropolitan area (Article 18, 
SABND). For example, by 2012, Korea Electric Power Corporation and Korea Land 
Corporation had moved to Gwangju, 330 km southeast of Seoul, and to Jeonbuk province 
respectively. Similarly, Gyeongnam province is the new home of the Korea National 
Housing Corporation. Furthermore, there has been some serious discussion about moving 
Seoul National University, the premier university in the country, south to the Yeongi-
Kongju area. Along with the relocation plans, the government has selected six small-sized 
cities to develop into business centres and is receiving more applications from 
municipalities. 
Thirdly, “innovation cities” refers to a plan to build ten cities in the non-metropolitan 
areas to recognize the existing national spatial structure. Rather than simply re-
distributing the effects between Seoul metropolitan area and other developed regions, 
innovation cities were to be achieved by promoting the diverse development capabilities 
of different regions and to generate a more balanced competitiveness and more spatially 
integrated approaches to development. Another reason was that such a transfer would 
give the provincial governments the opportunity to become more economically 
independent (Seo Joon-Kyo, 2009; Kim Dongsoo and Kim Youngsoo, 2013). 
                                                          
48 To treat those that move to sites out of the new administrative city, Sejong, the Special Act 
for Constructing and Supporting Innovation City in Consequence of Government Ministries' 
Relocation was established in January 2007. The first stage (2007-2012) was the stage for 
the relocation of governmental ministries/institutions; the second stage (2013-2020) is the 
stage for industry, academia and research bodies; and the third stage (2021-2031) is the 
stage for innovation to diffuse. It is planned that the staff of relocated ministry/institution 
and related companies will number 2,500-4,000 in each city, and the planned induced 
population is 15,000-25,000. (PCBND, 2004). 
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To sum up, BNDP differed from the previous regional policies in many respects. Past 
regional policies were usually planned and executed by central government and their 
agencies without proper coordination. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration tried to change 
this so that each regional policy could be planned and enforced for each region. That is, 
each region became the unit of planning and execution of regional policy. The PCBND was 
founded to manage the BNDP, and the SABND was established to guide balanced 
development policy independently and systematically. 
This gave rise to great resistance, however, because wealth in South Korea is largely 
concentrated in real estate (Steinberg, 2006: 92), and such a move would severely 
damage the assets of many individuals in Seoul. The opposition party, the Grand National 
Party (GNP, now the Senuri Party), fiercely opposed the bill, and the Gyeonggi government 
and council members also expressed strong opposition to it. A petition against the 
constitutionality of the Special Act for the Administrative City Construction was filed, 
which claimed that “the act is practically intended for the relocation of the capital of the 
country.”  
The Constitutional Court held that although the capital of South Korea was not written in 
the Constitution, Seoul had been the capital for six hundred years, and hence, this location 
of the national capital had become a “constitutional convention.” Therefore, for any 
relocation of the national capital, the government needed either to amend the 
constitution or hold a national referendum. Although the Roh Moo-Hyun administration 
accepted the constitutional court’s decision, it insisted on the necessity of diluting the 
powers concentrated in Seoul and the Gyeonggi province (The Korea Herald, 28 June 
2012).  
A noticeable change in devolution happened in 2008 when the government was the Lee 
Myung-Bak administration (2008-2012) of the conservative party. The seismic change of 
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government meant it was not possible to ensure the consistency of the former regime’s 
specialised policies. According to the Maeil Gyeongje newspaper, Lee Myung-Bak pointed 
out in an interview with Reuter that the administrative city would prove to be the failure 
of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration.   
Although the Lee Myung-Bak administration and the Park Geun-Hye administration 
(2013-present) declared that they would continue with the outline of the policies 
inherited from the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, fundamental changes were made to 
the BRDP framework (17th Presidential Transition Team, 2008: 351).  
First, the PCBND was nearly abolished in the process of reorganising the government; then 
it was renamed the Presidential Committee on Regional Development (PCRD), meaning 
the term “balance” was removed. During the change, the PCBND criticised the former 
BRDP for its “adherence to arithmetic and consequent balance” (PCBND, 2008a: 2) and 
“whack-up policy” (PCBND, 2008b: 4). Secondly, the SABND was fully revised in April 2009 
despite opposition from other regions. The keywords, such as “balance” and “innovation”, 
disappeared in the new regional policy.   
The PCRD’s first annual report (2008: 15) pronounced that the paradigm of regional policy 
had been shifted “from balance and dispersion to co-prosperity and competition”. Finally, 
the Lee Myung-Bak administration decided to deregulate the restriction of the 
metropolitan area to facilitate national competiveness, which had been the main pillar of 
regional policy since the 1960s. Moreover, the GNP’s politicians constantly raised 
questions over the New Multifunctional Administrative City and innovation cities. This 
reorientation was a tremendous shock to the non-capital regions. However, the 
government could not prove the need for the drastic transformation. They also suggested 
that interregional cohesion should be a new policy goal, but the inconsistency of regional 
 95 
 
policies was responsible for intensifying conflicts between the capital region and non-
capital regions.  
  
 
4.5 Concluding reflections: continuing tension and new horizons   
The impact of national legacies in shaping regional politics was significant, as this chapter 
has demonstrated. The theoretical perspectives presented in Chapter 2 emphasise factors 
such as the inherited administrative structures, production capacities, and policy 
paradigms alongside the elements of national and local history and culture. The 
incorporation of this particular set of factors into the analysis of the changing politics of 
regional policies in South Korea does not imply the rejection of the dominant economic 
variables and statistical indices. On the contrary, it counterbalances the prevalent 
economistic tendency by supplementing the analytical framework with non-economic 
variables. 
Thus, this chapter has highlighted the institutional traditions in South Korea from the 
earlier history, the military regime, and the post-military regime period. The historical 
reviews have revealed the existence of regional administrative traditions across the 
country, which were directly related to the process of the national consolidation and state 
formation. These kinds of traditions offer a significant tool to explain the difficulties that 
appeared in certain localities regarding acceptance of particular administrative reforms 
and the constant attempts of others to restore previous structures.  
In addition, these reviews illustrated that whenever regional development policies existed, 
they normally constituted part of a broader territorial or sectorial national development 
plan. This subordination of local needs and aspirations by the national priorities and goals, 
irrespective of whether it was justified on nationalistic or ideological grounds, has resulted 
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in a lack of experience and of administrative capacity for the design and delivery of 
autonomous local and regional development projects. 
After having examined the historical development of state-regional relations, we may 
argue that South Korea’s regional autonomy is able to pursue regional interests. Although 
local autonomy is highly constrained by central government, the bulk of community 
power rests in the hands of the provincial governments. However, one issue that has 
received less attention is that of the interaction between regional interests and state 
interests. Does regional economic priority interact at all with national priority in South 
Korea? Does regional economic policy complement or contradict that of its central 
government?    
Certainly, the characteristics of the development patterns have influenced the nature of 
development policy and politics in the Gyeonggi province after the review of local 
autonomy in South Korea. The degree to which these inherited legacies, traditions, and 
norms have continued to exist, or to have been eliminated or amended during transition, 
as well as the degree of their impact in the post-catch-up economy, is examined in the 
next empirical chapters. 
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5 System of innovation in Gyeonggi province: core region and obstacles 
to change 
The theoretical perspectives having already been described in Chapter 2 and the national 
background regarding the national force in devolution having been reviewed in Chapter 
4, this chapter aims to respond to questions related to the current system of innovation 
in Gyeonggi province.   
This chapter focuses on industrial policy processes in Gyeonggi province by tracing the 
connections between specific strategic aims and policy agendas. During the period of the 
national rebuilding with the “Five-Year Economic Development Plan”, not only higher 
education institutes but also research institutions were concentrated in Gyeonggi 
province. The concentration of knowledge infrastructures has been very effective in 
accelerating growth because those institutions have provided the skilled labour required 
for the development. In addition, the strong push of the central government for the fast 
economic growth and the effective distribution of funds through the bank loans offered 
at a low rate of interest have helped to bring about rapid economic growth. However, due 
to the rapid increase in the population of the region, central government has begun to 
employ a series of population and economic redistribution policies. It is these conditions 
and pre-conditions that are characteristic of the RSI of Gyeonggi province to date.    
This chapter comprises four sections. The first section highlights the ways that the 
historical developments and legacies of the country, which were analysed in the previous 
chapter, have influenced the economic profile of Gyeonggi province.  
The second section focuses on policies and key actors together with the processes and 
practices that have shaped the province’s nature and its dynamics. Although Chapter 4 
touched upon issues from a broad range of regional policy areas, the section concentrates 
on the regional policy areas of urban development and industrial development in 
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Gyeonggi province. The formation and evolution of structures in terms of policies and 
relationships are explored along with the competence to enhance collaboration. The 
selected policy areas comprise typical examples of the challenges surrounding the 
processes of industrial policy and planning. It is also shown that, in Gyeonggi province, the 
ministries and the Technopark are dominant players in the knowledge generation and 
diffusion subsystem.  
The third section identifies the degree of the relationship between national and regional 
levels. In Gyeonggi province, the relation is already ensured given that regions have fewer 
responsibilities and competencies, implying that they have fewer policy-making powers.  
The chapter concludes by drawing reflections from the Gyeonggi province’s experience 
with regard to urban development policy and industrial policy in terms of the structural 
factors from a strategic-relational perspective.  
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Figure 5-1 Political map and location of key actors of Gyeonggi province 
 
 
Source: Gyeonggi provincial government (2012: 8) 
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5.1 The story so far 
Gyeonggi province is a region shaped like a doughnut surrounding the capital city, Seoul 
(see Figure 5-1), which has been located in the centre of this region for over a 
millennium.49 The area is 10,183 km2, which is only 10% of the total land area of South 
Korea. In terms of area, it is roughly half the size) of South East England (19,096 km2). The 
region is the most developed province, with a population of approximately 11 million and 
a huge consumer market with about 22 million people in the Seoul metropolitan area. 
Thus, more than 50% of South Korea’s population lives in the Seoul metropolitan area. 
 
Table 5-1 Population growth in Gyeonggi province 
 
 
Population (thousand) Growth (%) 
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 70-80 80-90 90-00 00-10 
Korea 30,882 37,436 43,847 46,136 48,581 21.2 17.1 5.2 5.3 
Gyeonggi 1,842 4,933 6,156 8,984 11,196 167.8 24.8 45.9 24.6 
Seoul 5,443 8,364 10,628 9,895 9,631 53.7 27.1 -6.9 -2.7 
Note: Population decreased sharply as many people died during the Korean War (1950s). South Korea 
experienced a baby boom, which led to a temporarily rapid population growth rate after the 1960s.  
Source: Korea Statistical Information System (KOSIS)  
 
Table 5-1 reveals that Gyeonggi province experienced a very rapid population increase of 
more than six-fold from 1,842 thousand in 1970 to 11,196 thousand in 2010. Over the 
same period, the entire South Korea population increased from 30.8 million to 48.5 
million. The majority of the total population growth occurred in Gyeonggi province. 
Population growth is about internal migration. The population of Gyeonggi province has 
exceeded that of Seoul since 2005. Indeed, the rate of growth in Gyeonggi province has 
                                                          
49 The name “Gyeonggi” was first used in 1026 (the Korae Dynasty). During the Korae Dynasty, 
Gyeonggi was governed by separate “Left Gyeonggi” and “Right Gyeonggi” administrations 
until 1414 (GRI, 2014:1). The founding of the Joseon Dynasty in 1392 and the moving of the 
seat of government to Hanyang (former Seoul) were the turning points in the shaping of 
Gyeonggi as we know it today. Left and Right Gyeonggi were combined and renamed 
Gyeonggi. The north western part came under the region of Hwanghae province (of North 
Korea) and the southern eastern part transferred to Gyeonggi province to form the current 
territorial boundary (GRI, 2014: 6).  
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been fuelled by a massive inward migration of residents from the countryside, particularly, 
between 1970 and 1980 (Mawson, 1997: 417).  
 
Figure 5-2 The growth of cities and counties in Gyeonggi province 
 
 
Note: The cities are highlighted in dark colour. 
Source: GRI (2008: 22)  
 
The growth of the region has been characterised by the construction of new satellite cities 
around the established metropolis since 1975. The share of the construction of new cities 
was especially important during the period 1985-1990.50 The Korean government began 
                                                          
50 The development of Gyeonggi province is related to the rapid industrialization of South 
Korea. In the course of industrialization, population and income per capita have grown as 
well, spurring the housing demand. In the late 1980s, the Seoul metropolitan area suffered 
from an extreme shortage of housing and soaring housing prices accompanied by severe real 
estate speculation, which became a political burden to the administration. Consequently, 
the Roh Tae-Woo administration initiated land development policies (Two Million Home 
Construction Plan) in Gyeonggi province. The “Two Million Home Construction Plan” is a 
housing policy from the early 1990s that built five new towns (Bundang, Ilsan, Pyeongchon, 
Sanbon, and Joongdong). These were developed as the main component of the plan, and 
they had provided about 300,000 new housing units by the mid-1990s. The five new towns 
are situated at a similar distance from the centre of Seoul (20-25 km) (the Korea Herald, July?
15, 2013). 
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to construct new satellite cities around the metropolis because the government has been 
concerned with the redistribution of the urban population due to the continuously rapid 
growth of the urban population, especially in Seoul (Kim Ik-Ki, 2010: 114).51    
During the 1980s and early 1990s, the Seoul metropolitan area emerged, following the 
expansion of Seoul into the surrounding areas, including Incheon and Gyeonggi province. 
The metropolitan area absorbed most of the national population and economic growth, 
while the rest of the country suffered from population loss and relatively slow economic 
growth (Hashiya, 1996: 449-453). In addition, despite large numbers of people, there are 
still large areas of unpopulated countryside in the region, especially east and north part 
where the region borders North Korea.52  
Population concentration is associated directly with economic development. Thus, 
Gyeonggi province often receives special attention, as it is perceived as a miniature 
version of South Korea due to its economic profile, which to some extent, mirrors the 
country’s economic structure.  
Gyeonggi province produces around a quarter (23%) of South Korea’s value-added. The 
region exported goods and services to the value of 99,100 billion KRW in 2010, and 18.4% 
of South Korea’s total exports (GRI, 2012: 14). It also has a representative share of the 
GDP, which was 13.8% in 1985, and 19.8% in 2010, presenting a total of 232 trillion KRW 
at current prices (see Table 5-2). In terms of Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP), 
                                                          
51 At the city level, there are in total 27 cities and 4 counties in Gyeonggi province, of which 
seven are large cities with a population of more than 700,000; Suwon is the biggest city (with 
a population above a million), and it is the capital of Gyeonggi province. The population of 
the other relevant cities at the centre of this thesis are as follows: Ansan (seventh biggest 
with a population of 739,493) and Sungnam (second with 979,035). Those cities are 
concentrated in the western and southern area of the region, and some cities were elevated 
from county to city status owing to the influence of Seoul’s new town development plan (see 
more specific population status by city and country at http://eng.gg.go.kr/276). 
52  Gyeonggi province borders North Korea’s Hwanghae province. In fact, the top part of 
Gyeonggi province was cut off when the country was split in two after the Korean war. So 
the region is strategically important in terms of international relations and business markets. 
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Gyeonggi province ranks as the second most prosperous region amongst sixteen regions, 
behind Seoul. 
 
Table 5-2 Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) in Korea (1985-2010) (unit: a billion KRW) 
 
 
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Korea 89,570 198,618 420,686 603,733 869,304 1,172,742 
Seoul 22,877 51,989 108,506 151,355 208,899 271,649 
Busan 6,966 14,386 26,080 34,127 48,068 59,531 
Daegu 3,874 8,644 16,032 21,859 28,756 35,631 
Incheon 4,048 9,786 21,287 27,121 40,398 56,856 
Gwangju 0 4,491 9,619 13,134 18,896 25,140 
Daejeon 0 4,680 9,645 14,008 20,029 26,412 
Ulsan 0 0 0 28,958 41,697 59,159 
Gyeonggi 12,324 32,541 72,993 114,628 169,315 232,428 
Gangwon 3,599 6,704 12,250 16,964 23,014 28,828 
Choongbuk 3,122 5,974 14,195 19,841 26,720 36,233 
Chooingnam 5,691 7,301 17,230 29,277 47,497 76,353 
Jeonbuk 3,389 6,446 14,222 19,298 25,221 34,643 
Jeonnam 6,586 9,541 21,262 27,829 42,815 58,750 
Gyeongbuk 6,740 13,700 26,593 40,377 61,757 78,313 
Gyeongnam 9,556 20,552 46,590 39,600 58,250 82,340 
Jeju 792 1,877 4,175 5,350 7,966 10,468 
Note: Results for the Gyeonggi province and for Korea are highlighted in bold.   
Source: Korea Statistical Information System (KOSIS)  
 
This rapid economic growth can be better explained in relation to rapid industrialization 
and urbanization (Kim Ik-Ki, 2010: 116-118). The rapid expansion of the manufacturing 
sector and the correlating increase in service industries has resulted in a large influx of 
the rural population into urban areas. The central government adopted strategies of 
industrial concentration by converging investments on manufacturing sectors to achieve 
efficient resource allocations (Markusen and Park Sam Ock, 1993; Park Sam Ock, 1993). 
Gyeonggi province has experienced rapid spatial changes and a drastic concentration of 
economic activities.  
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5.1.1 Key industries and Banwol-Siwha industrial districts  
There are more than 60,000 manufacturing SMEs in the Gyeonggi province, accounting 
for approximately 33% of all SMEs in Korea. Furthermore, 5,600 venture firms are also 
operating in the region, comprising about 30% of all such firms in the country (Korea IT 
times, November 3, 2009). Particularly, similar to the economic development of South 
Korea, Gyeonggi province’s industrial tradition is closely linked to mechatronics (i.e. 
mechanical engineering and electronics)53, textiles, and information and communication 
technology (ICT). Although these industries have declined over recent decades, traditional 
industries with low growth rates are still over-represented (see Table 5-3). 
 
Table 5-3 Valued added of key industries by regions in South Korea (2011, %) 
 
 Automobile Shipbuilding Machinery Steel Precision chemical 
Textile/ 
garments Electronics 
Telecommu
nication 
Semi-
conductor 
1 Gyeonggi (26.1) 
Gyeongnam 
(44.1) 
Gyeonggi 
(26.9) 
Gyeongbuk 
(30.8) 
Ulsan 
(33.9) 
Seoul 
(43.1) 
Gyeonggi 
(28.2) 
Gyeongbuk 
(59.4) 
Gyeonggi 
(79.7) 
2 Ulsan (20.7) 
Ulsan 
(40.7) 
Gyeongnam 
(26.3) 
Jeonnam 
(25.9) 
Jeonnam 
(22.1) 
Gyeonggi 
(13.7) 
Gyeongnam 
(18.1) 
Gyeonggi 
(31.5) 
Choongbuk 
(7.6) 
3 Choongnam (10.7) 
Jeonnam 
(10.1) 
Incheon 
(10.5) 
Choongnam 
(8.9) 
Gyeonggi 
(12.3) 
Gyeongbuk 
(12.7) 
Choongnam 
(17.2) 
Seoul 
(2.5) 
Choongnam 
(5.3) 
4 Gyeongnam (8.3) 
Busan 
(3.1) 
Choonnam 
(7.7) 
Gyeongnam 
(7.7) 
Choongnam 
(10.4) 
Daegu 
(7.9) 
Gangju 
(11.1) 
Incheon 
(1.9) 
Gyeongbuk 
(2.9) 
5 Gwangju (7.8) 
Jeonbuk 
(1.3) 
Busan 
(5.1) 
Busan 
(6.5) 
Jeonbuk 
(5.4) 
Busan 
(5.9) 
Gyeongbuk 
(6.5) 
Gyeongnam 
(1.6) 
Seoul 
(1.3) 
6 Jeonbuk (6.0) 
Gyeongbuk 
(0.6) 
Gyeongbuk 
(4.7) 
Gyeonggi 
(5.3) 
Choongbuk 
(5.0) 
Ulsan 
(5.3) 
Incheon 
(5.5) 
Choongnam 
(0.9) 
Gwangju 
(1.3) 
7 Gyeongbuk (5.1) 
Choongnam 
(0.1) 
Daegu 
(4.0) 
Incheon 
(4.9) 
Gyeongbuk 
(3.3) 
Gyeongnam 
(2.6) 
Choongbuk 
(3.6) 
Daejeon 
(0.7) 
Jeonbuk 
(0.9) 
8 Incheon (4.7) - 
Ulsan 
(2.6) 
Jeonbuk 
(3.7) 
Incheon 
(2.2) 
Choongnam 
(2.6) 
Seoul 
(2.9) 
Choongbuk 
(0.5) 
Deajeon 
(0.6) 
9 Daegu (3.3) - 
Jeonbuk 
(2.6) 
Ulsan 
(2.8) 
Daejeon 
(1.9) 
Jeonbuk 
(1.7) 
Daegu 
(2.0) 
Daegu 
(0.4) 
Incheon 
(0.3) 
10 Choongbuk (3.1) - 
Daejeon 
(2.1) 
Gangwon 
(1.1) 
Gyeongnam 
(1.4) 
Choongbuk 
(1.6) 
Busan 
(1.4) 
Gwangju 
(0.3) 
Gyeongnam 
(0.1) 
11 Busan (2.9) - 
Choongbuk 
(2.1) 
Choongbuk 
(1.0) 
Busan 
(1.0) 
Incheon 
(1.2) 
Daejeon 
(1.4) 
Busan 
(0.2) 
Daegu 
(0.1) 
12 Gangwon (0.8) - 
Seoul 
(2.1) 
Gwangju 
(0.7) 
Seoul 
(0.5) 
Gwangju 
(0.8) 
Jeonnam 
(0.8) 
Jeonbuk 
(0.1) - 
13 Daejeon (0.3) - 
Gwangju 
(2.0) 
Daegu 
(0.5) 
Gangwon 
(0.4) 
Daejeon 
(0.5) 
Jeonbuk 
(0.6) 
Gangwon 
(0.1) - 
14 Seoul (0.1) - 
Jeonnam 
(0.7) 
Seoul 
(0.1) 
Daegu 
(0.2) 
Jeonnam 
(0.3) 
Ulsan 
(0.4) 
Jeonnam 
(0.0) - 
15 Jeonnam (0.1) - 
Gangwon 
(0.6) 
Daejeon 
(0.1) 
Gwangju 
(0.1) 
Gangwon 
(0.2) 
Gangwon 
(0.3) - - 
16 - - - - Jeju (0.0) - - - - 
Source: Korea Statistical Information System (KOSIS) 
 
                                                          
53  “Mechatronics” involves technologies in mechanical engineering, electronics, electrical 
engineering, control engineering and computing. “Automated robots” at manufacturing 
assembly lines are an example of mechatronics. 
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The key industries are agglomerated in particular areas within the region. The northern 
part of Gyeonggi province, where LG Display is based, serves as the production base for 
OLED and LCD panels, sectors in which South Korea boasts the highest world market share. 
NEG, KOTEM, and Ulvac Korea, world-renowned names in LCD, are also located here, 
making the location a display-products complex. In the southern section of the province 
lies a car-making cluster, where the country’s largest car manufacturers, including 
Hyundai-Kia and Ssangyong, and foreign parts-makers (e.g. Bosch, Siemens, and Delphi) 
are situated. Vehicle institutes can also be found here. 
 
Figure 5-3 Geographical distribution in Gyeonggi province 
 
 
Source: GSTEP (2011a: 34) 
 
In particular, firms are clustered in the Banwol-Shiwha industrial district of the west coast 
of Gyeonggi province. It is a national industrial district, which was originally intended to 
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relocate the pollution-making industries from Seoul to Ansan.54 Due to its original purpose, 
the district accepted polluting industries, such as chemical production, plating, dyeing, 
coal, textile, steel industries and so on. These industries were the main producers and 
exporters that brought economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s (Park Sang-Chul, 2007, 
2012; KDI, 2012). Currently, more than 9,000 firms occupy the area, with a total 
production of 41.3 trillion KRW (7.72 billion USD) in exports and over 170,000 employees.  
 
Table 5-4 Banwol-Siwha Industrial districts (September 2006) 
 
 Banwol Siwha 
Preparation 
period 1977-1987 1986-2002 
Management KICOX, K-Water KICOX, K-Water 
Size 15,374,000m² 16,581,000m² 
Firms 2,425  (Small:1,960, Medium:437, Large:28) 
4,551 
(Small:4,099 Medium:445, Large:7) 
Key  
Industry 
Machine  954 38% Machine  2,350 49% 
Electronics 504 20% Electronics 551 12% 
Auto parts 124 5% Auto parts 308 6% 
Chemistry  322 13% Chemistry  455 9% 
Textile 213 8% Textile 109 2% 
Steel 101 4% Steel 424 9% 
Others 328 13% Others 620 13% 
Products 18,830 hundred million KRW/month 19,203 hundred million KRW/month 
Exports 288 million USD/month 320 million USD/month 
Employment 89,075 83,635 
Note: The creation and the management of industrial districts have been executed by KICOX and K-Water. 
KICOX (Korea Industrial Complex Corporation) has managed and supported firms entering their industrial 
districts since 1997. K-Water (Korea Water Resources Corporation) is a government-funded organization that 
was established in 1967. Its major business activities include water resource development, power generation, 
dam management, water supply, industrial infrastructure development, and new town and industrial complex 
development.  
Source: Korea Industrial Complex Corporation (KICOX)   
 
                                                          
54 During the 1980s, Ansan increased in its capacity in terms of population. Ansan earned the 
title of “city” in 1986 with a population of 120,000 people. Due to increasing demands for 
additional factory space, the central government confirmed construction of the second 
industrial district, called the Shiwha industrial district, right next to Banwol industrial district 
in 1986. After earning the title of city and completing the construction of the additional 
industrial space, the city-region grew rapidly. In 2008, the population grew rapidly up to 
750,000, including 20,000 foreigners. 
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5.1.2 Higher knowledge infrastructures 
Higher knowledge infrastructures are more unevenly distributed across the country. 
Figure 5-4 illustrates how total patents granted between 2000 and 2009 in South Korea 
were concentrated in Gyeonggi province. Only nine cities averaged more than 1000 
patents per year between 2000 and 2009; those nine cities accounted for 161,216 patents, 
that is, 36.8% of the all patents of South Korea. Four cities are located in the Seoul 
metropolitan area.  
 
Figure 5-4 Distribution of patents (2000-2009) and top nine cities (> 1,000 per year)   
 
Source: Korea Intellectual Property Office (KIPO)  
 
R&D actors who are particularly strong include high-ranking universities and research and 
technology organizations. Table 5-5 shows the density of Gyeonggi province’s research 
institutes. In 2001, there were 1,750 research institutes; however, by 2009, the number 
of research institutes had risen to 4,957. It is a characteristic of the region’s higher 
education infrastructure that most of the universities are generally research-oriented and 
teaching-oriented; as a result, they often lag behind in terms of technology transfer and 
business spinoff activities, such as technology transfer offices (TTO) and venture 
 
City Province Patents 
Suwon Gyeonggi  3,924 
Yongin Gyeonggi  2,097 
Yuseoung-gu Daejeon 2,080 
Seongnam Gyeonggi  1,874 
Gangnam Seoul 1,513 
Seocho Seoul 1,406 
Anyang Gyeonggi  1,143 
Songpa Seoul 1,076 
Pohang Gyeongbuk 1,009 
Total  161,216 
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incubators. Thus, there are only 49 venture incubators in the universities in the region 
(KISTEP, 2012).  
 
Table 5-5 Research and technology organizations in Gyeonggi province (2001-2009) 
(numbers, %) 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
University 52 (14.57) 
54 
(13.88) 
61 
(15.33) 
53 
(15.27) 
42 
(18.67) 
55 
(18.71) 
67 
(18.55) 
65 
(17.29) 
72 
(18.41) 
Public 37 (15.68) 
33 
(15.64) 
42 
(17.43) 
40 
(17.54) 
17 
(17.78) 
41 
(18.64) 
43 
(16.22) 
47 
(14.55) 
56 
(14.81) 
Private 1,661 (24.68) 
1,830 
(26.32) 
1,994 
(27.77) 
2,075 
(27.89) 
2,381 
(28.27) 
2,975 
(28.68) 
3,461 
(29.39) 
3,992 
(30.14) 
4,829 
(30.70) 
Total 1,750 (23.89) 
1,917 
(25.38) 
2,097 
(26.82) 
2,169 
(27.06) 
2,477 
(27.58) 
3,071 
(28.21) 
3,571 
(28.80) 
4,104 
(29.43) 
4,957 
(29.67) 
Note: (   ) refers to % of total institutes in South Korea.     
Sources: Regional science and technology year book (2004, 2005, 2008, 2010)  
 
Most key research and technology organizations are funded by the central government 
(e.g. Korea Electric Testing Institute, National Cancer Centre, Korea Electric Institute, 
Korea Railroad Research Institute). The provincial government also supports similar 
organizations, such as Gyeonggi Product Research Institute, Gyeonggi Research Institute, 
and so on. These knowledge infrastructures are located in the southern part of the region 
(Figure 5-5).  
The region benefits from a favourable knowledge infrastructure, good access to the 
networks, and from the geographical proximity to the market agglomeration, in particular 
to the neighbouring regions of Seoul and Incheon and the country’s international airport. 
This geographical advantage combined with the number of firms and the population 
concentration has made it the heart of South Korea’s economy and an important region 
for trade in East Asia.  
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Figure 5-5 Universities and public and private research institutes in Gyeonggi province 
 
 
Note: Private Research Institute (more than 200 researchers)    
Source: GSTEP (2011a: 12-13) 
 
 
5.2 Policies shaping regional development in Gyeonggi province   
This section outlines the political context of regional policy in Gyeonggi province. This 
aggregate overview of industrial policy areas and instruments examines how working 
relationships span across levels of governments and contribute to the formation of 
policies and a strategically selective context.  
As we reviewed in Chapter 4, the central government exerted a power over Gyeonggi’s 
regional development in two ways. On the one hand, in the name of the balanced 
development policy, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration promoted several relocation 
policies in the 2000s. In Gyeonggi province, the Seoul metropolitan regulatory policy has 
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been the major obstacle to the urban development policy. It incorporates land use 
planning and other developmental issues, such as an infrastructure facility planning 
(transport, water, sewage, and so on). On the other hand, to date, aiming for national 
growth, the central government still holds the initiative to cultivate industrial clusters and 
foster high-tech industries for the respective regions. In this section, we look closely at 
the two different regional policies.  
 
5.2.1 Urban development policy  
5.2.1.1 Containment of growth of the metropolitan area  
As mentioned earlier, the rhetoric of “balanced development” has been the cornerstone 
of national agenda since 2004 (Lee Yong-Sook, 2009: 357-358). The development of 
regional policy in South Korea, as examined in the previous chapter, shows that there have 
been radical discrete changes in the urban development policy: one under the Kim Dae-
Jung administration and the other under the Roh Moo-Hyun administration. The 
significant changes in the key elements and ideological attributes of regionalist thinking 
can be seen before and after the two governmental changes.  
In particular, the launch of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration in February 2004 marked 
the highest point from which a new approach, in stark contrast to the approach under the 
previous administrations, unfolded. The radical change in thinking under the Roh Moo-
Hyun administration was heralded by the creation of the PCBND.  
Under the auspices of the PCBND, a sizable state policy was put into action to achieve the 
stated goals of regional development, that is, to achieve the maximum benefit from the 
extant local administrative system rather than creating a new scale of regional entities 
(PCBND and MOCIE, 2004; PCBND and MOCT, 2005). On the one hand, all scales of existing 
political jurisdictions, whether local, metropolitan, or provincial, were adopted as a unit 
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outlet on which regional innovation systems operated,  and on the other, various policies 
for balanced regional development were carried out.  
Five specific policy areas, i.e., innovation policy, regional equity policy, industrial policy, 
spatial policy, and Seoul metropolitan management policy, constitute the core of the 
balanced regional development policy in this period (Cho Cheol-Joo, 2012: 247). These 
policy areas represented a new regional policy that the Roh Moo-Hyun administration had 
pursued based on a balanced model. Under this model, two types of policy measures were 
adopted: one was the proactive decentralization strategy to enhance a region’s internal 
growth potential based on the idea of a regional innovation system, and the other was 
the proactive globalization strategy to boost national competitiveness. 
Urban development policy is initially formed at the national level, and it then expands 
across the regional levels. Accordingly, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport 
(MOLIT) is responsible for preparing, approving, monitoring, and adjusting regional 
planning (Kim Heung Min and Han Sheng Sun, 2012: 152). The MOLIT defines how to 
survey and predict the future population and specifies what should be included in sectoral 
activities. Thus, the basic plan could easily turn into a comprehensive plan rather than a 
strategic plan. Even though the basic plan is supposed to be a long-term plan, it can occur 
that the long-term plan is changed to cater for the needs of regional development projects 
in specific areas. The central government formulates these plans and the provincial 
government has to follow them up.  
 
5.2.1.2 CRRPA and its relation to industrial development 
In 1982, Gyeonggi province received planning guidance through the ratification of the 
“Capital Region Readjustment Plan Act (CRRPA)”. Since then, its goals and amendments 
have dictated infrastructure development and provisions for uneven development.  
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According to the provision of the CRRPA, “the First Metropolitan Area Management Plan 
(1984-1996)” was prepared in 1984. The plan was implemented together with other land 
use regulations at the same time. The basic tenet of the plan was to divide the Seoul 
metropolitan area into five zones55 and to restrict the location of “population-inducing 
facilities” in each zone to varying degrees. For example, the construction of new large 
office buildings, colleges and universities, and large factories was in principle banned 
within the Density Abatement Area, which includes Seoul and its vicinity, while the 
restrictions were more relaxed in outlying areas (PCBND, 2003, 2006).  
These five zones were consolidated into three because of a 1994 amendment to the 
CRRPA. The Second Capital Region Management Plan for 1997-2011, prepared according 
to the same Act, adopted a somewhat more flexible approach.  
The current plan is the third of its kind (2006-2020). The Capital Area Development Plan 
takes precedence over other laws and regulations in place in the area involving land use 
plans and various development plans. In fact, it forms the basis of those laws and 
regulations. The Ministry of Land, Transport, and Maritime Affairs develops a draft and 
submits it to the Capital Area Development Plan Committee (chaired by the Prime 
Minister), which deliberates and finalizes it. The Capital Region Readjustment Planning 
Act contains regulations for the construction of universities, factories, public complexes, 
and other large buildings; regulations on the development of land for industrial and 
housing purposes; and location rules set out according to specific districts in the area (e.g. 
those which have measures in place to curb overcrowding, those with measures to 
manage growth, and nature reserves). 
                                                          
55 The five zones are Relocation Promotion Zone, Growth Management Zone, Development 
Promotion Zone, Environment Preservation Zone and Development Reservation Zone.  
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The current policies are summarized in Table 5-6 and Figure 5-6. The location of factories 
is subject to an annual quota system. In addition, factories are subject to another law, 
which regulates the construction, expansion, and relocation of factories depending on 
firm size and the type of industry. For instance, the new construction and expansion of 
existing factories owned by large enterprises is, in principle, prohibited in all three zones 
(i.e. the whole Seoul metropolitan area). However, exceptions are made for a list of 
industries that are deemed vital for the nation’s economic growth. For example, the 
construction and expansion of manufacturing plants in the Growth management area has 
been allowed for several high-tech industries (e.g. LG-Philips semiconductor).  
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Table 5-6 Regulations of location in the Seoul metropolitan area 
 
Zones Density Abatement Zone Growth Management 
Zone 
Environment Protection 
Zone 
Location 14 cities near Seoul 14 cities in north and 
South Gyeonggi 
8 cities in East Gyeonggi 
Large 
commercial 
building 
Subject to congestion charge  Allowed  Prohibited  
Colleges, 
universities 
and 
other higher 
education 
institutions 
Prohibited in principle  
(exceptions: new vocational  
school, increase of student 
roll within regional quota, 
relocation from Seoul) 
Prohibited in principle  
(exceptions: new 
vocational school, new 
university with less than 
50 annual entrants, 
increase of student roll 
within regional quota, 
relocation from other 
parts of the Capital 
Region)  
Prohibited in principle  
(exceptions: new 
vocational school, new 
university with less than 
50 annual entrants, 
increase of student roll 
within regional quota, 
relocation from other 
parts of Environment 
Protection Area)  
Factories Subject to annual quota. Other zone-specific restrictions by Industrial Agglomeration 
and Factory Construction Law 
Corporate 
training 
facilities 
Prohibited  Prohibited in principle  
(exceptions: expansion of 
existing building, 
relocation within the  
Capital Region, others 
approved by the 
committee)  
Prohibited in principle  
(exceptions: expansion of 
existing building, other 
labour-related facility 
approved by the Minister) 
Residential 
land 
development 
Approval by the committee  
required for large project 
after population impact 
Approval by the 
committee required for 
large project after 
population impact study 
Small projects allowed  
(less than 30,000 m2: 
allowed, 30,000 to 
60,000: approved by the  
committee)  
Designation of 
Industrial 
zone 
Prohibited  
 (exceptions: cases which 
does not increase total 
current industrial area on the 
provincial level)  
Allowed in accordance 
with the Capital Region  
Management Plan (such 
as relocation from 
Congestion Suppression 
Area)  
Prohibited  
Industrial land  
development  
Approval by the committee  
required for large project 
after population impact study 
Approval by the 
committee  
required for large project 
after population impact 
study 
Small projects allowed  
(less than 30,000 m2: 
allowed, 30,000 to 
60,000: approved by the  
committee)  
Resort  
development  
Approval by the committee  
required for large project 
after population impact study  
Approval by the 
committee required for 
large project after 
population impact study  
Small projects allowed  
(less than 30,000 m2: 
allowed, 30,000 to 
60,000: approved by the  
committee)  
Source: Gyeonggi provincial government (2012: 2)  
Note: “Committee” in the table refers to the Capital Region Growth Management Committee headed by the 
Prime Minister.  
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Figure 5-6 Urban development regulations in the Seoul Metropolitan Area 
 
 
Source: Gyeonggi provincial government (2012: 3) 
 
The CRRPA met with mixed responses. On the one hand, the other regions interpreted 
such moves as compromising the traditional spatial policy stance, because they believed 
the increasing prosperity of the Seoul metropolitan area to be incompatible with the 
growth of other regions. 
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On the other hand, economists in the metropolitan area, including Gyeonggi province, 
claimed that the changes were only marginal, while the rationality of the policies 
remained unproven and unwarranted. For example, they challenged the rationale for the 
annual quota on the allowable total floor area of manufacturing plants set by government 
officials and distributed over localities in the region. Some Gyeonggi Provincial council 
members tonsured their hair as an expression of vigorous protest,56  and opposition 
advertisements were made against the SABND in newspapers (see Figure 5-7). The capital 
region argued that excluding Seoul, Incheon, and Gyeonggi from the SABND was reverse 
discrimination against the core regions of the nation and that the non-capital region 
oriented policy would weaken national competitiveness.  
 
Figure 5-7 Tonsure strike in Gyeonggi Provincial council (11 November, 2003) 
 
 
Sources: ohmynews newspaper. 
                                                          
56 In South Korea, ‘tonsure’ was derived from Buddhist culture in ancient India. In modern 
history, the tonsure is expressed as a means of strong resistance. Hunger strikes are another 
means of resistance. Both customs are a warning of the last struggle. During authoritarian 
administrations, students demonstrated against the military regime, some of them shaving 
their hair in protest. Related to regional politics, the former president Kim Dae-jung went on 
a hunger strike for 13 days to achieve local autnomy in October 1990. Recently, some of 
relatives of the victims of the Sewol Ferry disaster in 2014 have conducted a tonsure strike 
and a hunger strike for more than 40 days to draw attention to their demand for a full 
independent inquiry into the ferry disaster that claimed more than 300 lives.     
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Overall, it is fair to say that national policies towards Gyeonggi province have consistently 
aimed at controlling population growth and economic activities, though there has been a 
shift away from containment to management over the last decade or so. 
 
5.2.2 Development and upgrade of the industry in Gyeonggi province  
5.2.2.1 Foundations of Gyeonggi Technopark 
One important structural factor is the long partnership that has developed through the 
regional hubs’ so-called Technopark (Chung Sun-Yang, 1999; Hassink, 2001, 2002; Cooke, 
et al., 2004). Since the 1990s, regional policy has assumed a role beyond the national 
economic policy with the upgrade of industrial districts with knowledge-based industries 
and new technology-based firms (NTBF). Innovation policies have become a major 
component of the industrial policy (Lee Won-Young, 2000: 281). The effort to strengthen 
the regional networks progressed with the 16 Technoparks, which played the role of 
coordinators at the provincial level. Industrial districts are mostly organized by evaluating 
this point of view, through which knowledge infrastructures are established (Park Sam 
Ock, 2007, 2010).  
An attempt was made to foster Technoparks as an important means for regional 
technology innovation and economic development. Ever since, Technoparks have created 
a channel for economic expansion or a revival of economic growth as a whole, though 
they mainly focus on knowledge-based start-ups. The allocation of resources at the 
national level is the first step in industrial policy decision making (OECD, 2012: 103-104). 
In 1997, the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy (MOCIE, former MKE) selected 
18 Technoparks for long-term financial support.  Technoparks have been located in 16 
different provinces and cities for several decades and have become representative of 
regional key players in a knowledge generation and diffusion subsystem. The MOCIE 
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supervises the Technoparks and allocates the necessary budgets, and they have become 
dominant players to promote industrial development.   
They are fairly homogenous across the different settings across South Korea, and they are 
organized according to areas corresponding to the administrative regions. In 1998, as part 
of the scheme planned by the MOCIE, the Gyeonggi Technopark was established from the 
outset as a collaboration between Ansan city and the provincial governments. Gyeonggi 
Technopark also had strong relationship with Hanyang University and the public research 
institutes of central government.57  
 
Figure 5-8 Gyeonggi Technopark  
 
 
Source: author’s own creation.  
 
Ordinarily, we imagine a ‘park’ to be a collection of buildings. However, a Technopark is 
implemented within a single building (see Figure 5-8). As an organization, Gyeonggi 
Technopark employs a staff of 55 engineers, economists, and legal experts, as well as 
                                                          
57  Key public research institutes are Korea Institute of Industrial Technology, Korea 
Electrotechnology Research Institute, Korea Testing Laboratory, Korea Ocean Research and 
Development Institute and Rural Research Institute.   
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administrative and financial personnel. They offer advisory (technical, legal, financial), 
coordinating, administrative, and information support to local firms. Especially, their most 
significant role is providing facilities to venture firms.  
The Technopark itself seems like the singular incubator. Gyeonggi Technopark operates 
open laboratories with 45 pieces of research equipment available for communal use 
among the start-ups inside the park or the neighbouring industrial districts (Banwol-Siwha 
industrial districts). This support allows firms to save money and time as well as enabling 
them to learn technical capability. Furthermore, Gyeonggi Technopark was from the 
outset actively involved in regional development from venture incubators to the 
commercialization and the marketing. Around 100 start-ups and SMEs have also been 
located in the building (see Table 5-7). Incubators are mostly specialized in the field of ICT 
and the bio industry, but also in mechatronics and for providing other services. Research 
services are provided for programmes that have commercial potential.   
 
Table 5-7 Number of firms (SMEs and start-ups) in tenant in Gyeonggi Technopark 
 
Industry 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Bio 13 15 17 18 20 19 20 
ICT 12 24 27 23 26 26 35 
Automobile 6 8 8 6 10 7 8 
Robots 2 2 2 3 4 8 9 
Others 25 27 26 21 22 18 21 
Total 58 76 80 71 82 78 93 
Source: Gyeonggi Technopark (2010: 23)  
 
In addition to incubator services, Gyeonggi Technopark provides services for the 
evaluation of new business ideas, making the final business plan, and finding partners and 
additional sources of funding. Venture firms can also use office space at the Park and 
consulting services in areas of the incubator’s specialization. Those planning to start any 
entrepreneurial activity can contact the incubator when developing their business idea. A 
so-called pre-incubator service can be applied to examine whether the business idea is 
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feasible and suited to the incubator. Acting as a business incubator, a Technopark may 
accept new start-up firms with an acceptable business plan. In addition, as part of the pre-
incubator services, it is possible to get funding from the MKE, which is intended for 
financing research and development in Gyeonggi province. They offer preparation and 
implementation of research and product development programmes that can be financed 
both from national funds and from regional funds (see Table 5-8).  
 
Table 5-8 The key roles of Gyeonggi Technopark  
 
Services Detail 
Open Labs 
45 pieces of equipment are available for the purpose of communal use 
among the firms in the Technopark or the neighbouring firms (e.g. 
Electronic/IT, fine chemistry, machinery, and bio) 
Financial support for 
marketing exploration 
Gyeonggi Technopark chooses five or fewer firms to set up creative 
marketing strategies for launching new products and exploring new markets. 
The supporting amount of money is up to around 8,000 dollars per company. 
Marketing consulting Gyeonggi Technopark offers supporting and consulting services for helping companies resolve their business difficulties. 
Support for 
developing Industrial 
design 
Gyeonggi Technopark supports up to 75% of all costs for producing new 
design for 10 or fewer chosen companies, and it hosts annual Ansan Design 
Contests 
Standardization 
National or international authentication support for ISO 9000, ISO14000, KS, 
CE, CSA, MINT, JET, UL, etc.: KTL (Korea Testing Laboratory), a national 
authentication agency has its branch office in Gyeonggi Technopark. 
PR Translation and interpretation services for marketing, PR, fairs, etc. 
Oversea marketing 
Helping companies explore overseas markets and regular consultations on 
administration, accounting, legal and patent related affairs, and public 
relation activities for tenant companies. 
Source: Gyeonggi Technopark website (http://www.gtp.or.kr/).  
 
Since Gyeonggi Technopark operates at a national level, we may ask whether the 
collaborations it fosters are underpinning the regional or the national environment. If 
seen as underpinning the national environment, this would mean that the national policy 
influences the regional cooperation more than the regional needs that are driving the 
Technopark’s activities. If too broadly engaged with national policy, the result might be 
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industrial development policies that are homogenous across the country rather than 
being sufficiently focused on specific regional economic demands; in addition, the 
engagement with national priorities might result in Technopark becoming too dependent 
on financial support from the central government.  
 
5.2.2.2 Inter-governmental relations   
Since regional policy and industrial development has been mainly shaped at the national 
level, the provincial government has to deal with the plans and aspirations of other 
government agencies along with internal challenges in the relationships between the MKE 
and the MEST (OECD, 2012: 98).58 The MKE works primarily with industrial development. 
It is the most influential, as it is charged with keeping the industry competitive; advancing 
the design, materials, automobiles, shipbuilding, machinery, steel, petrochemicals, and 
textile industries; and promoting the high-tech industries of semiconductors, information 
technology, and bio technology. In addition, the MEST is primarily responsible for higher 
education and is charged with formulating policies for research and development 
collaboration in universities.59 
However, there is a perceived lack of confidence in the efficacy of inter-ministerial 
relationships. Due to unresolved institutional misconducts, poor intra-governmental 
coordination was frequently cited as a cause of the lack of progress (Kim Heewon, 2008; 
Park Chun-Oh, 2011). Criticisms relate to inefficient relationships between the industrial 
                                                          
58 As the National Assembly of South Korea passed the government reorganization bill on 22 
March 2013, the Ministry of the Knowledge Economy (MKE) was renamed the “Ministry of 
Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE)” after taking over trade roles. The Ministry of Education, 
Science and Technology (MEST) being named the “Ministry of Science, ICT and Future 
Planning (MSIP)”. The ministry is in charge of promoting science and technology and 
telecommunication policies (The Korea Times, March 22, 2013). In this thesis, we use the 
terminology of that time, though the ministries have undergone numerous name changes. 
59  Though they are two largest players, other ministries with a science, technology, and 
innovation mandate have appointed their own advisory committees to help formulate policy. 
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public administration and the regions, which resulted in overlapping activities between 
the sectoral and the regional operational programmes, and the lack of communication 
between the MKE and MEST.  
These problems can be illustrated in relation to intergovernmental relations on industrial 
policy. In order to reinforce the position of the Seoul metropolitan area as a high-tech 
innovation hub, the central government enacted ‘the Promotion Law of Cooperative 
Research Activities’ in 1994. The following year, the MEST began establishing ‘Regional 
Research Centres (RRC)’ to promote research in universities. The RRC program was not an 
explicit cluster policy tool, although the term ‘cluster’ was being used in South Korean 
academic and policy circles in the mid-1990s. The RRC program’s main aim was to 
establish regional research networks among universities, firms, and local authorities, all 
of which had a common interest in motivating regionally specialized innovation (Lee Kong-
Rae, 2003: 30). Three RRCs are located at three universities,60 and the aim is to foster 
cooperation between universities and SMEs in the region. By offering technological 
consultants, co-workers, seminars, and training courses, and the use of scientific 
equipment for experiments, 37 RRCs have been established nationwide to increase the 
share of firm collaboration with universities in innovation projects.  
At the same time, the MKE established the Technology Innovation Centres (TIC). Both 
centres had similar aims, that is, to establish a regional knowledge network among actors 
and to secure their power in the region. In 2006, both RRC and TIC were integrated into 
one centre and were renamed Regional Innovation Centres (RIC) to avoid duplication by 
the presidential office.    
 
 
 
 
                                                          
60 Hanyang University in Ansan, Myoungji University in Yongin and Suwon University in Suwon-
city 
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Figure 5-9 Regional Innovation Centres 
 
 
Source: author’s own creation.  
 
This was because there was no clear division of roles among the industrial policy-makers. 
However, in the absence of a clear-cut division of constitutional responsibilities, the 
central government has been able to use its power (i.e. its ability to set up initiatives in 
industrial development policy) to make its presence felt in all areas. Mechanisms 
established to manage inter-governmental relations have not been utilised systematically: 
the concordats on cooperation in intergovernmental relations with equivalent or 
overlapping policy responsibilities are bypassed.  
 
5.3 Relationship between nation-state and region  
In our interviews during fieldwork, the excellent spatial position of Gyeonggi province 
within the national system was one of its main characteristics as an RSI. The most 
important players of the innovation process in Gyeonggi province stem from national 
initiatives, namely, the MKE and the MEST, and its agencies, such as Technopark. Most of 
the regional development plans come from these two ministries.  
The provincial government has participated only when the central government has acted 
as a co-financier, and, in such cases, the primary initiative in programme development has 
been with central government ministries. This means that industrial development policy?
initiatives still have a strong national character, so Gyeonggi’s regional innovation support 
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systems still can be typified as dirigiste as discussed previously. Consequently, Gyeonggi 
province has not developed a distinctive innovation consciousness, detached from the 
centre, and conveyed by a regionally based and territorially rooted industries. Provincial 
governments have been recognised as a key element in the delivery of national economic 
development, and they have played a minor role in this regard in the context of the 
monitoring and evaluation processes of programmes. 
Such plans are then implemented at the regional level. In the absence of an analysis of 
the specific features of demands for innovation at the regional level, those responsible 
for industrial policy tend to use a “generic” model. Specifically, questions were raised 
regarding the capacity of central government agencies, namely, Technopark, to undertake 
quality preparatory work and set in motion adequate mechanisms, before looking 
forward to fruitful policy implementation, improved coordination, and long-term 
monitoring. 
We have encountered examples of the Local Autonomy Act already undertaking a 
relatively proactive regional role (see Chapter 4 and Appendix 5). Since 1995, the central 
government has granted regional policy makers certain powers: the Local Autonomy Act 
provides regions with discretionary power to take action to promote or improve the 
economy of their space.61  
                                                          
61 In Gyeonggi province, the provincial government has a governor and 3 vice-governors, 
policy advisors (who are experts in the field of welfare, the environment, and science and 
technology), 8 offices, 13 bureaus, 43 affiliate offices, 22 business offices, and 43,565 public 
workers (GRI, 2010: 23). On the one hand, provincial governments may, if necessary within 
the scope of affairs under their jurisdiction, establish autonomous services, such as fire 
service, medical service, research and development service and services for firms. Provincial 
governments also may build a branch agency for the convenience of remote residents and 
for promoting the development of specific industries. If it is necessary to perform 
independently part of the affairs concerned, provincial governments can establish agency 
(GRI, 2009: 97). On the other hand, the provincial council members may serve to restrain 
the activities of the provincial government. Provincial councils may cut the budget submitted 
by the provincial government (KRILA, 2012: 19). The provincial council also has authority to 
decide by resolution matters regarding the following: deliberation and confirmation of a 
budget, approval of settlement of accounts, establishment and disposal of public facilities, 
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Some witnesses, however, have argued that the distributed powers are not as generous 
as they seem. According to evidence from documents and interviews, industrial 
development in Gyeonggi province originates in either the specialisation of national policy 
instruments, which tend to favour and discourage industrial development across different 
regions, or the institutional compliance of regional plans and activities with national 
guidelines and legislation. The policy issues discussed in this chapter demonstrate how 
regional policy overlaps with urban planning, economic development, culture, and other 
policy areas.  
GRI (2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2006) noted that decision-making powers excluded 
regional autonomy. Provincial government has become so used to existing in a culture of 
central control that the ambition to take on powers and responsibilities from central 
government is sometimes limited and timid. However, the core reason for this lies in 
central not provincial government. Despite the rhetoric of devolution, dirigisme is deeply 
embedded in government practices, particularly in the Seoul metropolitan area.  
When legislation determines such interrelationships, industrial development at the 
regional level emerges from hierarchical policy frameworks. In this case, in terms of its 
industrial policy context, industrial development governance incorporates an agenda of 
regional policy issues along with relationships through which national policy aspirations 
shape industrial development in Gyeonggi province. It is, however, the nature and volume 
of relationships in the industrial policies that indicate the centralised nature of 
development policy and planning in South Korea alongside the peculiar position of 
Gyeonggi province as the country’s metropolitan area and most developed region.  
                                                          
and other matters under its competence pursuant to Acts and subordinate status. The 
provincial council is officially responsible for making all ordinances and performing 
representative and oversight functions. 
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These frameworks are supposed to assess, in a systematic manner, whether regional 
development fits well within wider policy areas and national policy guidelines. Following 
the ratifications of national planning frameworks, industrial development in Gyeonggi 
province is incorporated within the Capital Region Readjustment Plan Act (CRRPA). It 
reflects the vision of the Metropolitan Area Management Plan for the metropolitan area 
and delivers the specialized guidelines of the Balanced National Development Plan (BNDP). 
Regional industrial promotion must comply with national principles and rely, to a certain 
extent, on funding schemes formed at the national level.  
The effectiveness of such frameworks is a debateable issue. Regional industrial promotion 
is a trend that has recently emerged in Gyeonggi province according to evidence from 
documentary sources and interviews. Likewise, the Metropolitan Area Management Plan 
and the BNDP were operating independently for more than 30 years with debatable 
results.  
 
 
5.4 Concluding reflections 
This chapter has set out the policy context shaping industrial development in RSI. It has 
also investigated the centralised nature of regional development policy making and its 
effects on urban development and the development of industry at the regional level. It 
has identified the relevant policies and exemplified why, in the case of Gyeonggi province, 
the practices of industry-related policy networks are very much dependent on the nature 
of statutory institutions. 
Applying the strategic relational perspective to the case of Gyeonggi province, there are 
two structural factors that influence the developments of industrial development policy, 
which may have led to the formation of the RSI. First, the important structural factor in 
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terms of the formation of RSI is the science and technology base in each region with the 
total R&D expenditure taking place in the region. Second, there have been recent political 
and institutional processes of devolution in South Korea that have influenced the 
obstacles to changes to the RSI in Gyeonggi province. Third, it is important to point out 
that the development of national initiatives has enhanced the regional industrial activities. 
local collaboration has been set up by the Technopark since the late 1990s, which 
constitutes an important knowledge generation and exploitation subsystem within the 
RSI.   
As the Local Autonomy Act was restored and devolution policies implemented in the 
1990s and 2000s, the formal institution of the region was transformed into the 
regionalized structure. However, the power of regional autonomy has increased little and 
has remained substantially circumscribed for the past two decades. Despite its 
constitutional autonomy, the provincial government has yet to achieve enough autonomy 
to obtain meaningful democratic governance. The distribution of authority and resources 
indicates the limited general competence for provincial government. The functional and 
financial bases of local government clearly show a vastly unequal power distribution 
between the state and the regions, and this hinders the enhancement of the democratic 
foundations of local government. Thus, in the highly centralized relation between the 
state and the regions, it is no wonder that the innovation system is largely determined by 
central governmental institutions and processes.  
While in general, the practices associated with dirigisme have been dismantled rapidly 
and thoroughly, this is not true with regard to Gyeonggi province. On the contrary, central 
government’s intervention has increased significantly in post-dirigiste period, as new 
central initiatives have been launched in the planning and implementation of regional 
innovation. Ironically, the central government has implemented important reform 
policies for improving productivity in a wide range of industries. 
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According to evidence from documentary sources and interviews, the complex policy 
context of industrial governance in Gyeonggi province faces challenges that transcend the 
boundaries of the central state apparatus. Such challenges range from the controversial 
operation of the public administration and problematic intra-governmental coordination, 
which in general circumscribe the delivery of industrial policy, to the ineffective 
relationships between the central government and regional autonomy, which attract 
criticism from regional policy makers.  
Given the current structural factors of industrial development policy, further strategic 
actions are needed from the regional actors and their regional partners in order to seize 
a regional advantage in the knowledge economy.  
The next chapter further explores the recent prospects, perceptions, and events shaping 
industrial development in Gyeonggi province. The first goal is to explore whether the 
initiative actors have been able to tackle challenges in regional policy and planning in light 
of the high expectations after 2006. The second goal is to verify whether substantial 
grounds have recently emerged to found and foster a strategic vision for industrial 
development. 
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6 The regional advent of the initiative actors and strategic actions 
As discussed in the previous chapter, there is evidence that the aim of central government 
was to design policies in which the role of the regional authority was only to assist in 
implementation; economic growth is possible even if there is no distinct role of provincial 
government. However, in 2006, the policy-makers in Gyeonggi province began to consider 
policy design and to create significant policies.  
As illustrated in the conceptual scheme above, this chapter analyses the so-called 
“agential factors”, defined here as initiating actors’ perceived roles and motivation in 
relation to the contemporary discursive context of industrial policy. One of the agential 
factors this chapter seeks to delineate is the perception of the initiating actors who play 
a role in establishing and implementing regional policy. Therefore, this chapter firstly 
highlights the perceptions of the current government policies that are shaping industrial 
development, the practices of the regional agencies, and the potential opportunities as 
perceived by the actors in this wider structure. The main sections of this chapter examine 
initiative actors, as they span across policy areas, through illustrative examples from the 
policy areas of industrial development planning.  
This chapter strongly relies on evidence from policy reports (GRI, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 
2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2008d; GSTC, 2009a, 2009b; GSTEP, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2010d, 
2011a, 2011b, 2011c) and interviews with individuals within the GSTEP. The GSTEP is a 
new regional agency to support industrial development in Gyeonggi province. Interviews 
were utilised as a means of illustrating how the actors involved industrial development 
perceive policies and the ways in which they respond and potentially act to reshape those 
policies.   
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6.1 The influence of the political context  
The political factor is relevant in regional policies where there is a devolved form of 
government. In devolution, the political party that wins the seat in the governor’s 
constituency is allowed to form a provincial government. Every political leader has their 
own agenda, and this will contain the vision and mission of the party. After the election, 
this is the document that will guide the party in formulating the various policies of the 
government. However, the ruling party can get a law passed only if the new bill gets a 
majority vote in the legislature. 
The governor Kim Moon-Soo (2006-2014) pushed forward a fully-fledged reform of the 
industrial policy. He was seeking re-election to the post of provincial governor, and thus 
he required some striking policy for his manifesto. ln the local elections of 2 June 2010, 
he was re-elected as governor of Gyeonggi province (The Korea Times, 2 June, 2010).  
As governor, he enjoyed a strong support base from businesses; in addition, he wanted 
to be popular and his short-term agenda was to win votes. He therefore pushed for 
business support policies to build infrastructures (e.g. new underground railway network, 
Gwanggyo and Pangyo Techno Valleys). The implementation of such programmes 
obviously affected the governor’s chance of being re-elected. In addition, the GSTEP had 
been established in May 2010 before the local election. Therefore, with his re-election, 
his policies on industrial development gained further momentum.  
Prior to the governor’s intervention, the provincial government had been struggling to get 
departments to agree on policy as part of the national development plan. Now, the 
industrial policy was seen as a political “race”, which led the provincial government to 
appoint GSTEP authority at the regional level. The GSTEP was viewed as a dynamic and 
talented policy maker, and they wanted to make a rapid impact on what they expected 
would be a relatively short tenure.  
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There was widespread recognition amongst interviewees in this research that the political 
situation and the agenda of the governor decide how industrial policy making plays out in 
the region:  
We are bound by the electoral cycle in the nation and region, and the influences at 
play here are things like the strength of the majority, the confidence of our political 
masters, whether that can drive things through, what they are balancing up, and 
how much money they have got. So, there are a lot of externalities and 
dependencies. (Interviewee 33)    
 
In particular, the position of the responsible governor was seen as crucial:  
Policy making doesn’t happen separate from who’s in charge, who’s arriving, or how 
powerful they are. It is all dependent, so our policy is going to be stronger when we 
have got strong leaders who know where we are going, what we want to achieve. 
(Interviewee 5)  
 
The strength of the governor matters because policies are produced through competition 
between the government and the council. Rather than being a contested process, “policy 
formulation and implementation are inevitably the result of interactions among a plurality 
of separate actors with separate interests and goals” (Scharpf, 1978: 346). As one 
interview put it:  
It is not simply a matter of policy making; it is a matter of getting policies agreed 
within government, and then implemented. And the extent to which a governor is 
able to do that will depend to a large part on his standing within his own political 
party and within the council. (Interviewee 31)  
 
Therefore, politics is only one component of policy making. As an interviewee in GRI said, 
“I am a policy maker based on evidence, but I have got to accept that policy objectives 
will be partly shaped by what works in the evidence in practice, but also by the governor’s 
nous” (Interviewee?20). Policy is viewed, not through a single lens, but through a set of 
competing values, motivations, and perspectives.  
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The interviews revealed the significant political factor behind the strategic action. The 
rapid establishment of the GSTEP and strategic policies was the result of strong support 
from the governor. The strategic action looked very promising, and they were confident 
that the new strategic policies would improve the efficiency of the regional support and 
solve the problems that firms faced. However, they could not initiate the development of 
the idea immediately at that time, because they had just started to work out a strategy 
and had not secured appropriate funds for the new idea. In particular, a major step was 
for the GSTEP to persuade the provincial council.  
   
6.2 Grievances over national policy  
Regional policy makers seek both sufficient formal power and more general autonomy to 
pursue a leading regional economic leadership role. However, existing policies for shaping 
industrial development do not provide these conditions, and thus, regional actors’ actions 
are constrained. An example of the discourse is that actors in the provincial government 
say the BNDP discriminates against the metropolitan area, while central government says 
that scrapping the regulations would escalate capital concentration and hinder provincial 
development. In the context of Gyeonggi, officers complained that the restrictions central 
government-imposed on their investments constituted a form of “reverse 
discrimination”62. 
A further example of this discourse is the statement of Governor Kim Moon-Soo (2006-
2014), who addressed the effects of central government control over regional regulations 
in Gyeonggi province:  
                                                          
62  A term “reverse discrimination”, in this context, means the regulation to discriminate 
against economic activities in Gyeongi province. During fieldwork, the term "reverse 
discrimination" appeared both in documents and interviews. There was profound distrust of 
central government’s policies. 
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Not only Gyeonggi province, but South Korea as a whole has seen competitiveness 
declining due to the regulations. (…) Due to the restrictions, investments worth 
51.34 trillion KRW by 53 companies have been put on hold, costing opportunities 
for creating 37,582 jobs. In the past year, I have aggressively made efforts to 
highlight how serious restrictions on the Seoul metropolitan area undermine 
corporate activities. (…) In this regard, we had 73 meetings with lawmakers and 
experts, submitted suggestions to the presidential office and agencies of the central 
government on 37 occasions, held 21 public hearings, issued publications on 
restrictions on 7 occasions, and provided support in legislating and amending laws 
and regulations on restrictions on 9 occasions. Given the rapidly changing 
circumstances facing South Korea, which is sandwiched between China and Japan, 
and the conclusion of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, we should reform 
restrictions to turn around our nation's competitive edge by departing from the 
obsolete perception surrounding restrictions on the Seoul metropolitan area. (…) 
The way to ensure a balanced national development is to give differentiated 
support, varying according to regions, rather than making direct investments into 
areas with a smaller competitive edge instead of better places with good 
investment efficiency. (Illyo Sisa, January 6, 2009)   
 
This viewpoint indicates the idea that the CRRPA may weaken the economic activities of 
Gyeonggi province. As reviewed in Chapters 4 and 5, the aims of the CRRPA are to reduce 
the economic gaps between Gyeonggi province and the other regions and to foster the 
creation of self-sufficient regions to create a balanced country where all regions prosper. 
The concentration of economic activity in Gyeonggi province had led to a widening gap 
with other regions, and subsequently, inefficiency (e.g. land prices or pressures on existing 
infrastructures were funded by the centre rather than by the province), making more 
pressing the need for a Metropolitan Area Regulation. This provides some justification for 
central government’s efforts to improve constraints, notwithstanding the argument 
offered by Governor Kim Moon-Soo, who chose to ignore those who would lose from such 
a development (i.e. businesses having to pay higher costs due to competition for land or 
those having to bear the costs of infrastructure development, which might include 
taxpayers in other regions of South Korea).   
Thus, it was necessary to restrict the construction and expansion of manufacturing 
factories in Gyeonggi province for the purpose of seeking balanced development between 
the regions in South Korea. Central government controlled the economic expansion of the 
 134 
 
metropolitan area and, instead, relocated facilities to non-metropolitan areas. This 
involved creating cities; moving national public offices and public firms out of the Seoul, 
Incheon, and Gyeonggi; and providing incentives (particularly, tax reduction63) to firms 
who moved to the other areas. 
Governor Kim Moon-Soo belonged to the GNP, which formed the Lee Myung-Bak 
administration (2008-2012), and ended some of the BNDP put in place by the Roh Moo-
hyun administration. The centrepiece of the Roh Moo-hyun administration’s plan was the 
relocation of the Korean capital from Seoul to South Chungcheong Province. Roh later 
scaled the plan down to the creation of ‘an administrative city (called Sae-jong-si)’64 when 
the capital move ran into political and constitutional challenges. As mayor of Seoul (2002-
2006), Lee strongly opposed the proposed capital move. His policy was based on the 
concept of national competitiveness. To strengthen national competitiveness, the Lee 
Myung-bak administration underwent reforms on a government-wide scale in order to 
change drastically the Seoul Metropolitan Area Regulation. The move came in response 
to strong calls from Gyeonggi province for deregulation.65 In December 2008, the Lee 
Myung-bak administration amended the related laws and allowed the establishment and 
                                                          
63 In the 2nd BNDP, the central government announced that it sought to classify regions into 
four categories (underdeveloped, stagnant, developing and developed) and impose varying 
levels of corporate taxes and health insurance fees depending on their status. For example, 
underdeveloped regions get a 70% discount in corporate taxes, stagnant areas 50%, and 
developing areas 30%. Developed regions have to pay the full tax. If a large company based 
in a developed area moves to an underdeveloped one, it will get a 70% discount in corporate 
income tax for the first 10 years and a 35% cut over the next five years (Digial Chosun ilbo, 
October 10, 2007). 
64 The government plans to spend 8.5 trillion KRW (9.3 billion USD) on the project, to fulfil one 
of the campaign pledges of the Roh Moo-hyun Administration in 2002. The site is in the 
Yeongi-Gongju area of South Chungcheong Province. The plan is to accommodate 49 
governmental agencies by 2014 along with some 500,000 residents. In March 2005, parties 
in the National Assembly agreed on a revised plan, which was scaled down from the original 
scheme. Seoul Mayor Gyeonggi Governor did not show up to the opening ceremony, citing 
personal scheduling conflicts. All other governors and mayors from 14 major administrative 
districts attended the event along with several ministers. 
65 President Lee Myung-bak and Governor Kim Moon-soo belong to the same conservative 
political party, namely, the GNP. 
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expansion of factories, regardless of scale and industry, in the industrial complexes in 
overpopulation control areas and growth-management control areas.  
 
Table 6-1 Government formation since devolution (1995-2014)66 
 
Central government 
Year 
Gyeonggi provincial government 
Administration Party Political ideologies 
Political 
ideologies Governor Party 
Kim Yong-Sam 
administration 
(1993. 2. 25 - 
1998. 2. 24) 
Democratic 
Liberal Party 
Conservative 
1995 
Conservative 
Lee In-Jae 
(1995. 7. 1 ~ 
1997. 9.18) 
Democratic 
Liberal 
Party 
New Korea 
Party 
1996 New Korea 
Party 
1997 
 
Kim Dae-Jung 
administration 
(1998. 2. 25 - 
2003. 2. 24) 
National 
Congress for 
New Politics 
Liberal 
1998 
Liberal 
Lim Chang-
Yeol (1998. 
7. 1 ~ 2002. 
6.29) 
National 
Congress 
for New 
Politics 
1999 
2000 
New 
Millennium 
Democratic 
Party 
2001 New 
Millennium 
Democratic 
Party 2002 
Conservative 
Sohn Hak-
Gyu (2002. 
7. 1 ~ 2006. 
6.30) 
Grand 
National 
Party 
Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration 
(2003. 2. 25 -
2008.2. 24) 
2003 
Open Uri 
Party 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Kim Moon-
Soo (2006. 
7. 1 ~ 2014. 
6.30) 
Grand 
National 
Party 
(GNP) 
2007 
Lee Myung-Bak 
administration 
(2008. 2. 25 - 
2013. 2.24) 
Grand 
National 
Party 
(GNP) 
Conservative 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
Park Geun-Hye 
administration 
(2013. 2. 24 - 
present) 
Saenuri 
Party 
2013 
Saenuri 
Party 2014 
Nam 
Gyeong-Pil 
(2014-7.1 ~ 
present) 
Source: own creation.  
 
                                                          
66 There are many changes of party name due to frequent party splits and merges right before 
the elections. For example, the GNP changed its name from Grand National Party to Saenuri 
(New Frontier) Party in the 2012 election. 
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In the same vein, the Gyeonggi Research Institute (GRI? (2007a, 2007b, 2008a) criticized 
how the CRRPA implemented “reverse discrimination” against Gyeonggi province, 
because limitations were placed on firms wanting to build new production plants and 
expand existing ones in Seoul and Gyeonggi province. They argued that core industries, 
such as ICT and the automobile industry, had been hampered by the BNDP.  
The documents of the GRI have expressed grievances that the metropolitan regulation 
remains insufficiently accountable to actors in the regional economy and that regional 
actors are unable to assimilate the industrial policies fully into their strategic vision for the 
locality.67 Although they express support for the powers they have in principle, they argue 
that, in practice, they are so constrained by central government interference—whether 
through performance monitoring or departmental directives—that they are unable 
actually to deploy these powers fully.   
The national territory development plan still exists. However, since the 2000 the 
influence of the plans has been weakened, and remains only as blueprints. 
(Interviewee 2) 
 
For instance, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration agreed not to approve the investment 
plan of Hynix Semiconductor (the largest memory chipmaker) to expand its chip 
production lines in the Icheon area for fear of a possible industrial concentration and 
environmental pollution. The proposed expansion of the Hynix plant in Icheon caused a 
great stir, as the plant is located within the “nature preservation zone”. Samsung 
Electronics also has been refining plans to expand its existing chip plants in Giheung and 
Hwaseong, both in the south of Gyeonggi province, but the firm has reported that the 
plans are unlikely to move forward due to the CRRPA restrictions on plant expansion in 
                                                          
67 GRI is the policy research organization established in March 1995 with investment by the 
provincial government. As a policy think-tank, GRI is engaged in socio economic issues mainly 
by way of developing regional policy. There are approximately 170 employees, half of whom 
have a PhD degree in economics, public administration, geography and environment.  
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the capital region. Another example is Fairchild Korea, a semi-conductor firm based in 
Bucheon, Gyeonggi province; the firm is a profitable manufacturer of transistors and 
generates 600 billion KRW in sales per year. With steady growth, the firm has attempted 
to build more manufacturing facilities since 2001. However, it has been unable to obtain 
approval for these facilities due to its location within the metropolitan area. Eventually, 
the firm turned to China in 2003 (Digital Chosun Ilbo, August 31, 2004). 
GRI argued that the current regional disparity in South Korea is not so serious as to call 
for equalization across the regions and that, therefore, policy focus on “regional equity” 
should be reconsidered. In agreement with Governor Kim’s statement, they also argued 
that balanced development is not compatible with growth or national competitiveness.68?
An interviewee from GRI also commented, “We have the powers to do really quite a lot if 
we want to. The issue is that we do not have the entire freedom to spend our money the 
way we might want to” (Interviewee 19). Another interviewee at GRI, observed that “our 
problem is not so much about the powers that we have, but the fact that we have been 
given the priority by the central government, and yet we do not seem to be trusted to run 
our affairs” (Interviewee 41). He concluded that “the balance of power is still skewed in 
favour of central government and needs to be addressed to give provincial government 
greater ability to shape their policies to meet local firms’ needs. Provincial governments 
should be independent of central government and have their own source of revenue and 
financial freedoms, subject to accountability to the local community”.?
  
  
                                                          
68  One interviewee attempted to identify the reasons for central government policies: 
“Academically, these policies are based on the new economic geography. The new economic 
geographers in Souh Korea suggest that balanced regional development is a means of 
relocating the resources of the core area to peripheral areas, but it is a policy objective that 
is not compatible with economic growth” (Interviewee 15). 
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Table 6-2 summary of the controversy regarding the CRRPA in Gyeonggi province   
 
 Gyeonggi provincial government Central government 
Key opinion 
Deregulation: the regions compete with 
one another in globalization. Through 
advancement and concentration, the 
metropolitan area should increase its 
competitiveness. 
Balanced development: Excess 
concentration eventually lowers 
competitiveness. Balanced 
development is the way to raise 
national competitiveness. 
Metropolitan Area 
regulation 
Stifling regulation reduces the overall 
development standard for the country. 
The regions are still in dire need of 
assistance. The metropolitan area 
concentration is still too localized. 
Reviving the other regions will benefit 
the country as a whole. 
Deregulation 
Putting provincial development before 
the deregulation of the capital region 
has two problems: uncertain feasibility 
and the fact that it is nothing more than 
a belated prescription to shore up 
national competitiveness. 
Deregulation increases population 
concentration and wealth in Seoul, and 
provinces will face a survival crisis. 
Source: own creation.  
 
Furthermore, the CRRPA classified both the northern and southern areas of Gyeonggi 
province into either developing or developed regions, even though these are vastly 
different in terms of their economic levels. Yonchon (the northern area in Gyeonggi) is an 
underdeveloped region (because the area borders North Korea) with a population of just 
46,000 and containing only 92 businesses with 5 or more employees and employing no 
more than 1,442 people. However, the central government has classified that area into 
the same group of developing regions that includes Busan, Korea’s second-largest city, 
and the southern-east industrial towns of Ulsan and Daejeon. Yonchon area has been 
facing difficulties in developing, as 98% of its total area has already been barred from 
development because it is reserved for military facilities. (Digital Chosun Ilbo, September 
10, 2013). Not only Yonchon, but Paju, Gimpo, Yangju, Pochon and other areas in northern 
Gyeonggi province have between 30% to 90% of their territories restricted from 
development because they house military installations. Eastern Gyeonggi province, 
including Gwangju, Namyangju, Yangpyoung, Yeoju, and Icheon also face restrictions in 
constructing factories since they surround the upper tributary of the Han River, a source 
of water for Seoul. In addition, the national development policy against Gyeonggi province 
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has made firms limit their investments, which has further led to the reverse effect of 
spreading economic depression to the regions. 
 
Figure 6-1 Cartoon on local newspaper  
 
 
Note: This editorial cartoon is from a local newspaper (i.e. Joongboo ilbo) in Gyeonggi province 
Source: Joongboo ilbo, January 18, 2010.  
 
In summary, there has been substantial controversy over whether to tighten or ease 
regulations in Gyeonggi province. In this regard, conflict has arisen between actors in 
Gyeonggi provincial government, business communities, and local media, all of which are 
seeking greater local autonomy, and the central government, which wishes to limit and 
direct this autonomy to national purposes. In other words, Gyeonggi province calls for 
deregulation to enhance its regional competitiveness, but the central government keeps 
to a balanced development plan for the entire country. Local media are outspoken about 
the negative effect on Gyeonggi province of the Seoul metropolitan area’s regulations, 
with Figure 6-1 capturing this conflict in a single, powerful image.   
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6.3 Why do we not have a better industrial policy than “best practice”?  
A possible consequence of maintaining central control is that policy makers in the regions 
are unable to incorporate fully industrial policies into their strategic vision for their 
localities. For example, relegating provincial governments to an implementation role may 
prevent these governments from fully developing appropriate local industrial 
development policies.  Most industrial policy decision making has been guided and 
structured, to a large extent, by competition initiated by the MKE (Doh Soogwan and Kim 
Byungkyu, 2014: 4). Such top-down initiatives were intended to promote regional 
development through the establishment of Technoparks. Technoparks are meant to 
inform local firms about national aid schemes and about management, sales, and 
purchase issues; to provide technological advice and test equipment; and to refer firms 
to other research agencies.  
In the implementation of Technopark developments and more generally, policy makers of 
provincial governments are tasked by central government with explicitly promoting “best 
practice” in policy (GRI, 2005a: 23). With the help of case studies of successful policies, 
provincial governments are encouraged to seek competitive advantage through the 
knowledge infrastructure, such as building high technology clusters (i.e. Gwanggyo 
Technovalley, Pangyo Technovalley, Daejin Technopark), business incubators (i.e. the 
GSBC69 and Gyeonggi Bio-centre), and technology transfer centres (i.e. the GRRC70 and the 
                                                          
69 The Gyeonggi Small and Medium Business Centre (GSBC) is an agency to promote the 
competitiveness of regional firms. It was established in 1997 as the Gyeonggi Small and 
Medium Business Promotion Foundation and renamed GSBC in 1999. The most important 
role of GSBC is to find buyers for SMEs’ products – how to find and have consultations with 
potential buyers who would buy their goods. GSBC operates three kinds of programme to 
help SMEs do this: Export Consultations with Invited Potential Buyers; Overseas Market 
Development; and advice to help them participate in overseas business fair. For these 
programmes, GSBC is operating global branches in Kuala Lumpur, Mumbai, Moscow, and 
Sao Paulo.  
70 GRRC (Gyeonggi Regional Research Centres) are a regional version of RRC in 15 selected 
universities that have a graduate school and researchers in the field of science and 
technology. As the provincial government has the largest budget of all regions in Korea, it 
has been able to establish more RRC. It is a regional agency for the cooperation of firms and 
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Nano Fab centre 71 ). In addition, provincial governments are encouraged to seek 
investment from foreign research institutes, who are lured by tax incentives (e.g. Institute 
Pasteur Korea72).  
Particularly, the Gyeonggi government designated two high technology-based clusters to 
encourage the formation of trans-sectoral platforms, but there was little interest for this 
specific kind of policy intervention from the relevant economic actors (GRI, 2014: 7-8).  
‘Gwanggyo Techno Valley’ is a public research-based cluster, which was initiated by the 
local government. Gyeonggi province has created its own research and development 
facilities. Currently, the Advanced Institutes of Convergence Technology73, the Graduate 
School of Convergence Science and Technology, Gyeonggi R&BD Centre, the Nano Fab 
Centre, Gyeonggi GSBC, the GSTEP, and Gyeonggi Bio Centre, as well as about 200 start-
up firms, research institutes, and related organizations, have moved to Gwanggyo Techno 
Valley. Thus, there are 3,864 full-time employees working there. In addition, near 
Gwanggyo Techno Valley, there are densely populated research and enterprise institutes, 
                                                          
universities that might activate the research and education for the promotion of regional 
industry, and the research and development of original technology and applied technology 
supported by the central role of university research institutes that have possess a graduate 
school of science and engineering. 
71 The Nano Fab Centre was established in 2006 to encourage and support nanotechnology 
research activities in the academic and research institutes and in industry as a public 
infrastructure for nanofabrication service. 
72 The Institute Pasteur Korea (IP Korea), which is part of the Institute Pasteur network, is 
established in Pangyo Techno-valley. It aims to improve the reliability of drug research 
through cellular models, high content screening, and medicinal chemistry. IP Korea was 
inaugurated in 2004 as a collaboration between the IP Paris, KIST (Korea institute of Science 
and Technology) and central government. Thus, IP Korea is funded via basic finance of 100 
million Euros over 10 years granted by the central government and the Gyeonggi provincial 
government. Until 2009, IP Korea was located in a small facility on the campus of KIST, and 
it then moved into Pangyo Techno-Valley.  
73 The Advanced Institutes of Convergence Technology were constructed by Seoul National 
University and Gyeonggi provincial government. Construction finished in March 2008. The 
Institutes aim to pursue collaborative research in the application of the high technologies in 
IT, BT, and NT, with the objective of commercialization. Currently, there are six institutes (i.e. 
Nano, Bio, IT, Green Smart Systems, Transdisciplinary Studies, and Living Together) and areas 
of research remain flexible in order to best meet society's demands in cutting edge 
technology. 
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such as Ajou University, Kyunghee University, and Sungkyunkwan University. The major 
research areas are IT, BT, NT, and convergence science and technology.  
The provincial government also built an IT business-based cluster in Sungnam city after 
2004. The purpose was to achieve education/R+D outcomes though synergies with 
domestic related companies and research institutes. ‘Pangyo Techno Valley’ has the 
advantages of lower maintenance costs due to the cheaper land price than Seoul, as well 
as support from the provincial government and convenient local and intercity transport. 
Recently, a number of software firms (e.g. game, software) elected to move to Pangyo 
Techno Valley, including NC soft, NHN, Neowiz, Nexon, JC entertainment, Com2us, YNK 
Korea, and Nowcom.74   
These kinds of activities have led to the imitation of a limited number of alleged success 
stories of other regions (i.e. Silicon Valley or European cases) and national policies (i.e. 
industrial district development) (Interviewee 40). The provincial government’s marketing 
of them?points to the vision many areas had for turning themselves into the next Silicon 
Valley. This was particularly true for large regions (high regional GDP and high fiscal 
independent regions, such as Seoul and Gyeonggi province) that have the scale, resources, 
and sophistication to implement these policies. 
However, after achieving only limited performance, these policies are now seen as a way 
to maintain existing knowledge infrastructures instead of trying to develop further 
activities (GSTC, 2009b: 20; GRI, 2014: 14). Such policies have sparked controversy over 
their effects and appropriateness in practice. The quotation below is from just one of 
many interviews where this was reported. This consequently hints at a lack of “strategic” 
                                                          
74 These software businesses were located in Tehran Valley in Gangnam, Seoul. It was such a 
cradle for game developer’s that there was even a rumour that small developers should 
move to there to obtain better investment. However, a phenomenon called “off the 
Gangnam” arose from the middle of 2000, and the companies started to move to other 
places such as Pangyo (Interviewee 3).  
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policies, an issue that is clearly at the heart of the development problem in Gyeonggi 
province. Interviewees said that the comparative lack of an overall strategy was a major 
problem that regional economies faced. Several interviewees supported this view, as 
follows: 
Large firms are already competing in globalized markets. This is because 
competitiveness has long become an essential factor in creating profits in the 
globalized markets. Nevertheless, we can see a substantial decrease in the 
productivity growth rate of SMEs recently. Especially, since 2000, the role of 
innovation as a growth factor is decreasing for SMEs compared to large firms. It is 
necessary to make specific efforts to complement the SMEs through better policies 
and systems to convert them into a competitive sector. It is beneficial to pursue 
policies to both improve the competitiveness of parts- and component-producing 
SMEs without harming the competitiveness of big companies facing global 
competition. By doing so, it will draw a virtual economic circle and improve the 
competitiveness of both big and small players. (Interviewee 10)   
 
Historically, due to the presence of major players in the domestic market, Korean 
small businesses have become reliant on a limited number of primarily domestic 
customers. All these efforts by firms have raised the price competitiveness against 
Japanese firms in the global market. By 2000, Samsung, LG, and Hyundai had passed 
Sony and Suzuki, and over the past five or six years, have become competitors. 
Moreover, many foreign firms are now coming to Gyeonggi province, wanting to 
collaborate with Chaebols with the aim of cooperating in both home markets and 
in third country markets. However, local SMEs are still far less competitive than 
SMEs in Germany, Japan, and other industrialized countries. (Interviewee 8) 
   
Although 90% of all firms in Gyeonggi Province are SMEs, Gyeonggi province did not 
have its own programmes, where the provincial government would invest our own 
money in something. Existing programmes do not reach the firms. With regard to 
support, the regional authority has no opportunity to give distinct support; yet that 
is the responsibility of the region. And we need technological support and general 
support, about programmes and so on, which are developed by the provincial 
government and central government as well. (Interviewee 7)   
 
Reproduce the success of others by copying a supposedly successful programme or 
project one-to-one without much adaptation. This may work in some instances, but 
in the vast majority of cases, it is likely to lead to a waste of public funding. The 
region’s objectives, challenges, systemic constraints, resources, and industrial 
structure need to be considered carefully. If policy measures and initiatives are not 
tailored to the particularities of each region, they are likely to fail to achieve their 
aim. The blind copy pasting of initiatives does not correspond to a region’s 
development level and specific profiles. (Interviewee 32) 
 
Thus, in trying to copy a regional test bench, provincial governments ignore the question 
of whether they can offer similar favourable preconditions. Such perceptions created a 
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motivation for policy makers in GRI to consider strategic actions. To respond to the 
challenges about the experience of regional efforts, the policy makers of GRI have 
constructed an elaborate policy of industrial development aid and assistance since 2006.  
Policies are rather small-scale and short-term and can lead to duplication and to 
a lack of vision or missing the “big picture”. A new competitive and demanding 
environment is the essential challenge for Gyeonggi province, yet provincial 
governments’ roles as facilitators and arbiters in the regional system are 
increasing in importance. Gyeonggi province still has unexplored potential for 
surviving in the rivalry with its challengers. Territorial rooting is one factor in this, 
since close proximity brings together the representatives and interests of 
members of different organizations. Provincial governments have to be places of 
technical, productive, and organizational integration, not mere replicas of large 
firms’ industrial strategies (GRI, 2007b: 23-24). 
 
Old industrial policies do not respond appropriately to current development 
needs in the regions, not least because they tend not to discriminate territorially 
and are poorly adapted to current business needs. Thus, their cost effectiveness 
is criticised. In general, they tend to be short-term and to work better with 
winners than with losers, and often they are more social conversion policies than 
real economic development growth policies (GRI, 2008a: 35). 
 
The initial actions in promoting policies involved holding seminars and distributing 
information through meetings. The questions required many rounds of discussions with 
experts, the provincial council, the provincial government, and the decision-makers. 
Finally, the provincial government and the provincial council accepted the proposal made 
by GRI in 2006. The next section discusses the content of this proposal   
 
 
6.4 The emergence of the GSTEP and rescaling regional interest 
The longer-term plan was first endorsed by the report in 2006. Then, in November 2006, 
GRI published its initial proposal to reform industrial policy. This included refining plans 
for producing a regional strategy so that the provincial government would have 
responsibility for industrial development, including planning, implementation, and 
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monitoring; and creating a unitary agency across Gyeonggi province to carry out an 
industry platform of the region:  
Provincial government would not expect to gain ‘free food’ though the network. 
Regional strategies require considerable investments in the process in terms of 
financial resources. The credibility of the regional strategy-maker is extremely 
important, and attention should be paid to gaining such credibility. (GRI, 2006: 25) 
 
Gyeonggi province should have a responsible agency to promote technology 
development in the region within an accountable and strategic regional 
framework. The new agency should be responsible to the provincial government, 
but operationally separate, acting as their executive arm in the area of industrial 
technology development. (GRI, 2006: 57) 
 
After several debates and discussions, the provincial government decided to invest in 
setting up an industrial technology policy as a driver of economic growth and 
development of the region. The governor and the council decided to accept the proposal. 
This included the creation of an industrial technology development policy agency, namely, 
the Gyeonggi Science and Technology Centre (GSTC).  
In fact, the GSTC had already been established in November 2006 as a department of 
industry and economy in GRI. However, the GSTC formally broke from its affiliation with 
GRI two years later. In May 2008, it became independent from GRI and moved its 
headquarters into Gyanggyo Techno Valley. Currently, the GSTC is chaired by Lee Won-
Young, the former Secretary of the President’s Office for Science and Technology Policy.75 
In May 2010, the provincial government restructured its industrial development 
investment scheme across the board, and the GSTC accordingly overhauled its technology 
development guidelines in order to play a more extensive role. In this radical move, the 
                                                          
75 He has been a member of the Korea Development Institute (KDI). He also worked as a senior 
researcher in Science and Technoppogy Policy Institute (STEPI). He was appinted by 
President Kim Dae-Jung as a Secretary of the President’s Office in 1999 for 19 months. Until 
2006, he was a professor at the Seoul National University. In June 2006, he was apponited 
as a resrearcher for the GRI. The provincial governor, Kim Moon-Soo, incorporated Lee Won-
Young’s thinking into his agenda, and after being elected, invited Lee Won-Young to be the 
head of the GSTEP from 2008 to 2013 (Interviewee 2). 
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GSTC was re-formed as the Gyeonggi Institute of Science and Technology Promotion 
(GSTEP) and was given the role of coordinating the science and technology policy in the 
region. As part of a major overhaul of the organization, the GSTEP employed over 110 
people including the staff of the Gyeonggi Bio-Centre, and it was endowed with an annual 
budget of 38 billion KRW in 2012.  
 
Figure 6-2 Development of the GSTEP 
 
 
Source: own creation.  
 
The GSTEP was founded to look after technology investment and management in the 
region. It aims to support endogenous technology development with several strategic 
actions by undertaking a holistic approach, an approach that differs significantly from that 
of previous agencies, such as the Gyeonggi Technopark. 
My concern is that throughout Gyeonggi Technopark, there seems to be too much 
focus on NTBF or high-technology based firms. I am not saying that that is a bad 
thing, because obviously it is high value-added generally speaking, but from the 
perspective of the types of business that we have in this region –low technology-
based firms – what impact has GSTEP had at that level? I think the aim of the GSTEP 
would be to see a wider use of the funding to more general benefit. (Interviewee 1) 
 
Alongside the move to emphasise bottom-up procedures, there have been more formal 
routes, such as public hearings, in order for the province to gather and identify opinions 
and listen to the views of the private sector about central governemnt’s policies and 
projects.    
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The GSTEP’s holistic approach involves paying attention to policy initiatives that reflect 
regional interests. Regional interests could be understood as “the prioritization done at 
regional level in a small group of sectors/technologies potentially competitive in 
international markets and generators of new activities with a competitive advantage over 
other locations” (GRI, 2008b: 34). It is, therefore, best expressed in terms of the 
development problems that need to be addressed. The GSTEP identified the regional 
interests through realistic, achievable, and measurable objectives, and specific initiatives 
connected to it, thus involving all the economic and social agents.  
There is a tendency for countries and regions to choose the same priorities. They all 
strive to become a hotspot in biotechnology, nanotechnology, or information and 
communication technology (ICT) by hosting clusters of excellence, incubators, 
science parks, and world-class research hubs. Regional priorities must be forward 
looking, truly contributing to development (GRI, 2008b: 36) 
 
The GSTEP defined regional interests based on two determinants: first, the most pressing 
technological problems that need to be resolved or the most promising opportunities that 
may be pursued to support the short term development of business firms; and second, 
the agenda of the important industries, which will contribute to the growth of regional 
industries and regional economic well-being (GRI, 2008b: 46).   
The GSTEP recognised that there are more demands in the region than just supporting 
high-tech industries and understood the importance of bridging the gap between 
traditional industries and knowledge-based industries. Regarding the low growth of 
traditional industries, such as the textile, ceramic, and furniture industries, the GSTEP’s 
report stated that in order to become a technological competence region, the region must 
“strengthen the knowledge-based industries, but also identify new strengths of 
traditional industry” because a competitive region creates clustering in accordance with 
its competence. To do so, it suggested that the priority was more internatyional 
collaboration in traditional industries with growth potential, such as ICT and 
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nanotechnology. Linked to these technologies, the plan was to undertake the product 
innovation and establishment of regional business cooperation as specific priority 
measures.  
In this way, priorities indicate the demands for new policies to deal with the issues that 
the region is facing in order to pursue industrial development. This process is important 
in that any previous strategies that did not include this provision would have had an 
entirely different character. What is new in this approach is that the policy-making process 
aims to encourage the articulation of the differentiation of demands (i.e. as opposed to 
imitation strategies) based on the comparative advantages in the innovation potential of 
the region. Thus, it can be seen as a new type of regional strategy, in that it incorporates 
technological capability into regional industries (old and new), regional collaboration, and 
global outreach. 
To establish a structured dialogue with industry, the GSTEP issued a call for a Gyeonggi 
Technology Policy Guideline, a mechanism by which industry could conceptualize the 
problems it is having difficulty addressing, including the kinds of technological barriers 
that must be overcome. Of course, the SMEs of the region are not monolithic. In fact, the 
guideline submitted was authored by policy makers, researchers of Gyeonggi Research 
Institute (GRI), public officers of the provincial government, and some university 
professors. The guideline process as well as the notion of the GTDP was introduced to the 
GSTEP. Between 2007 and 2008, five guidelines covering a range of technologies were 
submitted and were sorted in accordance with the technology taxonomy. Of these, the 
guidelines addressing SMEs’ technology development issue provided both scope and 
technical detail, and thus offered a comprehensive roadmap for the GSTEP in developing 
a partnership with SMEs. The guideline process provided a place for clients to go to with 
their ideas and provided an opportunity for the GSTEP to define the goals of the GTDP 
more clearly.  
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In my opinion, Gyeonggi is an attractive area in which to establish a business. The 
provincial government gave a lot of assistance in the beginning, helping us fund the 
setting up of our business. We think the biggest challenge is finding information 
about technological development. It is very difficult to find the right organization 
that is willing to share good information. I think the GTDP is good for our longer-
term prospect in product development. We found a technological partner 
(university) to improve our product. (Interviewee 24)       
 
  
The guidelines feature as a source of information for the business sector that facilitates 
technological development as well as market access and efficiency in production. In 
addition, the guidelines are frequently complemented by harmonised consensus-based 
standard setting on technical specifications. This allows regional SMEs to collaborate with 
GSTEP to design the most appropriate implementation standards and to update them 
regularly to take stock of evolving needs and technical progress. 
 
Table 6-3 Rescaling regional interest and priority-setting process 
 
Date Rescale process 
September 2006 
Established prioritization scheme led by the GSTC 
(reviewed the R&D objectives of Gyeonggi province vis-à-vis national and 
regional subsector  development objectives) 
December 2006 
Compiled baseline information 
(including the results of previous priority-setting exercises) 
Priority setting by scoring method  
January 2007 
First meeting of experts (reviewed national development objectives and refined 
the national priorities previously established) 
Second meeting (to analyse the constraints, refine regional network priorities 
previously established, and formulate regional strategy) 
Regional meetings of innovative actors (firms, universities and institute 
researchers) to examine national and regional priorities    
Workshop of key representatives of provincial governments, the private sector, 
and universities 
Determined regional objectives and strategy  
Examined GSTC’s mandate, mission and objectives 
Examined national priorities and regional priorities established by GSTC 
networks 
Defined regional themes and programs that fulfil objectives 
Identified project priorities for the short, medium, and long-term 
Included a strategic plan framework for the preferred option 
March 2007 Finalized options and clearly articulated the preferred option (including recommendations for implementation) 
May 2007 Sent the GTDP for review to provincial council   
June 2007 Sent the GTDP for approval to provincial council 
January 2008 Implementation over first strategic year 
Source: Own creation.   
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Most of all, the GSTEP needs to reform the spending structure in order to ensure fiscal 
viability. In 2007, industrial budget allocated up to 46.8% of its 270,160 million KRW 
budget on infrastructure projects, with only 5.5% on technology development spending. 
Then, in 2008, the provincial government announced an R&D budget plan after a hard-
fought tug-of-war among the GSTEP and other agencies to secure more fiscal means. The 
provincial government said that technology development spending would rise 95% to 
28,895 million KRW from 14,791 million KRW for 2007.  
In the creation of new demand and of markets for new products, technology development 
has become an important part of the industrial policy. Therefore, it has to be closely 
integrated with the R&D budget of provincial government; hence, the budget has become 
an important factor in region’s innovation process.  
 
Table 6-4 R&D expenditure by Gyeonggi provincial government (2001-2013) 
 
?  Technology investment 
Public research 
institution  Infrastructure Total Million 
KRW % 
Million 
KRW % 
Million 
KRW % 
2001      2,730  3.9%    63,260  91.5%      3,150  4.6%    69,140  
2002      3,900  4.2%    74,440  81.0%    13,536  14.7%    91,876  
2003      4,140  3.3%   108,900  86.9%    12,320  9.8% 125,360  
2004    10,710  6.9%    84,235  54.5%    59,608  38.6% 154,553  
2005      9,838  4.7%   117,788  56.3%    81,648  39.0% 209,274  
2006    11,280  5.1%   106,748  48.2%   103,222  46.7% 221,250  
2007    14,791  5.5%   129,029  47.8%   126,339  46.8% 270,160  
2008    28,895  12.6%   107,906  46.9%    93,051  40.5% 229,852  
2009    30,900  16.5%   107,836  57.7%    48,049  25.7% 186,785  
2010    37,910  15.9%    97,230  40.8%   103,279  43.3% 238,419  
2011    25,530  12.1%    99,718  47.2%    86,148  40.8% 211,396  
2012    34,138  12.1%   124,192  43.8%   124,960  44.1% 283,290  
2013    16,600  6.2%   124,427  46.3%   127,597  47.5% 268,624  
 Source: GSTEP (2014: 40) 
 
Table 6-4 shows the budget for R&D investment of the provincial government and how 
the funding is allocated to various uses. It also shows that there are important differences 
between infrastructure and technology development; infrastructure generally fared 
better than technology investment, as the region concentrated the budget on 
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infrastructure building, and technology investment in the region was less likely to be 
affected. However, as of 2007, some of the infrastructure (Gwanggyo Techno Valley) had 
been completed. Thus, between 2008 and 2010, Gyeonggi province experienced a gradual 
increase in technology development. One question that arises is whether the 
infrastructures had been made or were being developed without any accompanying 
technology investment concepts to boost entrepreneurial dynamism.  
 
 
6.5 The strategic actions   
Since the GSTEP focuses heavily on regional interest, it may be useful to spell out what 
strategic actions have been introduced and how they relate to regional economy. National 
objectives can be highly effective in promoting balanced development, while regional 
objectives are of critical significance for the regional economy. The following policy 
initiatives of the GTDP and knowledge communities, then, may be helpful to understand 
the processes. These are closely linked to local firms.  
 
6.5.1 The Gyeonggi Technology Development Programmes (GTDP) 
First, the GSTEP introduced a strategic policy for the technology development of local 
firms. As the GSTEP emerged as a strategic actor in the region, it was important that 
regional resources were focused on regional priorities that would really add value in the 
region. The GSTEP recognized that preparing for the knowledge economy was important; 
indeed, one of the interviewees reported its role as “ensuring that we focus constantly on 
the importance of SMEs to the upturn. If we do not grow the firms at the head of the 
upturn, we will not grow the Gyeonggi and national economy either. We need the 
investment that will enable this to happen” (Interviewee 2). 
 152 
 
The GTDP was launched in 2008 with the aim of addressing the particular technology 
development of the local firms. It is a cost-sharing technology development programme 
designed to partner the provincial government with the private sector to further both the 
development and dissemination of high-risk technologies that offer the potential for 
significant economic benefits for the region (GRI, 2008a: 55-56).  
 
Table 6-5 The Gyeonggi Technology Development Programmes (GTDP) 
 
Note: a) Provincial funding is limited to 40-60% of the project estimate or actual project cost. The rest of share 
cost required from project firm.  
Source: author’s own creation but modified from GSTEP (2012: 4) 
?
 Strategic Industry Technology 
Development 
Firms-led Technology Development 
Strategic Industry  Public Technology 
Sector 
Open Technology 
Development 
IICC 
Aim Enhancing 
industrial structure 
and high value-
added  
Development of 
public technology  
Demands-oriented 
support  
Promoting 
activities of IICC 
Target 14 sectors 
responding to the 
needs of provincial 
government 
Technology 
responding to the 
needs of publicity 
Applied technology 
in short-term 
Applied 
technology in 
short-term 
Clients Firms, universities and public research 
institutes 
Firms  More than two 
co-work firms 
Period  Within 3 years Within 2 years Within 1 year 
Funding 300m won / year 300m won / year 200m won / year 100m won / year 
Provincial 
fundinga) 
60% 60% 50% 40% 
Projects 
(2008-2012) 
56 9 129 116 
Example Solar battery Develop Foot and 
Mouth Disease  
antibody check kit 
VUI (Voice User 
Interface) 
navigation  
Environmental 
Stretch Film 
Funds  
(2008-2012) 
28 billion KRW  5.1 billon KRW 11.5 billion KRW 30.4 billion KRW 
Process Top-down Top-down Bottom-up Bottom-up 
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The programme identifies measures that lead to an improvement in economic 
performance, whether firms are already successful or are seeking to improve their 
technological performance. This measure is targeted at the regional level and provides a 
shared vision for the technological development of the region’s SMEs.  
The GTDP is composed of two sub-programs: the Strategic Industry Technology 
Development Program and the Firm-based Technology Development Program. These 
programs were selected to avoid duplication and poor coordination, since the resources 
available were limited.  
At first, the Strategic Industry Technology Development Programme reflected the 
relevance attached to firms from “key sectors”, which were viewed as important for the 
necessary modernisation of the local economy. For example, late in the autumn of 2010, 
South Korea was hit by a rapidly spreading outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD). 
FMD is a highly contagious and sometimes fatal viral disease of cloven-hoofed animals, 
such as cattle and pigs. FMD is not transmissible to humans, but the disease has major 
economic consequences. Were a case of FMD to be detected, the government said, the 
affected area would have to be quarantined and the infected livestock destroyed. 
Currently, the provincial government is planning to introduce a certification system to 
guarantee that stockbreeders have adequate training, particularly in hygiene. However, 
in 2009, the GSTEP provided 360 million KRW over two years to develop an FMD antibody 
check kit. This test kit was developed in collaboration with the Cha Hospital Research 
Institute and a private-sector firm. The research provided an effective means of 
vaccinating against FMD and of allowing the separation of infected animals from 
vaccinated animals.  
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The second, the Firms-led Technology Development Programme, became more focused 
on raising firms of lower technology capability and investing in firms of high performance 
and growth, as summarized in Table 6-5 above. Another strategy was the Industrial 
Innovation Cluster Policy (IICP), which was set up as partnership policy in June 2007. This 
is a partnership between the provincial government, research laboratories, and SMEs to 
conduct high-risk research to develop enabling technologies that promise significant 
commercial payoffs and widespread benefits for the economy. The IICP provides a 
mechanism for industry to extend its technological networks and push the envelope 
beyond what it otherwise would attempt. 
Beginning with the fiscal year 2008, the GTDP implemented a hybrid form of competition 
–bottom-up competition and top-down decision making – in which the GTDP could 
perform its outreach with industry much as it did under competition, with the competition 
open to all, but organised through a technological focus. In this programme, SMEs could 
propose research via a Request for Proposal (RFP) to the GTDP to be judged in 
competitions for funding based upon both the technical and economic/business merits of 
the proposal. This change was made primarily because the demands of SMEs for the GTDP 
outstripped the GSTEP’s budgetary ability to respond. The GSTEP holds RFP competitions 
open to all SMEs.  Upon completion of the review, the boards presented a ranking of RFPs 
to the Project Management Team, which was charged with making recommendations for 
financing to the GSTEP chairman. At this point, the Project Management Team could 
request clarification from the board members regarding the final selection. The GSTEP 
chairman would make the ultimate funding decision.  
The GSTEP formed a Technology Evaluation Board to review RFPs and make 
recommendations for funding. Board membership comprised university professors, R&D 
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researchers,76 and GSTEP employees possessing technological and business expertise. 
Board members also included business professionals, who in some cases are retired 
executives whose careers were spent in the selected technical area, or who were 
economists, venture capitalists, and business academics. In RFPs’ competitions, proposals 
first were screened to determine if they were relevant and contained all of the necessary 
documentation; then those remaining received detailed technical and business reviews. 
For the programme that operated during this time, a Technology Evaluation Board was 
set up, which generally comprised 3-4 experts in each sector. Sectoral reviews of RFPs 
were supplemented by additional reviews from cross-sectoral experts. With all the 
members in attendance, they discussed each RPF with attention to its conformance with 
both the technical and business criteria outlined in the guidelines. Those RFPs determined 
to be within the scope and possessing high technical and business merit in the region 
against the criteria were placed on the list of final candidates. 
 
Table 6-6 Number of GTDP applications (2008-2012) 
 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 (first half) 
Applied RFPs 226 233 201 166 83 
Selected RFPs 87 76 72 49 26 
Competition rate 2.6 3.0 2.8 3.4 3.2 
Sources: GSTEP (2011b: 23) 
 
In total, 283 projects were budgeted under the GTDP. Table 6-6 provides a summary from 
the GSTEP held between 2008 and 2011, in which 1,000 RFPs were received and 283 RFPs 
were selected. For example, R&D funding totalled 48,931 hundred million KRW in 2012, 
representing a commitment of 23,005 hundred million KRW from the provincial 
government and 25,926 hundred million KRW from the private sector (GSTEP, 2012: 10). 
                                                          
76 R&D researcher reviewers are primarily employed in central and provincial institutes chosen 
for their expertise in the selected technical area.  
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Table 6-7 Some cases of GTDP 
 
Firms Collaborators Technology development 
Aegisco Co., Ltd. Senplus Co., Ltd. Gyeonggi University 
Develop chucking substrates such as silicon, sapphire 
and glass in the industries of semiconductor, LED and 
Display. 
Sung An Machinery 
Co., Ltd. 
New Control Tech 
Co., Ltd. 
Develop ‘doctoring system’ for Auto-positioning and 
anti-sputtering of ink in the printing unit. The 
development of process and equipment for printed 
electronics including OPV solar cell, OLED, lighting, and 
others. 
Bio Skin Care Inc. Fure Cos co., Ltd. 
Develop new raw material (growth factor), newly 
manufactured material, which are essential to naturally 
manufactured functional cosmetics for medical skin 
purpose.  
Ihlshin co., Ltd. Mirim co., Ltd. VCI Stretch Film for industrial packaging business.  
Laonzena co., Ltd. Woodmetal co., Ltd. Develop intelligent furniture using ‘u-media board’ (touch UI technology) for multimedia contents services   
Korea Micro Fiber 
co., Ltd. KITECH 
Develop new antibiotic and antivirus fibre for IT cases 
(e.g. iPhone and iPad), shoes, gloves 
Kolong Tech co., Ltd. 
Jaeil co., Ltd.  
Yongdotrim Art co., 
Ltd. 
Develop new fibre for car interior materials. 
Hyundai Industrial 
co., Ltd. 
Gyeonggi Industry 
University 
DAS co., Ltd. 
Develop Car seat Ass'y With ‘Lumbar Supporter’ 
Yuneco 
Development co., 
Ltd. 
Gyeonghee 
University 
Development ‘HM2 Filter System’, which is a water 
treatment system with high efficiency, can apply various 
membrane materials and pore sizes with treatment 
purposes, and the system shows excellent treatment 
efficiency and is very compact because of integration of 
various processes (coagulation, precipitation, flotation, 
filtration and sterilization) into the one reactor.  
Sources: author’s own creation from interviews 
 
When asked whether the GSTEP was viewed as being part of a regional system of 
innovation, an interviewee highlighted the success in advancing “GTDP as a future” in that, 
currently, around 1,300 firms are part of it. The GTDP was intended to provide a shared 
vision for the development of the regional economy, to improve firms’ capabilities and 
enhance the region’s competitiveness. The manager of GTDP (Interviewee 3) commented 
that the GSTEP had evolved from the GSTC, which had a legacy of regeneration, and the 
first programme had therefore focused on the regeneration of the institutional 
framework.  
The GTDP can be defined as short-term efforts aimed at specific well-defined 
technology and business goals. This programme, which involves the parallel 
development of a suite of interlocking R&D projects, tackles major technology 
problems with a relatively high payoff potential, which cannot be solved by an 
occasional project coming through the general competition. By managing the actor 
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of projects that complement and reinforce each other, the GTDP can have a possible 
impact on the Gyeonggi’s economy. (Interviewee 3)  
 
 
6.5.2 Development of regional partnerships  
The IICC and IMT projects were launched with the aim of encouraging local firms to work 
in partnership to tackle fraud more effectively. The IICC, which will be discussed in more 
detail in the next section, connects greater Gyeonggi communities to GSTEP in order to 
help solve difficulties and take advantage of new opportunities. An important part of the 
IMT project is to facilitate the exchange of information and experience between individual 
actors.  Both projects bring together local talent and resources with GSTEP and seek 
funding to drive technological development.  
 
6.5.2.1 Industrial Innovation cluster committees (IICC) 
In 2007, 300 of the firms with the GSTEP launched the Industrial Innovation Cluster 
Committee (IICC). IICC is an important element of the sectoral cooperation partnership 
and is an extended form of the industrial-robot firms’ network, named the Bucheon 
Industry Promotion Foundation (BIPF),? in Bucheon city 77 . The committee aims to 
“enhance the technology capabilities of a firm through the creation of sectoral learning 
networks and to tap into its resource and increase its accessibility for other firms in the 
region” (Interviewee 3). This, for instance, can help to mobilise technological knowledge 
between SMEs and research institutions/universities. It focused its efforts on achieving 
                                                          
77 The BIPF is responsible for searching and networking new technology that could be applied 
in existing products and for solving existing technological problems. One objective of the 
BIPF was to activate Bucheon city’s economy by developing an intelligence-based industry 
(specifically, industrial robots, molding, accessories, and materials) through promoting 
regional industrial information; designing research and development programs; training an 
industrial workforce; stimulating industry-based technology development businesses; and 
encouraging links among industry, universities, and laboratories. 
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this aim by supporting networking and especially by amplifying the endogenous 
technological strength of the region. This follows the strategic orientations outlined by 
the GSTEP. 
IICC comprises a group of firms, research universities, and research institutions within the 
same sectors, which came together to share and to learn from each other. The principle 
of a learning network is that the individual firms hold deposits of tacit knowledge, which 
are considered core knowledge resources. These resources have been built up within the 
firms’ actual business experience and entrepreneurial success and failures. Their 
knowledge is an under-utilized regional resource. Firms as learning networks offer the 
potential for firms to learn how to solve technological problems through communication 
and by learning from other firms’ experiences. It was apparent from the research 
conducted with the participants that a key benefit of IICC was that it helped technological 
collaboration (Korea IT Times, April 9, 2012).  
In the words of a participant from one member firm, “Before, I felt quite isolated in 
technological improvement; now I feel more connected” (Interviewee 22). This is relevant 
in the context of economics on a regional scale, as isolation can be a key problem faced 
by the business community. A key objective was that each of the committees would 
become sustainable, in that they would continue to operate after the completion of co-
works and thus provide lasting benefits to the participant firms and the regional economy. 
Networks quite often disband when the interested firm running the network loses interest 
or funding is cut. Thus, if the network were able function under complete self-direction, 
the function of the network would be to serve the needs of the firms solely and not to 
reflect values or interests associated with any funding body or support agencies. 
IICC provides an opportunity to meet other firms in similar industries who understand the 
frustrations and worries of technology. While networking between firms in similar 
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industries is beneficial, it can be difficult for firms in more fragmented regional economies 
to find sectoral networks. This is where IICC can be of real benefit to the regional economy, 
and the interviews supported the concept that firms can help and develop their product 
by networking with other business professionals. As one interviewee stated, “I realized 
that we all face the same problems, like cash flow. Seeing other firms being so honest 
encouraged me to be honest and forthcoming with information also” (Interviewee 23).  
To become member of the committee, a firm should have experience in cooperating with 
other firms of the same or a related technology. Participant firms must display a serious 
intent to grow their business so that they can maximize their benefits from engaging in 
the network. The time, trust, and closeness built up between the member firms facilitate 
feedback on issues and problems related to their business. Participants reflected that a 
key benefit of a network approach in comparison to other existing business networking 
models is that “in this committee, because we have to divulge, it is all built around building 
up trust. Therefore, one would build up much closer relationships, which in turn, benefits 
the business” (Interviewee 24). 
IICC currently focuses on the bio, new material, car parts, fabrics, and nine other select 
industries. By 2010, more than 1,200 SMEs and research institutes from 13 different 
sectors had joined (see Table 6-8).78 Since its establishment, the committee has been 
funding technical transfers and cooperation among member firms and developing new 
technologies. In addition, the provincial government has added to the list the software 
sector, new start-ups, companies based in the northern part of Gyeonggi province, and 
                                                          
78 GSTEP announced to increase the number of committee sectors from thirteen to seventeen 
by adding four more highly competitive industries. Newly added are the memory 
semiconductor, broadcasting and communications LED, and recycled materials industries, 
all of which are closely related to the seventeen ‘new growth engine’ industries designated 
by the central government for their considerable growth potential and market influence. 
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companies engaged in the commercialization of technologies recognized in technology 
contests.  
 
Table 6-8 Sectoral committees of IICC (December, 2010)  
 
Industry 
Number of member 
Start year 
Total SMEs Technological sub-committee 
Intellectual mechatronics 111 105 6 
Jun. 2008 
IT-SoC, Mobile 86 65 4 
Textile 98 79 5 
Robot 74 74 3 
Pharmaceuticals 77 64 5 
Packaging 62 61 4 
Automobile parts 62 61 5 
Nano 180 112 5 
Furniture 97 87 5 Oct. 2008 
Medical Equipment 91 80 5 
May 2009 Printed-Circuit Board 95 86 3 
Bio-New Materials 74 72 2 
New and Renewable Energy 93 81 3 Aug. 2009 
Total 1,200 1,027 55  
Note: GSTEP has decided to include the memory semiconductor, broadcasting, LED, and recycled materials 
industries in its committee, all of which are closely related to the seventeen ‘new growth engine’ industries 
designated by the central government for their considerable growth potential and market influence.  
Sources: GSTEP (2011c: 7) 
 
To create and develop a sustainable learning network, the IICCs are closely connected to 
the GTDPs of the GSTEP. For firms to qualify for network entry, they have to have reached 
a sufficient stage of their business cycle to benefit from taking time out to think 
strategically about their technology development, and to have reached a level of sufficient 
experience to transfer knowledge to others within the committees. It was also necessary 
that participants from firms were the owner or top manager in their business to ensure 
that they had the autonomy to implement any actions brought about through their 
learning in the committees.  
In the area of IICC, the province provides a total of KRW 5 billion for 25 projects, with 200 
million KRW for each project, to a consortium of more than two companies. In total, the 
province provides 300 million KRW for research and development to companies that are 
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less than four years old for one of three designated projects. In the areas of service, 
manufacture, and software, a total of 500 million KRW will be provided annually to 
companies engaged in five designated areas, with 100 million KRW allocated for each area. 
For the development of R&D in the northern part of Gyeonggi province, the province 
offers local companies in Goyang and other localities a total of KRW 1 billion for ten 
projects, with KRW 100 million for each. 
Here, we can see the GSTEP and firms in a better relationship, because of their direct 
negotiating relationship and mostly, because of the direct influence of firms’ 
requirements on the innovation process. This is a major and durable outcome of the 
continuous action regarding firms. To date, the benefits that IICC has created and the 
impacts it has had are extensive and continue to positively affect the regional economy. 
The GSTEP tracked the development of technology and the potential impact that its 
involvement with IICC would have on the regional economy. 
 
6.5.2.2 The Intellectual Mechatronics (IMT) project 
There are greater demands for mechanical products with high technologies than for those 
without. This concerns mainly the industry network of Intelligence Mechatronics (IMT) 
that emerged in 2010 out of the four provinces’ interdisciplinary programme for 
promoting the IMT convergence industry through cooperation – in short, the convergence 
of the mechatronic industry. The IMT project is a networking policy for mechanical 
engineering firms, and it has envisioned the realization of the IMT industry, as discussed 
in the interviews.   
IMT was established in 2009 with the objectives of promoting an integrated system 
of research, training, information, and documentation activities in the field of 
mechatronics and of evolving as a centre of excellence in the field of mechatronics 
for value-added products at regional levels. With these objectives in mind, we have 
established strong inter-regional links, and organized many seminars, workshops 
and conferences; and we have given training to local firms in the field of 
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mechatronics. We have extended help and provided funding to those firms who are 
trying to establish mechatronics activities in four regions. With respect to research, 
the recent activities have been mainly towards developing new demands in the 
areas of intelligent mechatronics. Our work includes a combination of both new 
technologies and practical applications to robotics and nonlinear systems. In this 
context, we have accumulated strong expertise in machinery based on IT 
technologies. (Interviewee 3) 
 
The IMT project combines the traditional metal and engineering industries with expertise 
in modern ICT and electronics, producing what could be termed as intelligent hardware. 
The project was established to provide expertise in utilizing and applying the new 
technology (i.e. IT, BT, and NT) concepts and ideas in the mechatronics industry. Based on 
this idea, the project provides an interdisciplinary, tightly focused approach to designing 
such devices, producing mechatronic technologies that can have an immediate impact on 
the industry. The IMT industry includes four interrelated areas of new technologies 
(GSTEP 2010b: 1):  
 IMT parts (IT, BT, NT + MT parts): Automobile cockpit sensor (SOC sensor and 
communication + automotive cockpit module), Bio-sensor (Bio marker + electronic 
integrated circuit), Automobile Engineer Control Unit (Man Machine Interface 
contents + Automobile control module)    
 IMT products (IT, BT, NT + MT products): CNC constructing machine (contents, 
communication software + NC constructing machine), Health test kits (bio sensor + 
test kits), 3D TV (3D module/contents + digital TV), Automobile parts test system 
(visual test devices + parts manufactures)  
 IMT systems (IT, BT, NT + MT systems): Semiconductor/display product system 
(product control system + product equipment), Remote health test system 
(contents, communication system + health test kits)  
 IMT services (IT, BT, NT + MT services): Plant management/control service (remote 
hitch test/management service + processing system)   
 
In particular, three major research categories are being pursued: robotics, electric 
machines, and automotive systems.  
 First, robotics research deals with the fusion of machines, computing, sensing, 
electronics, software, and systems engineering to create intelligent devices 
capable of interacting with the complexities of the real world. Research in 
robotics focuses on the perception and control of autonomous machines in 
unstructured and dynamic environments and the application of robotics in 
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infrastructure maintenance, urban search and rescue, health care, and road 
vehicles.  
 Second, electric motors and drives are an essential part of many mechatronic 
devices. The focus is on employing new materials and topologies for electrical 
machines and power electronic circuits, effective system design optimisation 
algorithms, intelligent sensing, monitoring, and variable speed control techniques, 
and the optimum design and integration of compact low temperature PEM fuel-
cell systems.  
 Third, automotive systems are a major application area for mechatronic systems. 
The focus is on automobile powertrain and suspension control for improved 
transmission shift performance, fuel efficiency, drivability, driver and passenger 
safety and comfort; sensing and perception for situation awareness and fatigue 
monitoring for road safety; sensing and control for reducing emission levels in 
internal combustion engines; and hybrid powertrains. 
 
Figure 6-3 IMT project between four provinces and Russian university   
 
  
Source: GSTEP (2012: 13)  
 
Particularly, the GSTEP considers that working in IMT collaboration with other provinces 
(i.e. Seoul, Inchoen, and Changwon) is crucial, as all of them have something different to 
offer (Figure 6-3). Existing policies imply looking inside the province; however, this might 
be insufficient for strategic actions. In other words, the GSTEP identified the competitive 
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advantages of key industries by looking beyond the provincial administrative boundaries 
and making comparisons with other provinces. This concerns first of all the industry 
network that, in 2010, emerged out of the four provinces’ interdisciplinary programme 
for promoting the IMT convergence industry through cooperation – in short, the 
convergence of the mechatronic industry. The project identifies relevant linkages and 
flows of knowledge, revealing possible patterns of integration with partner regions. 
Recently, the GSTEP has cooperated with 18 experts in knowledge-based technologies 
and mechatronics, that is, IMT coordinators, to develop an active network of firms and 
research institutes. An IMT coordinator refers to a group of academics, patent attorneys, 
and experts, for mechatronics firms within the IMT project who understand how 
mechatronics and new technology fit together in product innovation. They bring together 
stakeholders, led by industry, to define short- and medium-term research and 
technological development objectives and to lay down markers for achieving them. The 
extent of the active external coordination and cooperation role of the GSTEP is arguably 
more advanced than in other actors. This is also linked to a finance agreement with central 
government. The finance agreement between the GSTEP and central government existed 
previously, and it is said to have been influential in the process of establishing the IMT 
project and for the intra-provincial clustering.   
The development of the GSTEP’s programmes demonstrates a shift away from strategies 
that had been previously implemented. Rather than simply replicating actions that 
worked in the past, the GSTEP and SMEs have consciously developed new ways of acting. 
This is reflected in several changes. For instance, there are new players in the coordinator. 
In particular, the regional authorities play a much more important role than they did in 
previous efforts. There are also new behaviours, such as technology development funding 
(i.e. GTDP). The shift from indirect funding to direct funding is also new. The IICCs have 
also developed new ways to collaborate; for example, they make much more extensive 
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use of the regional budget to facilitate innovation activities. Taken together, it is clear that 
the development of the GSTEP represents a substantial change in the routines and 
objectives of research collaboration. 
The GSTEP has played a major role in making and continuing this tie. It acts as a platform 
for external between other regions in the field of mechanical and electronic industries. In 
addition, it has coordinating and cooperation functions both internally and externally at 
the regional level. It is internally responsible for the executive actor of the region’s 
innovation forums that were established in 2009, namely, the Wednesday seminar, 
Gwanggyo Knowledge Forum, and Gyeonggi Science and Technology Committee. The 
participation of various persons is a sign that the cooperation has become a part of the 
GSTEP culture. This seems not only to foster a strategy upgrade internally, but it is also 
likely to be a key contributor to the funding GSTEP receives.  
We believe we have a core offer of innovation support programmes that are unique 
to firms, and we offer more regional services that are not unique to us, but are part 
of a package that could be. That is why we work with other regional authorities. 
Also, they offer things unique to them. For the past year, we have been actively 
looking for partnerships with the innovation connectors through formal 
partnerships, a memorandum of understanding. (Interviewee 3) 
 
And the project will be a good example of how different provincial governments can 
work together. (Interviewee 15) 
 
 
6.6 Concluding reflections  
This chapter has concentrated on addressing the emergence of new actors in and new 
approaches to Gyeongi’s regional development policies with a technology focus, on 
examining how and why the GSTEP has developed such a strategy, and which factors have 
facilitated the process.  
As was shown in Section 6.1, we explored how the political context is intertwined with 
the technological development policy in Gyeonggi province. As we saw in the case of the 
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GTDP, IICC, and IMT, a region-specific strategy has emerged. Particular attention was paid 
in Section 6.4 to the case of new regional authority, the GSTEP, which has pioneered its 
way to developing the regional strategy in the industrial policy. The GSTEP and policy 
initiative has grown quickly in Gyeonggi province, fuelled by a demand from the governor 
to use the power to tackle the regional economy. Just as the provincial government has 
cooperated with central government, the provincial government has started to develop 
its own approach. Interviewees agreed that the main catalyst for strategic action on policy 
had been the decision by the governor to focus on the economy, as this raised its political 
profile. 
This is an elaboration of the partnership relationship, which sees central government and 
the provincial government as more or less equal partners. This also postulates that both 
central government and the provincial government have resources (legal, financial, 
political) that each can use against the other. Thus, the provincial government sees the 
relationship as a process of bargaining and exchange. The relationship is not evenly 
balanced, but the regional actors have significant assets of their own that they can exploit: 
local knowledge and expertise, networking, and above all, their position as the elected 
and concerned representatives of their communities. 
However, Gyeonggi province can only be seen to be successful by actively implementing 
a bottom-up development strategy that is based on a widely accepted vision of the future 
by using harmonizing programmes that have different economic development effects 
with the help of dynamic regional networks. Two major issues emerged from the debates 
aimed at the interpretation of systemic change: on the one hand, how do other actors, 
especially existing actors, respond? On the other hand, how can regional competitiveness 
be improved, by which GSTEP intervention may be regarded as successful?  
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It is important to realise that different modes of governance exist, ranging from 
deliberative to hierarchical, and there are different perspectives on development. 
Depending on the perspective used and the mode of governance, different constellations 
of processes, instruments, actors, and institutions play a role in sustainable development. 
Clearly, disagreement can exist between old and new actors. Tensions and conflicts may 
arise if certain tools or procedures do not match. In fact, it is probable that the conflicts 
inherent in the change should be reflected in some form within the transition arena. 
At the beginning of the strategic actions in 2008, the GSTEP had a rather ambiguous 
position with regard to this initiative, being its natural promoter but also being on the 
defensive in case the strategic action were to end up dismantling the network, which had 
it taken so much time an effort to set up. Thus, a new direction for the evolution of the 
system has been embarked upon with several points of conflict.  
Therefore, it is the combination of structural factors and agency factors that explains the 
new relation formation in the RSI. The next chapter seeks to provide a continuing change 
process account of these questions and to describe the specific relationship among 
regional actors.     
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7 Continuity and change of RSI  
This final empirical chapter discusses the political factors affecting change and their 
continuity in the RSI over time. In particular, we examine whether the emergence of the 
GSTEP represents a transformation or involves a continuity with past patterns of 
relationship.   
The chapter consist of three parts. The first section explores integration in the GSTEP and 
national agencies and assesses key problems among them. The second section considers 
the responses of national agencies, while the third section explains the political sources 
of continuing tensions. This section explores how the relationship has kept moving 
towards being complex and fragmented since the emergence of the GSTEP. 
 
 
7.1 A ‘new’ form of RSI through de-centralization or re-centralization?  
Cooke et al.’s (2004) case studies on RSI in his book, which included Gyeonggi, as discussed 
in Chapter 1, provided the motivation for this study. According to his approach, RSI in 
South Korea are changing in two particular aspects: ‘interactive’ business innovation and 
‘networked’ governance (Cooke et al., 2004: 15).  
On the one hand, ‘interactive’ business innovation activities and their performance effects 
can be confirmed by a number of statistical indicators. First, we examine the performance 
of the region and then the interactivity. As shown in Table 7-1, Gyeonggi province is one 
of the innovative regions in South Korea. Jang Jae-Hong (2006) examined regional 
innovation performance (2000-2004) using the European Innovation Scoreboard index. 
Daejeon shows the highest score (.6728) and Jeonnam the lowest (.0693). Only Daejeon, 
Seoul (.5055), and Gyeonggi (.4962) are regions with higher than average (.3548) scores 
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on this index. The regional differences are greater in the Innovation Inputs Index than in 
the Innovation Output Index, with Daejon significantly above not only Gyeonggi but also 
every other province. It seems appropriate to say that spatial differences came from the 
high performance business in Seoul and Gyeonggi province, with an important reason for 
the higher standing of Seoul being the government-funded research institutes in Daejeon 
(Daeduk Techno Valley).  
 
Table 7-1 Regional innovation index (2002-2004) 
 
 SII (Summary Innovation 
Index) Innovation Inputs Index Innovation Outputs Index 
Seoul 0.5055 0.3306 0.6803 
Busan 0.1549 0.0953 0.2146 
Daegu 0.1912 0.1096 0.2729 
Incheon 0.2728 0.1934 0.3522 
Gwangju 0.2533 0.178 0.3287 
Daejeon 0.6728 0.8628 0.4829 
Ulsan 0.129 0.1002 0.1579 
Gyeonggi 0.4962 0.4352 0.5573 
Gangwon 0.1208 0.1402 0.1015 
Chungbuk 0.3458 0.2578 0.4337 
Chungnam 0.288 0.2361 0.3399 
Jeonbuk 0.1456 0.1265 0.1646 
Jeonnam 0.0693 0.075 0.0636 
Gyeongbuk 0.3473 0.2449 0.4498 
Gyeongnam 0.2029 0.1825 0.2234 
Jeju 0.111 0.1461 0.0758 
Average 0.3548 0.2657 0.4438 
Note: The indices consist of the summary innovation index (SII), the innovation inputs index (which, in turn, 
consists of the human resources index and knowledge creation index), and the innovation outputs index 
(again consists of innovation-application index and intellectual property index). 
Source: Jang Jae-Hong (2006: 50)  
 
With regard to the ‘networked governance’ observation made by Cooke, the results have 
been more mixed.  The last decade has seen the establishment of numerous policy actors, 
such as Gyeonggi Technopark, the GSTEP, and various partnerships, and these are now 
playing a major role in the knowledge generation and diffusion subsystem. The fieldwork 
for this thesis yielded a simple picture of the interrelationships among the actors 
participating in the industrial policy process. Here, for the sake of simplicity of the 
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representation, we have summarized many of these actors and have highlighted the 
various types of interaction among them (see Figure 7-1).  
This is a governance structure in the making. Much of the policies on industrial 
development itself were derived from central government funding. There are also many 
policy actors now involved in responding to industrial policy, and there are multiple 
interactions between these and all the organisations in Figure 7-1 (to maintain the clarity 
of the diagram, the web of interactions is not shown). These include universities, city 
governments, and industrial R&D institutes.  
 
Figure 7-1 Simplistic diagram of governance for regional and industrial development policy in 
Gyeonggi province 
 
 
Sources: own creation.  
 
Figure 7-1 portrays two distinct strands of policy interaction in an overall pattern of policy 
linkage. The Gyeonggi provincial government acts as a bridge between the groups of 
GSTEP and Gyeonggi Technopark. One strand shows links between the national area of 
the Gyeonggi Technopark, the Ministry of Knowledge and Economy, national research 
institutes, Hanyang University, and Ansan city government relationships that have existed 
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for a long time. Gyeonggi Technopark’s role, with a long and rich tradition, tends to enjoy 
a higher status, as measured in terms of local SMEs’ interaction. The case study suggests 
that technology development policies initiated by the Ministry of Knowledge and central 
government in the region where Gyeonggi Technopark enjoys a high status have been 
meant to respond to pressing economic challenges, such as adjusting the training supply 
to the SMEs’ needs for a productive structure (Section 5.2.2).  
Another strand shows the link between the GSTEP and the regional actors in Gyeonggi 
province and other regions of the IMT network. The GSTEP played a role in opening the 
new path of innovation through funding, legislation, and leadership in the region. An 
advantage of initiating the innovation process through a bottom-up approach is the 
crucial role that the regional authorities and SMEs have played in initiating the innovation 
activities. The political leadership of the provincial government has been effective in 
bringing the different actors together, and it has been a key force behind the creation of 
the GTDP and their policies (see Section 6.1). Legislation and funding from the provincial 
government drove and supported the institutional arrangement initiated by the creation 
of the new regional programmes, though the GSTEP is also a relatively recent and perhaps 
under-appreciated phenomenon. ?
What can we say about the relationship (the dotted line in Figure 7-1) between these two 
policy actors? Are they integrating or conflicting? The answer is a bit of both. On the one 
hand, from a broader and longer-term perspective, there appears to be substantial policy 
integration. Some of that congruence is derived from the economic enhancement of 
industrial policies. Such economic enhancement can, in turn, lead to the enhancement of 
regional policy objectives, as mentioned at the outset of the RSI. On the other hand, the 
two policy actors are not so well aligned in the short term. The newly established GSTEP 
not only addresses deficits regarding industrial policy, but also takes on functions formerly 
performed by Gyeonggi Technopark, creating an overlap that can be a source of conflict. 
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Moreover, the organisational overload associated with the new policy initiatives raises 
questions about the extent of coherence of the RSI itself, let alone coherence with other 
policy areas.  
Although there does not seem to be serious conflict, tension can be observed.  We found 
a strong debate between the GSTEP and the Technopark resulting from policy actors 
finding themselves in redundant and possibly ambiguous positions. There is an ongoing 
debate about “too many policy actors” in the industry policy field. From the point of view 
of integration between the two actors, it can be observed that the GTDP have still not 
been fully understood, accepted, or adopted by Gyeonggi Technopark. These views were 
reflected in the comments of a number of those interviewed, with the specific issue of 
wasted resources being highlighted: 
There are no agreements with regard to the integration of different programmes 
between different actors. This is rather arbitrary, and it happens that you look into 
other databases, and suddenly see a firm with the same title and with the same 
programme that has already been applied. (Interviewee 4)   
 
The regional network of technology development and innovation support is 
organized around Gyeonggi Technopark and industrial districts and some cities; 
however, the networking is rather low between the various types of actors, and 
there is no coordination in their activities. This deprives the region of synergies and 
results in overlapping. (Interviewee 11) 
 
 
These interviewees’ argument is that this overlap reduces the effectiveness of regional 
resources and does not facilitate the regional growth. This opinion was frequently 
expressed in the interviews with participants from Gyeonggi Technopark and nationally 
funded research institutes. In particular, interviewees from the Technopark did not hide 
their disapproval of the GSTEP’s style: 
There are overlaps, which one could transfer from completion into cooperation. It 
really concerns the interfaces, which are often not sufficiently clear. And there is 
always an intersection, which is covered by both organizations at the same time 
(interviewee from the provincial government. (Interviewee 13) 
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Too much is duplicated here. For instance, a different initiative and a different actors 
work on the same programme as we do, sometimes without knowing about it. I see 
a further weakness in that we are often in danger of losing the practical relevance. 
Programmes are too theoretical and too scientific for our clients and too abstract 
for SMEs. They often do not understand what such a network can actually offer 
them. The practical relevance is often already lost because the language of SMEs is 
not used. (Interviewee 12)   
 
Specific arguments arose due to a dispute over the provincial government’s budget for 
the fiscal year 2008 when Gyeonggi Technopark was asked to present a discussion for 
reform before drawing up its budget plan. Because Gyeonggi Technopark is receiving 
reduced funding from the provincial government, there had been animosity between the 
officials in the Technopark, and there was a tension between them.  
Compared to last year (2008), our budget this year (2009) has decreased. Budget falls 
in the 2009 budget amount to 8000 million KRW. Last year the funding was 5000 
million KRW. The series of programmes most likely still to be the same as last year. 
It is a bone of contention. (Interviewee 6)  
 
The responsibility for urban development and the upgrade of the industry remains 
divided between different administrations, and this fragmentation of management, 
frequently exacerbated by the political tensions of level of administrations, may 
lead to incoherent and uncoordinated economic development. (Interviewee 20)  
 
One interviewee reflected that the terms ‘conflict’ or ‘tension’ are themselves generally 
regarded as “arm wrestling” (Interviewee 42). This interviewee suggested that this sort of 
relationship is healthy, as it contains a vital element of challenge, and serves to nurture 
an improved understanding and awareness of regional objectives, which in turn, can lead 
to fresh ideas and a united and focused move forwards. The findings also suggested that 
the majority of interviewees did respond positively to the conflicts.  
The GSTEP and Gyeonggi Technopark are two key neighbouring regional authorities, 
which benefit from good relations as well. But their good relationship does not 
mean that their programmes and goals are identical. Therefore, their perspectives 
on regional developments are different. Gyeonggi Technopark has preferred to stay 
quite consistent in terms of its official announcements in regard to the national 
developments. Therefore, it seems that Gyeonggi Technopark’s strategies in the 
region are to some extent in line with those of the central government. But the 
GSTEP’s views are very different. Their positions in regard to the regional 
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developments are not the same either. The GSTEP’s stance in regard to Gyeonggi 
province is surprising, even to Gyeonggi Technopark as well, since these two players 
had extended their relations to a strategic level, and their past conflicts seemed to 
have been over. Gyeonggi Technopark has changed its strategy in regard to SMEs; 
it has opened its programmes to the GSTEP and is even talking about the necessity 
for reforms in Gyeonggi Technopark. Gyeonggi Technopark is trying to turn into a 
new model of policy and governance in the region in order to increase its bargaining 
power with the GSTEP. (Interviewee 42)  
 
It may seem a paradox that while many interviewees explicitly addressed the ‘governance’ 
implication of industrial policy and regional development policy, they also indicated the 
democratic dilemmas raised by the development and implementation of regional policy 
in terms of conflicts between national and regional objectives. 
For this reason, the Committee of Economy and Investment of the provincial council made 
emphatic calls for policy integration between Gyeonggi Technopark and the GSTEP 
(Gyeonggi Council, 2010a: 21; 2010b: 34). Calls have been made to avoid such fragmented 
decision making by integrating different but interrelated policies (Gyeonggi Council, 2011: 
4). These calls are coming at a time when decision making is facing increasing complexity 
as a result of various concurrent trends. Some of these trends are toward globalisation 
and the re-centralisation of decision making in regional policy, whilst other trends are 
toward fragmentation and the devolution of decision making. A variety of factors have 
increased the number of actors involved in the policy process, such as the emergence of 
the regional actors in the decision-making process. It makes policy integration increasingly 
difficult but more compelling to achieve.  
While Cooke et al. (2004: 11-13) addresses more explicitly the ‘governance’ implications 
of the RSI conceptions, it would seem that there is substantial political tension between 
the Technopark and the GSTEP arising from actors in the latter viewing the Technopark as 
being insufficiently responsive to local needs (particularly SMEs). It also seems that this 
tension is heightened by overlapping responsibilities and is amplified by the declining 
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provincial support for the Technopark. In practice, however, these actors need to co-exist.  
If they fight too much, the political authorities will intervene to ‘sort them out’ in ways 
that might be to neither of their liking. Hence, they must be seen to be ‘playing nicely’ 
together and to work out ways of co-existing. In terms of governance, this does not 
suggest a smooth or complete devolution of authority to the region; however, nor does it 
suggest that the central government is in complete control of developments.  
This issue is about the interactions of politically legitimate bureaucratic players – each 
group draws from a somewhat different idea of legitimacy: the centre draws from the 
overall development goals of the country (which it may get wrong by being too 
redistributive), and the province draws from the needs and aspirations of its local 
constituents (who are likely to argue that they are engines of national economic growth 
and competitiveness in light of their size and contribution). Thus, we will explore Gyeonggi 
Technopark and national agencies’ response in the next section.?  
 
   
7.2 National agencies’ responses to the strategic actions  
In 2009, Gyeonggi Technopark proposed to strengthen its role and to secure more 
provincial budgets to help firms with more supportive policies. It raised awareness of 
firms’ specific needs, so that more customized support could be delivered. 
 
7.2.1 More strategic policies  
Confronting budget challenges, Gtyeonggi Technopark is under pressure to focus on 
immediate needs at the expense of investments. Thus, in the Technopark, there has been 
a substantial improvement in the business support programmes.  
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At first, the ‘techno-doctor’ programme seems to be a technically supporting programme 
to help firms that have a difficulty in hiring high quality human resources. The programme 
focuses on the technological disorder of firms. ‘Techno-doctor’ may refer to scientists who 
are specialists in their fields and/or technology experts who specialize in operating 
technology.  
The rationale is that the techno doctors are directly involved in the delivery of the 
technological difficulties, and thus have a greater knowledge and understanding of the 
client or service-user needs and of the market for that service. The techno-doctor unit 
provides an overarching coordination role, including assisting with new product 
development, providing advice on technological difficulties, and monitoring performance. 
Thus, as one interviewee put it, the techno-doctor performs a “supportive role and a 
centralised function that people can dip into as and when required” (Interviewee no. 6). 
Gyeonggi Technopark set up 500 techno-doctors to deal with technological advice. More 
than 300 firms received support from a techno-doctor in 2010 (Gyeonggi Technopark, 
2010: 61). For example, a small-scale turbine manufacturing firm, ATT Co., possessed core 
techniques for wind turbine development in the renewable energy sector. Facing 
difficulties in developing smaller advanced generators, ATT was able to receive a technical 
consultancy from a techno-doctor, and research and development has subsequently 
accelerated. An interviewee at ATT said that this support had helped them to concentrate 
on technology development (Interviewee 22). Another interviewee described the 
activities of the techno-doctor service.  
We have very devolved structure, so we have a range of expertise to support 
business. So, whether it’s new product development, solving a technical problem, 
or simply driving internal efficiencies, our team can respond to any business 
challenge, and we can also assist in directing you to appropriate funding 
programmes that might be available. (Interviewee 11)  
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Another new policy is the ‘Green-All programme’ to help firms obtain a ‘Green Certificate’ 
from the central government (Jones and Yoo Byungseo, 2011). The Green Certificate is a 
national certification system certifying a green technology or a promising green project to 
clearly stipulate the object and scope of supporting green investment and to concentrate 
on investment as part of the Lee Myung-Bak administration’s Green Growth policy in 
2008.79 When Lee Myung-bak’s administration was inaugurated in 2008, he hailed ‘low-
carbon, green growth’ as the nation’s new guiding economic development agenda, 
stressing that environmental stewardship can be an engine for economic growth. The 
certificate holders were rewarded with 50% money back off the registration fee and 1,000 
USD marketing subsidies. 
The nation’s move to adopt an international standard is aimed at garnering businesses 
interest and recognition from eco-conscious businesses oversea. Gyeonggi Technopark 
argued that local firms need to get a certificate for their products if they wish to 
outperform in the global market.   
Because the export market is so important to us, it is vital that we continue to 
develop the Green Certificate scheme in a way that is consistent with international 
standards. (Interviewee 12)  
 
Gyeonggi Technopark supported the initiative by offering consultations, arranging 
meetings with experts for documentation, and covering the costs of the application for 
this certificate. Before starting the service, Gyeonggi Technopark employed this 
businesses support programme to hint that this and other services could be accessed with 
                                                          
79 There are three types of green certification, namely, green technology, green business 
project, green company, and these three types are categorized evolutionarily. For green 
technology certification, the MKE has chosen 10 categories of technologies, in total, 1,263 
technologies. For green business projects, 9 categories and 92 projects have already been 
chosen for the support; and for green companies, the threshold is 30% of the revenue, which 
should be obtained from green technologies or projects (see more www.greencertif.or.kr).  
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a single phone call. One of the interviewees described the significance of this to the 
Technopark’s outreach efforts: 
We tried to find our new role. While the government took two years to make the 
enforcement ordinance after the president’s proclamation on green growth, we 
prepared to set concrete plans for practising the initial concepts. Implementing a 
new programme for regional SMEs right after the issue of an ordinance needed a 
lot of preparation time for planning. It was difficult and time consuming for us, but 
it was the best way to gain an advantage in the competition. We had never had any 
experience related to green technology services before 2010. We tried to take an 
initiative to lead green technology services in Gyeonggi province. Our strategy, 
which Gyeonggi Technopark chose, was to maximize the pre-existing service 
resources, utilizing expert pools for consulting services and the techno-doctor 
program for helping firms out with providing technical solutions. Since holding 
intellectual property rights was one of the pre-requisites for earning green 
certification, we let more firms access useful consultations and services from our 
IPR team to earn patents. Combining pre-existing services and new ones, we 
created a brand-new service program; the Green-All programme became the first 
green support activity in the region. Planning took several months, but the service 
started in May 2010, only one month after the announcement of the enforcement 
ordinance. (Interviewee 11) 
 
 
Consulting was provided on 93 cases as of the end of 2010. When the cases needed more 
specialised inputs from expert consultants, each case was sent to experts so that the firm 
could find better ways to earn the certificate.  
 
7.2.2 Linkage with proximate national agencies  
Gyeonggi Technopark tried to a build national agency partnership in the Ansan area. In 
2009, it was given its current name, Ansan Science Valley (ASV), in order to further 
promote joint research and cooperation programs for science and technology 
development.  
This effort was undertaken in conjunction with Hanyang University, which conducts basic 
research, and several other research institutes (i.e. Korea Testing Laboratory (KTL), Korea 
Institute of Industrial Technology (KITECH), Korea Electric Research Institute (KERI), 
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Hanyang University, LG Parts and Materials Research Institute, and the Rural Research 
Institute.  
 
Table 7-2 Ansan Science Valley (ASV) 
 
Actor Specified area Researchers Type 
Gyeonggi 
 Technopark 
Information and communication/electronic, 
automotive, bio-technology, robotics 49 Public 
Korea Institute of Industrial 
Technology (KIIT) Robot technology, textile materials 170 Public 
Korea Testing Laboratory 
(KTL) 
Quality certification, standards, instrumentation, 
test and evaluation, education and training 140 Public 
Korea Electric Research 
Institute (KERI) Convergence technology division 124 Public 
LG Parts and Materials 
Research Institute Electronic and material parts 293 Private 
Hanyang University ERICA 
Campus Basic sciences, humanities and social science 250 Public 
Rural Research Institute  
Research institution affiliated with Korea Rural 
Community Corporation; technology 
development required for the public role of 
agriculture and fisheries, rural areas 
Supporting national agriculture and fisheries, 
rural policy 
191 Public 
Source: Gyeonggi Technopark (2010: 67) 
 
There are two features of ASV. First, ASV is a partnership of national agencies. Monthly 
meetings are held among members of ASV to discuss issues pertaining to the cluster and 
to the region, and to explore new service programmes for the members and local SMEs. 
It is worth mentioning that an interviewee who had worked as the first chairman (1999-
2010) at Gyeonggi Technopark shared the initial reasons regarding the linkage with 
national agencies. The following quotations illustrate his concerns:  
Working with other national agencies is the perfect link for us, so we can further 
develop cutting-edge technology support to grow firms. Being based at the Ansan 
Science Valley –which is within such close proximity – has enabled us to form this 
partnership. (Interviewee 6)    
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Second, ASV is supported by Ansan city government. In 2010, the Ansan government 
secured some funding to activate ASV community joint programs in networking, 
information exchange, consulting and education. 
ASV has allowed us to increase our role much faster and to expand into all area of 
Ansan city and Gyeonggi province. Several programmes have also been created, and 
the Ansan city government has been supportive of the programmes and is pleased 
to be helping a local business, which was born and bred in Ansan. (Interviewee 17)  
 
Figure 7-2 Ansan Science Valley (ASV) 
 
 
Source: Gyeonggi Technopark (2011: 10) 
 
 
 
7.3 The political sources for continual tensions  
While sections 7.1 and 7.2 have discussed the interaction experiences of the regional 
actors, this section focuses on the important discussion on what may have influenced the 
way in which fragmented? relationships take place in the industrial policy process in 
Gyeonggi province.  
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Three main political factors can be blamed for the continual tensions to date. One is the 
political party incongruence. The emergence of party political differences in the 
composition of the government and council after the elections in 1995 provided an 
opportunity to examine whether the relationships between units of government have 
changed as a consequence. Another source of tension is the financial issues that had 
pushed regional policy toward becoming less proactive. Third, occasionally, there are 
unbridgeable conflicts between provincial governments?? These political sources have 
contributed to the continuing tensions in the system of innovation of Gyeonggi province.??
7.3.1 Political party incongruence between provincial government and the 
council 
The provincial councils could be described as the weakest element of South Korea’s 
regional politics. Just as the president dominates the legislature and the national 
bureaucracy at the national level, so the governor tends to dominate the provincial 
council and the local bureaucracy at the regional level. The national government is not 
beholden to a narrow group of interest.  
Similarly, the provincial government is relatively independent of provincial economic and 
social interests. With no powerful rivals in the local political process, the governor appears 
to be able to hold power with a certain amount of central control (Hwang Ah-Ran, 2006).  
This does not mean that regional issues are never relevant in local elections. Rather, it 
underlines the fact that being a candidate of a provincial hegemonic party greatly affects 
the governor’s chances of winning the election. As regional elections are used to pass 
judgment on the central government, electoral outcomes rarely reflect the performance 
of a party in power locally. The governor and the council members are popularly elected 
through partisan ballots. Thus, the structure of provincial government primarily embodies 
the principle of political accountability. In contrast, the rest of the local officials are not 
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elected but, instead, are appointed based on merit. The provincial bureaucracy, which has 
long developed professional norms of administration, is the core of provincial government. 
Hence, we can say that the structure of provincial government embodies the principle of 
administrative efficiency as well. 
The system of regional politics maintains a strong governor and a weak council. The 
governor and the local council officially share budgeting, legislation of ordinances, and 
other policy making. However, the power of provincial government is organized in favour 
of the governor over the local council. For instance, the governor has the authority to 
appoint local bureaucrats, to submit a budget of expenditures and revenues, and to veto 
ordinances passed by the provincial council. 
 
Table 7-3 Party distribution of provincial council in Gyeonggi province (1995-2014) (Seat 
won, %) 
  1995 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 
GNP  62 (45.5) 38 (39.2) 90 (86.5) 115 (96.6) 42 (32.1) 50 (39.0) 
DP  52 (38.2) 58 (59.8) 10 (9.6) 2 (1.7) 76 (58.0) 78 (60.9) 
Others 22 (16.2) 1 (0.0) 3 (2.9) 2 (1.7) 13 (0.1) 0 (0.0) 
Total 136 (100.0) 97 (100.0) 104 (100.0) 119 (100.0) 131 (100.0) 128 (100.0) 
Provin
cial 
gover
nment 
Lee In-Jae 
(GNP) 
Lim Chang-
Yeol 
(DP) 
Sohn Hak-
Gyu 
(GNP) 
Kim Moon-
Soo 
(GNP) 
Kim Moon-
Soo 
(GNP) 
Nam 
Gyeong- Pil 
(GNP) 
Note: Most political parties have recently adopted new names. In this thesis, these recent names are used, 
even when we refer to earlier periods when the parties used older names. 
Source: Gyeonggi council website (www.ggc.go.kr) 
 
However, in all the local elections since 1995, a majority of the electorate voted for parties 
that were identified with their regions of residence, namely, their hometown parties. As 
shown in Table 7-3, in the Gyeonggi province, which has been a stronghold of the GNP, 
the vote share of the elected governor was 40.6% in 1995, 58.4% in 2002, 59.7% in 2006, 
and 52.2% in 2010. These voting patterns amply illustrate the significant influence the 
major national parties have over local elections. To a large extent, local electoral 
accountability appears to be very limited. Since party labels are generally important for 
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mobilizing votes, independent candidates cannot compete effectively with party 
candidates. 
The provincial council was convened in 1995 with 136 members comprising 123 district 
representatives and 14 proportional representatives elected from 31 cities and counties; 
it engaged in legislative activities. The next council first met on July 1998 and served until 
June 2001 with 97 members.  
Council members went unpaid for 15 years after the nation revived the local autonomy 
system in 1991. This changed in 2006 when they began to be paid for their activities. The 
stipend system was intended to enhance their capability as the guardian of grassroots 
democracy. In 2006, the GNP won the local elections with a landslide victory, gaining 11 
of the 16 large city mayor and provincial governor seats, including Gyeonggi province.   
However, in the 2010 election, which was widely seen as a mid-term assessment of the 
Lee Myung-Bak administration, there were 76 members from the Democratic United 
Party, 42 from the GNP, 2 from the Nation’s participation, 1 from the Democracy Labour 
Party,  2 independents, and 7 academic members. These 131 members made 11 standing 
committees, and they were in government until June 2013. The Democratic United Party, 
the most important opposition party, reacted strongly against Governor Kim Moon-Soo’s 
proposed policies and budgets.  
Gyeonggi province has been a stronghold repreatedly of the conservative GNP between 
2002 and 2010. Kim Moon-Soo, a member of the GNP, became the governor of Gyeonggi 
province with 52.2% of the votes, while Rhyu Si-Min of the DP?had 47.8%.80 During the 
Gyeonggi province election campaign, Kim Moon-Soo promised to help firms by offering 
direct technology support. His strategy was to win voters with calls for administrative 
                                                          
80 The Participant Party is a recent political party founded by members of former President 
Roh Moo-Hyun’s administration. It has since attracted a large following on the internet and 
among the younger generation. Rhyu Si-min was elected as Party Chairman in 2011.  
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stability to aid economic recovery. The defeated candidate of the DP, Ryu Shi-Min, 
focused on economic inequality and the social integration of the people in the province 
(Ohmynews newpaper, October 5, 2010).  
In provincial council elections in 2010, the trend was, however, not so smooth. For the DP 
as a whole, the election represented a clear comeback. The DP faced the challenge of 
consolidating the opposition on the basis of the election victory. If it could achieve this, 
the DP would emerge with a good position regarding the next elections. Because the local 
elections are ultimately closely linked with the presidential election, only through winning 
the provincial election would it have been possible to win the presidential election in 2012.  
During the fieldwork, the central question at the heart of the continuing debate about the 
industrial policy was as follows: What is the proper balance between the nation state’s 
interest in achieving consistency in state-wide policy and a regional authority’s interest in 
establishing a level of service and activity that meets its needs? There is clearly an inherent 
tension between the goals of increasing accountability at the provincial level and 
maximising equity in the allocation of resources for the nation state as a whole. 
 
7.3.2 Financial pressures on strategic action  
Second, one of the most controversial issues since the founding of the GSTEP and its 
strategic actions has been the way in which it devises the regional budget. Interviewees 
highlighted the importance of efforts to engage with the GSTEP and provincial  
government as part of the systemic change. However, regional political systems have a 
four-year election cycle. This can encourage a short-term outlook from the provincial 
government, and it makes it difficult to garner support and funding for an innovation 
process. 
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This is the most obvious source of continuing tension in Gyeonggi province. A lack of funds 
leads to serious communication problems. Gyeonggi province is one of the richer regions 
in South Korea. However, the scope for fiscal action has recently encountered limits.  
After the local elections in May 2010, the provincial governments were faced with 
significant reforms to the regional budget. In Gyeonggi, the provincial council was strongly 
committed to deficit reduction, principally through cuts in spending on technology 
development. Some areas of spending, such as the welfare and education, were relatively 
protected from cuts. Others, particularly, the GSTEP and Gyeonggi Technopark, were key 
targets for spending cuts. Members of the provincial council considered that the 
provincial government could make significant savings.  
The provincial council’s annual inspection was highly critical of the congestion and 
competition in the industrial development field.81 During the audit and inspection of the 
industrial policies in 2010, council members raised the issue of the GSTEP and Gyeonggi 
Technopark’s programmes that had reformed their business funding considerably. One 
council member accused the provincial government of pushing for massive business 
programmes at the sacrifice of firms’ interests.  
One significant reason for this problem is that a governor was elected by direct 
popular vote, rather than being appointed by the central government, thus altering 
the balance of power in the administrative and political arenas. This led the 
provincial government to establish regional policies for economic development. 
The work of national and regional administrations was, thus, duplicated and 
fragmented. (Interviewee 31) 
 
                                                          
81 The regional autonomy of South Korea with shared sovereignty has already been explored 
in Chapter 4. It is characterized by devolution to the effect that some functions allocated to 
the regional autonomy are being given the right of autonomous self-administration. 
However, in reality, the function of the council is very vulnerable. Because of the provincial 
council’s low level of expertise and resources, policy initiatives are likely to come from the 
provincial government that is headed by the governor. 
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The provincial council’s reform measures are expected to add to the difficulties facing 
policy actors.  The reform has had a particular impact on economic policy actors and their 
strategic actions. Both the GSTEP and the Gyeonggi Technopark budgets have been 
significantly reduced or, in some cases, cut completely.  
Figure 7-3 shows that the GSTEP has faced a very substantial budget decrease since 2010. 
It received a budget of only 37,910 million KRW in 2010, and the pressures this has 
produced are set to continue. The result of the local elections of 2010 led to calls for 
budget cuts in 2011. Politicians of the economy committee reached a compromise to 
reduce the GTDP budget; thus, the GTDP budget was slashed to 10,000 million KRW. The 
GSTEP has been considering how to react:  
Without the continuing funding, we won’t be able to keep up with the schedule of 
works. (Interviewee 28) 
 
The sharp downward trajectory of GSTEP spending shows the significant financial 
challenge we have faced over the past few years. (Interviewee 26) 
 
Figure 7-3 The budget of the GSTEP 
 
 
Source: GSTEP (2014: 23)?
 
In 2012, the GSTEP submitted its budget plan to the provincial council. Even with this 
supplementary budget, the provincial council had to cancel some GTDP services because 
of the lack of funds again. The governor then called for the formation of a massive 
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supplementary budget in 2011. However, council members delayed making a decision 
because they needed more public consensus before the GSTEP could see an increase in 
funding, one council member said (Interviewee 31). The province was scheduled to draw 
up a second supplementary budget in September 2010. Finally, the council approved it. 
As a result of such factors, which tend to pull and push tensions, change happens slowly.   
 
7.3.3 Inter-provincial conflicts: the thorny issue of ‘our region’  
What should not be overlooked, however, is that party incongruence is not the only factor 
that challenges smooth change within the interlocked structure of RSI in South Korea. 
Until 1995, the regions were relatively homogenous with regard to their economic and 
fiscal powers. However, cracks in the system had already started to appear in the 1990s. 
The growing polarization of the party competition outlined above was accompanied by 
increasing regional disparities resulting from divergent economic development in the 
Seoul metropolitan area (Seoul, Incheon and Gyeonggi province) and other provinces.  
Particularly, increasing budgetary constraints meant that regional policies turned into a 
more conflictual issue, especially with regard to the balanced development scheme 
between the rich and poor provinces (Interviewee no. 15). Political devolution in 1995 
could thus have provided the necessary window of opportunity for an encompassing 
reform of the constitutional structures. Yet, although central government shouldered the 
main burden of the financial support for the regions, the balanced development policy 
was not able to prevent regional disparities from widening further, and South Korea 
became polarised between a ‘rich Seoul metropolitan area’ and a ‘poor other provinces’.  
While party conflict and government incongruence continued to have a great impact, the 
deepening of the territorial rift developed into an additional major disruptive factor 
regarding the policy coordination required to produce a consensus. 
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The provinces not only have to be able to coordinate their own policies; they also have to 
be able to come to strong consensual decisions to maximise their collective influence. 
Such agreements can be based either on a party or on a territorial logic. The intensification 
of regional conflicts has made agreements along the lines of regional interests increasingly 
difficult, but it has also affected intra-party coordination. Because of the deepening 
regional rift, party organisations at the provincial level have had to adopt province-specific 
policy positions, and politicians (in both the provincial government and council) are 
increasingly prepared to advocate their regional interests even against their own national 
party. As a result, coordination within the parties – both horizontally between the 
provinces and vertically between the provinces and the central level – has become more 
difficult, and the ability of the central government to integrate interests and defuse 
conflicts throughout the system has weakened.  
 
7.4 Concluding reflections  
Drawing on data from interviews and documents, this chapter has described recent trends 
and events in the industrial policy in Gyeonggi province. In so doing, it has demonstrated 
that Gyeonggi province has tended to reproduce the political sources of the RSI. Ideas 
about what is hidden behind the tension in dealing with the complexity of the industrial 
policy context have been presented.  
From the perspective of the system of innovation, the future of the RSI in Gyeonggi seems 
to be inextricably linked to the building of relationships, including the different levels of 
the public actor and the organized segments and interests of groups of private actors. Yet 
the central government has not completely retreated from the interventionist role. For 
example, in the process of structural adjustment, the central government opted for 
traditional methods rather than liberal market measures.  
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This chapter has operationalized the theoretical framework of the strategic relation to the 
policy analysis of the industrial development in Gyeonggi province. The aim was to add 
theoretical and explanatory depth to the previous description of industrial policy and the 
regional system of innovation.  
In doing so, the demise of the particular form of South Korean development has been 
captured not in terms of the demise discussed in the existing literature (Chapter 2), the 
theory of which ignores critical aspects of power relations and thereby distorts the nature 
of the state, but in terms of the change in the way nationa state-province relations are 
organised. The change was conceptualised as a transition from the dirigste settlement, in 
which the operation of industrial development largely relied on political regulation, to a 
somewhat different composition, in which the policy process is more regionalized on the 
basis of regional control.  
Coordination between the provincial government and council is regarded as problematic 
because of political party incongruence. The structure of politics in Gyeonggi province 
demonstrates “vertical” (central-provincial) and “horizontal” (inter-provincial) 
incongruence, despite the presence of national parties with close organizational linkages 
between provincial levels. The governor, a member of the GNP party, is a powerful actor 
in Gyeonggi province. However, the GNP is unable to obtain sufficient seats in the 
provincial council to have a dominant position.  The problematic nature of relationships 
delays or prevents the rationalization of industrial policy in the policy areas of territorial 
planning, economic development, and technological development. A similar reasoning 
applies in the case of inter-provincial relationships and consultations, whose outcomes 
remain under question. 
The nationalized nature of industrial policy decision making in South Korea seems to be 
struggling to digest regional development in the region’s wider area because of the 
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dispersal of power and responsibility and the lack of consensus within and beyond the 
boundaries of state apparatus. In so far as challenges such as these remain unaddressed, 
repercussions from the absence of a strategic vision cast a shadow over the actor’s 
perceptions about the future of regional development.  
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8 Concluding and theoretical reflections  
This chapter concludes the thesis. Firstly, key findings of the thesis are summarized in the 
light of the research questions identified in Chapter 1 and after reviewing the theoretical 
perspectives presented in Chapter 2. Secondly, this chapter then highlights the originality 
and importance of the research undertaken in terms of its contribution to academic 
thinking. Finally, based on the findings in this thesis, possible areas of future research in 
terms of practice are identified. The chapter concludes by arguing that power and the 
political dimension need to be considered as a dynamic process as part of the innovation 
system in the post catching-up economy. 
 
 
8.1 Research questions revisited 
 
8.1.1 Theoretical framework  
Change or transition has been an emerging part of contemporary RSI discourse. Much of 
the literature on RSI has remained strongly focussed on regional trends and realities. 
Contemporary challenges to this approach have, in turn, been largely preoccupied with 
the influence of globalisation on the potential for regional mobilisation.  
A RSI comprises the relations between the knowledge generation and diffusion subsystem 
and the application and exploitation subsystem, in which the provincial government is an 
emerging policy actor linking both subsystems. The recent industrial policy initiatives in 
South Korea promoting provincial government aim to fill the gap between these 
subsystems. This has required a new form of intergovernmental relations as part of the 
change of RSI of the post-catch up economy.    
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Based on the existing literature, this study has provided a detailed narrative of research 
findings concerning the following questions: How can a major change in the regional 
system of innovation be identified and characterized? Is it possible to distinguish between 
change as an emergent process (not attributable to any specific actor) and change as 
being “directed” (principally controlled by a single actor or groups of actors)?  
We then introduced the four empirical research questions that guided this study: First, 
what was the relative importance of the different factors that may cause changes in the 
regional system of innovation in the case study at hand? Second, are the initiating actors 
trying to change towards a more regionally networked system in a coherent way, or are 
contests over purpose and method protracted? Third, what conflicts has the initiating 
actor (either central or regional) encountered in the course of change, and why do these 
arise? And fourth, how have these conflicts been overcome or persisted in the regional 
system of innovation to date? 
Using the directed and emergent alternatives in analysis is useful, since it often seems 
that the directed approach has an overpowering status in new initiatives, particularly in a 
Korean context. A blueprint future is easier to pursue using a relatively dirigiste system. 
However, such directed approaches are being modified by the rise of a more open system 
of knowledge exchange and a more decentralized political economy. This has been a 
particularly remarkable feature of the political economy of many countries in recent 
decades, and Korea is no exception.  
The concept of the strategic relational perspective was introduced in Chapter 2 as a main 
analytical tool to be employed in this thesis. The strategic relational perspective 
acknowledges that structure and actors are interdependent and can transform each other. 
Relation as power is seen as a dynamic process rather than as a static structure. This 
conceptualization of relation can be applied across subnational scales linking regional and 
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national dimensions, and this can be applied over different historical times. Therefore, 
the strategic relational perspective to relations constitutes a theoretical perspective that 
can be applied both regionally and historically. 
This thesis identified a paradox about the role of central government in regional 
development. Central government is seen as a central part of an industrial policy and 
regional development policy in the developmental state. But it seen to have difficulties in 
coordinating regional strategies in the 21st century.  
Political relationships between central government and provincial governments in 
industrial and regional development policies have been seen to have grown in South 
Korea in the past two decades. This growth has been set in the context of wider national 
and regional policies, the devolution of politics, and existing regional economic disparities. 
Throughout this study, industrial and regional policies have been found to be historical 
and geographical accomplishments. Thus, the fieldwork focused on relationships, with 
some historical background to set the relationships in context. 
South Korea’s industrial policy and its regional development policy since 1995 have been 
characterized by the devolution of governance and regionalization in the area of 
innovation and technology policy. However, it needs to be noted that the policy processes 
are constrained by tension between national and regional industrial policies. These are 
the areas where public policy responses meet within the newly emerging organizational 
fields. In the light of this, new forms of relation in regions can be seen as strategic actions 
taken by provincial governments in response to the new opportunities and constraints 
perceived by regional actors as structural factors.  
Focusing on the development of industrial policy in the case of Gyeonggi province in South 
Korea, this thesis aimed to reflect on the process of change from a nationally directed 
 194 
 
development to a growing interest in the regional dimension in a post catching-up 
economy.  
?
8.1.2 Empirical findings  
Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 provided an empirical insight into the development of relationships 
as strategic actions between actors as can be seen in South Korea, which was set against 
the concept of the regional system of innovation.  
Chapter 4 recounted the background or established the history by which fully-fledged 
regional autonomy elections were held in 1995, establishing the first substantial provincial 
government and council in the history of South Korea. However, the traditional and 
historical political structure remained characterized by the interventions of central 
government, the subservience of local authorities to central control, and the allocation of 
resources by the central government.  
In Chapters 5, 6, and 7, the specific case of one particular region, Gyeonggi province, was 
examined.  Chapter 5 revealed that structural factors, such as metropolitan management 
plans, are crucial in the policy processes in Gyeonggi province. It showed how national 
policies seeking a redistribution of industrial and innovative activity have created delays 
and coordination problems. In every region, the institution of Technoparks appears to be 
emphasising the role that they can play in regional development, but each region differs 
in terms of the emphasis and the resources available for industrial development. 
Gyeonggi province is characterised by the rapid development of more advanced 
knowledge infrastructures within the region. Chapter 5 delineated the points of 
congruence and distinction between industrial policy and regional development policy. 
The emergence and development of recent relationships in the governance structure of 
the RSI in Gyeonggi province provides empirical evidence demonstrating that the rhetoric 
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of devolution has some basis in reality, but also involves a more complex transition and 
accommodation path than might be suspected from reading the statement of 
government intent regarding devolution or ‘local authority.’ 
Chapter 6 revealed that agential factors had a substantial impact on the development of 
policy making and implementation in the regional industries. Local firms came together 
in networks to create and shape other networks, such as IICC. This network is of strategic 
relevance, and it increases the opportunities for innovation actors in the region. It 
positively influences outcomes by managing the assignment of roles to complementary 
actors and by reducing uncertainty and ambiguity. Additionally, several different forms of 
committees, working groups, commissions, and boards were seen to have been formed 
and durably installed with the aim of including external competences, including those of 
experts and key actors not directly involved in the regional partnership. The specific role 
of the GSTEP for promoting local economy development was shown to be a reflection of 
the articulation of local needs and hence to be responsive to the local political 
representation, since the GSTEP is organised and managed by the Gyeonggi provincial 
government.  
The positive performance of the GSTEP can be seen as a political achievement of the 
locality. From the viewpoint of some actors, regional interest is the primary consideration 
when making economic strategy and policy – and this is a source of tension between 
national and local administrations. The virtues of the localisation of control over 
innovation and technology policy include prioritization, one of the most important 
features for reflecting local interest. A local initiating actor tends to take the local interest 
as the primary consideration, which causes a number of problems. It leads to tense 
relationships between actors attempting to implement national policies as the first 
priority and actors focussing on local needs and interests. As mentioned above, the most 
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difficult task of networks is the process of balancing different actors’ interests and 
aggregating them to a communally shared position. 
Chapter 7 revealed that tensions are the key issue and that the difficulties vary according 
to disagreements regarding the priority of national or regional interests. The GSTEP 
asserts that the new initiative of the GTDP is good for technology development for the 
following reasons: the GTDP will increase public sector efficiency, therefore improving 
service delivery and regulation, which will create a more conducive innovation 
environment and greater incentives for firms; regional authorities have better local 
knowledge and business contacts, making them more able to make locally relevant, 
appropriate decisions; and the GTDP can reduce the opportunities for corruption, 
particularly large-scale corruption, which also has a beneficial effect on national economic 
growth. 
One the other hand, each of these arguments has a strong counter-argument as well. 
There were a number of reasons for defending the status-quo. A national agency, 
Gyeonggi Technopark, argues that such initiatives can have a negative impact on the 
regional system: for example, regional initiatives can reduce public sector efficiency. 
Furthermore, administrative capacity at a regional level is often constrained, with too few 
staff, inexperienced actors, and, particularly, inadequate financial resources; while 
regional technology development is reliant on efficient, reliable service provision, for 
example, commercialization, facilities, and water. As noted above, regional initiatives do 
not always improve service delivery; while the GSTEP may have better information and 
accountability pressures, it may be more vulnerable to capture by local elites. This, in turn, 
undermines effective business development, as decisions are made to benefit certain 
actors rather than to promote general economic growth. Thereby, the GSTEP activities 
that could benefit economic development, such as planning and regulation, become 
 197 
 
ineffective in protecting the national interest and are exploited as regional rent-seeking 
activities.  
This view was backed up by a head of the GSTEP, who added, “The existing regional actors 
are traditionally not good partners. They only have a ‘one size fits all’ approach across the 
network. There is a lack of joined up thinking and a history of poor implementation” 
(Interviewee 1). By contrast, however, a head of Technopark remarked, “We have had 
close links since the creation of Technopark in 1998. That's not to say we have not had 
problems, but I think our relationships are better than elsewhere. I think we are more 
involved in networks than are other actors of the region. Overall, we have good 
relationships” (Interviewee 6).  
We can conclude that at this moment, the paradigm shift in regional policy is not universal; 
currently, both the ‘old’ and ‘new’ paradigms co-exist in Gyeonggi province, and the 
growing proliferation of actors can lead to issues of internal coherence. 
Furthermore, political party incongruence between the provincial government and the 
provincial council does indeed raise a number of interesting and, so far, unresolved issues.  
During the 1980s and 1990s, the development of the regions was highly dependent on 
such political leaders. Political party congruence in regional and nation levels meant that 
conflicts between region and nation within the regions remained rare. Provincial 
government formation was governed by similar considerations to those at national level, 
and provincial government composition became, with few exceptions, essentially 
congruent with the pattern of government and opposition at the national level. The latter 
changed, however, when devolution faced a hostile ruling party in South Korea. 
Subordinated decisions between the centre and the regions became much more difficult 
because the ruling parties were no longer congruent. Congruence and incongruence are 
thus characteristics of politics compared to government at another level or at the same 
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level. If there is incongruence between levels, some parties find themselves in duplicating 
and possibly ambiguous positions. They govern at one level and are in opposition at 
another level, or they govern at both levels with different partners. These ambiguous 
positions were examined in Chapter 7. Table 8-1 provides the answers to the study’s 
research questions.  
 
Table 8-1 Summary of answers to the research questions 
 
Research questions Answer 
First, what was the 
relative importance 
of the different 
factors that may 
cause changes in the 
regional system of 
innovation in the 
case study at hand? 
Political relationships, whose origin and development depend on the 
operation of the nation state, are distinguished from those that 
ensue from working relationships between central government and 
provincial governments on the basis of a common agenda of mutual 
advantage. While the former category reveals how each government 
regulates the planning and implementation of regional development 
policy, the latter examines the ways in which the provincial policy 
makers develop relationships with each other and sometimes with 
provincial governments in order to influence the decisions and 
practices of the central government apparatus. 
The dominance of central government and its agencies in industrial 
policy decision making is undermined by weak coordination and 
challenges. Similar operational challenges also undermine the efforts 
of provincial governments. They focus on the enhancement of 
relational and knowledge resources to influence the policy of central 
government. 
Second, are the 
initiating actors 
trying to change 
towards more 
regionally 
networked system 
in a coherent way, 
or are contests over 
purpose and 
method protracted?  
The second question addressed the precise activities of the actor in 
which initiatives could be designed in a coherent way or a different 
way. Chapter 5 empirically revealed the emergence of initiating 
actors and their different initiatives. 
While numerous central government agencies control industrial 
policy-related powers at the national and regional levels, provincial 
governments also have important jurisdictions, which affect the 
development, promotion, and management of technological 
development. They call for better coordination and enhanced 
consultations with local actors as well as for less tokenistic 
approaches. 
New initiative exacerbates conflict and reduces cohesion as it leads 
to scenarios where the GSTEP are established along regional lines 
and continue to mobilise regional identities to consolidate their 
power. This encourages actors to identify with the province rather 
than with central government, and fosters genuine differences 
between provinces. Regionally established GSTEP’s incentives lie in 
defending regional priorities, thereby deepening policy polarization 
and rifts with Technoparks. 
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Third, what conflicts 
has the initiating 
actor (either central 
or regional) 
encountered in the 
course of change 
and why do these 
arise?  
There is a disparity between the strategy posed by the rhetoric of 
politicians and the tactics employed by state actors regarding 
industrial development in Gyeonggi province and the improvement 
of governance procedures. Provincial government and policy-makers 
seem to grasp the interest of solidarity as a means of improving their 
influence on RSI. 
Despite the lack of integrated efforts, there is consensus on the 
necessity for industrial policy to be adequately integrated into 
regional planning and economic development as well as to become 
the subject of targeted marketing and systematic management. 
However, a lack of consensus is exhibited in policy aspirations and 
perceptions between levels of administration about the impacts of 
regional development.  
And, fourth, how 
have these conflicts 
been overcome or 
persisted in the 
regional system of 
innovation to date? 
Despite the lack of potent and systematic policy networks between 
central government and provincial government as well as conflicting 
perceptions each has about the roles of the other, there is a growing 
understanding about the importance of partnerships at the 
provincial level.  
Despite the lack of an explicit vision, there is potential for 
strengthening collaboration (see previous answer).  
It seems, however, that any effort at the regional level might be 
fruitless without the contribution and coordination of provincial 
council in regional budget.  
 
 
8.2 Discourse and conflicts in a case of Gyeonggi province    
We have examined these developments through the lens of the strategic relational 
perspective of Jessop (2008) and Hay (2002). Such an approach is useful for examining the 
interactions and power relationships between actors with an interest in policy strategy 
and for characterising the evolution of such relationships.   
This study gathers together data from diverse actors in the area of industrial policy as well 
as from political actors. By so doing, it sheds light on the nature of political relationships 
and illustrates the complexity of industrial politics in Gyeonggi province. The resulting 
interpretive account represents more than an assessment of the changing roles of actors, 
such as central government, provincial government, and political actors. What this thesis 
demonstrates is how actors, interactions, and industrial policy together shape RSI within 
the politics of regional development. In addition, the discussion from theoretical 
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perspectives explains why the industrial policy is susceptible to the preservation or 
transformation of RSI.   
It is not easy to draw out any implications that an analysis of change process may have for 
the region’s current dilemmas. It has been emphasised here that there is no single 
coherent pattern of change in the region. Change is a highly complex and patchy process, 
which in many cases has taken decades rather than years. Gyeonggi province is clearly no 
longer exclusively a ‘nationally driven RSI’, and the catch-up imperative has ceased to 
dominate industrial development efforts. This has heightened and broadened the 
potential for political factors to influence the future development of policy governance in 
the region and, more generally, in the nation.   
In this respect, the strategic relational perspective guided the relationship through its 
particular viewpoint on the dialectic of structure and agency. Crucially, a conceptual 
scheme substantiated the assumption underlying our effort to bridge the study of regional 
politics with contemporary themes of innovation studies (Steinmueller, 2013: 161). The 
intent was to build a broader relational perspective as a key feature for examining the 
elements and processes of the RSI, and this is the central contribution of this study to the 
innovation studies field. 
According to the RSI and the rationale of the strategic relational perspective, the multi-
faceted ensembles of industrial politics are expressed. On the one hand, place-specific 
contexts emerge from the interaction of agency and structure, which span across policy 
areas, levels of government, groups of actors, and forms of resources. On the other hand, 
the attributes embedded in the same context are recursively seen as the outcomes of past 
development and the engines of further change. Thus, the perceived contribution of the 
relational perspective increases while clarifying the multi-faceted and shifting nature of 
politics in an RSI. 
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In short, the theorization of the strategic relational perspective enabled this study to 
advance the exploration and interpretation of themes and concepts of political science in 
the research area of RSI. Regarding the case of Gyeonggi province, emphasis was placed 
on the coupling of actors and provincial councils within South Korea. Hence, the strategic 
relational perspective uncovered how the constitution and iterative coupling of 
ensembles and modes of relationships shaping the regional development in Gyeonggi 
province outlines a configuration of conflicts, which is not directly understandable 
without a good grasp of the specific context.  
 
8.2.1 Structural and agential factors 
The following structural and agential factors can be identified along with the emergence 
of strategic actors and strategies. Applying the strategic relational perspective to regional 
development and industrial policies in Gyeonggi province, there are three important 
structural factors that influence the recent development of regional and industrial policy, 
which may lead to the formation of an RSI: first, the important structural factor in terms 
of the formation of an RSI is the Technopark in each region, with R&D expenditure taking 
place in local firms; secondly, the recent political processes of devolution in South Korea 
have influenced the development of RSI; and thirdly, it is important to point out that the 
Seoul metropolitan regulation promoting balanced development has enhanced the 
regionalism of policy activities. Regional mechanisms of industrial policy have been set up 
by the GSTEP with the support of the provincial government 
These three structural factors influence the strategic contexts emerging within the policy 
field of industrial development and regional development, in which a strategic actor at 
the regional level is selectively interacting with and forming network relationships. In 
particular, the role of the GSTEP in this process, especially through the GTDP, which have 
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been promoted by provincial government, has been analysed in this thesis. These 
processes affect the change of RSI in South Korea. An RSI is constructed through the 
dialectical and interactive process between structural factors, such as the wider political 
economy and strategic actions by agent, which, in turn, create governance dimension of 
RSI.  Thus, there is an interaction between structural and agential factors: national policy 
allowed provincial government to appoint an agency that is devoted to creating new links 
and strategic networks, which, in turn, influence the structural factors in the regional 
contexts, and in some of the national contexts.  
While this research focus may well represent a long-overdue move away from the nation 
state-centric approaches that still characterise much of South Korea, it risks drawing our 
attention away from the legitimacy deficits at the centre that created the opportunities 
for regionalism in the first place. This study has sought to bring the territorial state back 
into the analysis by explicitly conceptualising regionalism as the partial rescaling of 
legitimacy from the national level to the regional scale: 1) The regional policy of the centre 
is challenged in some way, and 2) the regional scale is seen as a more legitimate or capable 
representative of the people in this respect.  
From this perspective, the regionalist revival in the post-catching up period can 
theoretically be based on two rationales. First, new challenges to the legitimacy of the 
central government may have encouraged a regionalist revival in provinces that have 
traditionally enjoyed a high degree of regional legitimacy. Secondly, an increase in the 
legitimacy of the provinces as an alternative scale of government may have created 
support for decentralisation in areas where the legitimacy of the cental government has 
traditionally been compromised. While these two dynamics need not be mutually 
exclusive, drawing this distinction provides us with theoretically grounded ideal types 
through which to re-examine the origins of popular demands for greater autonomy in 
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different provinces and time periods. In order to apply this perspective empirically, 
however, the concept of political legitimacy needs to be operationalised.  
This study not only examined the origins of the regionally networked system, but also 
explored under which circumstances such popular demands for greater regional 
autonomy were likely to lead to an actual rescaling of powers and resources from the 
central level to the regional scale.  
In this context, it was argued that a careful analysis of the formal distribution of central-
provincial power represents a useful first step in analysing the patterns of policy stability 
and change. While many of the existing studies into regionalist accommodation and non-
accommodation implicitly present arguments in which local actors have a binary choice 
between accommodation and resistance,  the reluctance to explicitly state and justify the 
proposed distribution of veto powers that underpins this analytical narrative both 
obscures the arguments and makes it more difficult to test and challenge them empirically. 
Using the South Korean case as an example, this study has sought to demonstrate that a 
more formal approach can help us to further our understanding of these processes, even 
in a context where veto powers tend to be strongly concentrated in the hands of a single 
partisan player. According to the relational approach to the RSI in Gyeonggi province, 
there are different empirical points of departure to the investigation of patterns of 
complexity, fragmentation, fluidity and contingency. This can be a significant contribution 
particularly to the research regarding RSI, which has not yet witnessed the introduction 
of theoretical frameworks capable of addressing the dynamic processes of industrial 
policy.    
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8.2.2 Politics as part of RSI 
This study focused on the emerging regionally networked RSI as constructed particularly 
at the regional level in Gyeonggi province. These are the areas where politics meet within 
the RSI. As Chapter 4 showed, the devolution of politics has happened within the wider 
nation and the development and spread of the neo-liberal economy. All these 
developments have happened mainly in the last two decades, that is, since the 
establishment of Technoparks, and other regional agencies; in some regions (Seoul, 
Daegu and Gyeonggi province), these processes had occurred earlier.  
As the account of Gyeonggi province in the empirical chapters has made clear, the region 
has a distinct regional economy structure and a history of political economy including 
those in the RSI. There are processes of policy development on a regional basis. Some 
consensus on what the GSTEP views are has been developing in the region. However, less 
has been accomplished so far in general long-term or ongoing terms.  
In order to make a regionally networked system and to create a regional advantage, 
longer-term strategic thinking is required at both national and regional levels so that the 
dynamic change of RSI can be introduced. The creation of industrial policy to integrate the 
three structural factors identified above is one of the key areas where the GSTEP can play 
a critical role in delivering regional growth. Policy congruence and joined-up thinking, 
both vertically and horizontally, seem to be the key. However, in reality, there are acute 
issues about coordination and about industrial policy at the regional level.  
Firstly, there has been a problem of too much short-term funding and too many policy 
initiatives without much discourse. Secondly, there is conflict and tension in the 
relationship between the central government and the provincial government. As Chapter 
6 discussed, the GRI report suggests that the GSTEP will be given a stronger role in steering 
the industrial policies. There are voices of concern from the Technopark that the GSTEP 
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does not have the appropriate experience to influence technological policies and 
industrial policy making. Thirdly, the formation of regional networks is not without 
problems. When it comes to inter-regional networks at the regional level between firms 
and universities, there seem to be some barriers to overcome. Firms have set up local 
partnerships with their large firms over years as well as forming partnerships at a national 
level. These existing linkages do not necessarily communicate well with the new network 
relationships being formed, sometimes centrally by the institutional administrative bodies 
and triggered by the new government funding initiative and new funding opportunities 
coming through the Technopark.  
These issues need to be located in studies on the changes to RSI, as discussed above. The 
relationship in RSI needs to be understood in relation to the changing relationship 
between the regions and the nation state. It is inadequate to pay exclusive attention to 
the regions as a contrast to nation state direction to account for this new level of 
governance. There is allegedly an emergence of peer-pressure towards shared 
perceptions of appropriate roles, funding incentives, planning instruments, and all 
manner of incentives to lateral cooperation, and this emergence needs to be seen in 
relation to the diverse activities and missions of provincial governments and their 
relationships with other agencies in the region. The changing nature of the national 
political economy, the dynamics of RSI, and the new relationship between them, all 
challenge current forms of RSI in the fields of both industrial policy and regional 
development.            
 
8.2.3 Tensions between council and government   
In addition, in considering politics in this regional and industrial policy processes, it is also 
important to consider the changing relationship between provincial councils and 
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provincial governments at the regional level. The characteristics that weaken the 
relationship are found between provincial governments and provincial councils. Councils 
and governments have brought different perspectives to their positions in the council-
governor relationship, while politicians have different priorities and values than have 
professionals.  
In the past, however, those politicians who belonged to the same political party tended 
to have attitudes that reinforced those of the governor. The typical council member was 
a trustee rather than a delegate or political party member, and was seen as a volunteer 
who filled the office as a community service worker without a strong interest in a political 
career. Council members limited the amount of time (four years) they committed to public 
office and were comfortable referring citizens' complaints to staff. With less political 
ambition and less attachment to specific issues, there was presumably less competition 
among the council members themselves. 
In the past decade, these characteristics have been changing. Today, more council 
members are emphasizing the representational rather than the governance aspects of the 
position and are solving current problems rather than approving solutions developed by 
a governor.  
Recently, the relationship between the council and the governor is commonly the 
interaction between an ‘activist’ council and an ‘initiator’ governor. The governor has 
always been involved in policy making. Now, however, the governor must not only 
develop proposals, but must also be more assertive in attempting to focus the council’s 
attention on long-range concerns and in shaping the tone of the policy-making process. 
Thus, the governor is not just proposing specific policies, but is promoting a perspective 
and an agenda.  
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8.3 Contributions to the field, and limitations and avenues for future 
research 
Steeped in the tradition of the political economy debate on post catching-up economy, 
this study intends to contribute to this discussion by examining the regional system of 
innovation. This study has examined how a particular type of RSI has been developed in 
South Korea’s regions. Political perspectives have been considered to try to understand 
RSI as a complex and articulated process of positioning in the post catching-up economy, 
and this has led to a focus on the relationship between nation state and regions that 
underpins this process. As South Korea slowly changes from a nation state-led economy 
with nationalism to a devolving political economy, there have been considerable 
difficulties arising from the conflicts in matching regional economic goals with broader 
national blueprints.  
 
8.3.1 Contributions to the field  
This thesis has taken the strategic relational perspective of RSI following the framework 
developed by Jessop and Hay. Regional development and Industrial policy is seen as 
strategic actions, and context influences both the structures and the actors in the 
dialectical process of change. Industrial policy needs to be seen as constantly under 
construction, with strategic actors selecting their contexts strategically (Hay, 2002: 131), 
while the policy process involves power relationships.   
Regional policies shaping industrial development as strategic action proved to be useful 
and robust enough to highlight the dynamic processes within RSI. By applying the strategic 
relational perspective, factors that make the policy process dynamic have been identified. 
One of the strengths of this perspective is that the interactions between nation state and 
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province are highlighted by identifying both the structural and agential factors that 
influence agency and strategic actions.   
The concept of RSI has been employed in this thesis as a main theoretical perspective to 
encompass complex and interactive processes. The thesis has argued that the regional 
economy can be seen as an RSI in which there are vertical and horizontal relationships 
and knowledge flows between different actors at different levels. As has been mentioned 
several times throughout the thesis, provincial governments’ priorities regarding their 
activities are not necessarily determined by their geographical location. It is a combination 
of a region’s history, resources, political economy model, and bureaucracy. Relationships 
are always under construction, sometimes contested, and in a state of constant change. 
Thus, the thesis has highlighted the dynamic change process involved in the formation of 
regionally networked RSI in the post catching-up economy.   
When RSI is integrated into an increasing regional autonomy, some controversies and 
conflicts are opened and framed. National policy as a structural factor influences the 
economic structure and forms the regional system of innovation, in which agencies and 
actors are embedded. The formation of other regional intermediaries, such as the GSTEP, 
may, however, change the structural factors by strategic actions in strategically selective 
contexts. 
Combined with the concepts developed in political science, such as politics and circuits of 
power, the strategic-relational perspective applied to RSI in this thesis has illuminated the 
conflicts between actors in the policy field of industrial development and science and 
technology development with different dimensions of power. Provincial governments are 
transforming themselves as strategic actors, and the region is emerging as a new strategic 
selective context in the RSI of the knowledge economy where regional networks are 
formed.  
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Thus, this thesis argues that the actual process of changes of RSI in South Korea was highly 
political. This study has endeavoured to make a contribution to the post catching-up 
economy by applying the political perspective to industrial policy as strategic actions. The 
formation of industrial policies has been analysed within the concept of RSI, which 
comprises interactions. Policy relationships as dynamic processes link actors on different 
levels as part of the nation state-regional relationship of the post catching-up economy, 
in which regional policy is implemented by strategic actors, changing both the actors 
themselves and the structures within which they are historically located. The empirical 
findings from the case of Gyeonggi province have provided insights into the change of RSI 
(change within key actors, interactions between policies and institutions) with different 
forms of power influencing these dynamics of RSI change. The approach taken in this 
study has highlighted the actual processes of change in the South Korean economy within 
the RSI, illuminating the restrictions and opportunities made by policies, and by national 
and regional actors.       
  
 
8.3.2 Limitations and avenues for future research 
Single case studies “are at great risk of indeterminacy in the face of more than one 
possible explanation, and they can lead to incorrect inferences if there is measurement 
error” (George and Bennett, 2005: 32). The findings of a single case study are not 
generalizable to the larger population and lack sampling controls, and the inherent 
limitations of the research design include "a relative inability to render judgments on the 
frequency or representativeness of particular cases and a weak capability for estimating 
the average 'causal effect' of variables for a sample" (George and Bennett, 2005: 22). 
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This case study did not aim at formal generalization. Instead, is aimed to generate findings 
that are analytically or theoretically generalizable because of the ubiquity of the agenda 
setting, issue definition and regional policy formation in the RSI. Similarly, Gerring (2004: 
341) argues that “a case study is best defined as an in-depth study of a single unit (a 
relatively bounded phenomenon) where the scholar’s aim is to eluciage feature of a larger 
class of similar phenomena”. 
This case study sought to add to the growing literature examining RSI studies and 
demonstrated the utility of this research design to theory development by generating 
some interesting amendments for the future considferation of scholars.  
This thesis provides ample opportunities for ensuing research. First, the change process 
of RSI in Gyeronggi province was characterized by complexity and was heavily influenced 
by the province’s historical, political, and socio-economic context. To understand 
thoroughly the politics of RSI, it was necessary to accumulate vast amounts of information 
from multiple sources and engage in thick description to produce a detailed narrative. The 
dynamic interaction of contextual forces and individual motives and actions that shaped 
the process emerged through the continuous analysis of the collected data and the 
examination of competing interpretations and explanations. Additional comprehensive 
case studies on the politics of RSI in other provinces can shed light on the politics that 
have been overlooked in the literature, contributing to our understating of RSI.  
Second, understanding the RSI in political terms offers opportunities for further research 
in respect to the analysis of power. Although Hay and Jessop offer a conceptual apparatus 
for the investigation of power as a corollary of contextually and discursively embedded 
political practices and interactions, it does not satisfy a frequent sign of intellectual 
narrowness in the innovation literature.  
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Consistent with this observation, we take into consideration the work of Allen (2003) on 
the modes of power as an additional source of explanation during future attempts to 
extend the contribution of the political perspective in the research area of regional policy. 
As this study has explored the effects of interactions between the central and provincial 
actors of economic development in Gyeonggi province, a future study may specify which 
of the modes of authority, coercion, domination, inducement, manipulation, negotiation, 
persuasion, and seduction encapsulate more appropriately empirical evidence of the 
power practices and interactions among actors.   
The same reasoning applies to the potential operationalization of the political approach 
of specific regional innovation, and even to the examination of the changing relation 
between structure and agency in light of the post catching-up economy that states like 
South Korea face as a consequence of the ongoing change.   
Though the future of regional economy policy as the main priority for the South Korea 
economy is in question, with Park Geun-Hye’s administration (2013-2017) championing 
her own economic program, the trends observed in this research are likely to continue. 
Few concrete details are available for President Park’s flagship initiative, “the Creative 
Economy”, but it will almost certainly continue to experiment with the devolution of the 
economy (Financial times, June 24, 2015). 
Third, in this study, we have not fully considered regionalism in South Korea context. 
Political parties and party leaders have tended to identify themselves with specific regions, 
which has caused national politics to be known as “regional party-centred politics” (Shin 
Myungsoon et al., 2005: 87). Regionalism seems to serve a rather political aim, contrary 
to the economic main goals of the regionalism in western countries. Regionalism is the 
localism, cronyism, nepotism, factionalism, and corruption, all mutually enforcing and 
variously connected, that are characteristic of a Korean politics with regions that are not 
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tourist landmarks or easily recognised geographic locations. One of the political 
characteristics of Korea is that the division of the Korean peninsula is not so much 
between North Korea and South Korea as between East (Gyeongbuk and Gyeongnam) and 
West (Jeonbuk and Jeonnam). Unfortunately, in South Korea, with a mountain range 
dividing the two areas, there is more animosity between the eastern areas and the 
western areas, with Gyeonggi province being evenly split and often becoming the tie-
breaker in elections. This feature is related to the broader framework that allowed the 
emergence of the region. Whilst in Western Europe, the region, as the output of both the 
regionalisms, disclosed a bottom-up demand for change and modernisation, in South 
Korea, the region emerges as a top-down condition of political integration. 
Finally, we end by sharing the following quotation from an interviewee, one of the most 
engaged and experienced in regional industrial policy. After a series of interviews and 
conversations with this interviewee over the course of the fieldwork visits, reflecting on 
the preliminary findings we had just told him about, he made the following comment:  
South Korea’s economic context has totally changed. It means that, at present, 
the industrial policy, with a theoretical frame, the predominant actors, and the 
institutions do not respond anymore to the needs of this country... we now see 
this policy structure did not solve the major problems of this economic growth at 
the national and regional levels. That is why we need studies, we need a 
diagnostic to understand where we find ourselves now, to know who the actors 
are that lie at the core. And from that understanding, we need to formulate new 
policies that will help to remedy these economic problems and move us toward a 
post-catching up economy. (Interviewee 1) 
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Appendix 1 Interviewee lists 
This appendix 1 contains the list of interviewed policy makers, practitioners and academic 
experts from Gyeonggi province during the period of September 2010 and January 2011. 
The listing is always headed by the date the interview took place, followed in the next line 
by the name of the interviewee, their organization’s position and/or unit -where citable-, 
the organization and finally the place where the organization is based. Total number: 46 
interviews with 42 interviewees of which 4 were interviewed twice. 
 
No Date Name Role and organization 
1 08 Sept. 2010 Lee * Founder and first president (2008-2013), GSTEP 
2 09 Sept.2010 Yim * Vice-president. Originally member of the start-up team, Cewit, State University of New York 
3 10 Sept.2010 Lee Team leader of Technology Cooperation team, GSTEP 
4 16 Sept.2010 Lee Senior researcher in Office of Strategy and Planning, GSTEP 
5 16 Sept.2010 Lee Head of office of Strategy and Planning, GSTEP 
6 23 Sept.2010 Bae Founder and former president (1999 to 2010), Technopark 
7 07 Oct. 2010 Kim Professor of Technology management School, KAIST 
8 13 Oct. 2010 Kim Researcher in Office of Management, GSTEP 
9 13 Oct. 2010 Chung Professor of Technology of Management School, KunKuk University 
10 13 Oct. 2010 Lee * Senior research fellow, KISTEP 
11 28 Oct. 2010 Kil Manager of Techno Doctor, Technopark 
12 28 Oct. 2010 Nam Team leader of Green growth, Technopark 
13 28 Oct. 2010 Kim Researcher, Gyeonggi Technopark, Technopark 
14 29 Oct. 2010 Lee Professor of Dept. of Management, Gwangwoon University 
15 29 Oct. 2010 Lee * Professor, South Seoul University 
16 10 Nov. 2010 Chun CEO of Genewel, Co. SMEs, www.genewel.com 
17 16 Nov. 2010 Han Team manager, KOTERI (Korea High Tech Texile Research Institute) 
18 18 Nov. 2010 Kim Head of Gyeonggi branch, Gyeonggi  Korea Testing Laboratory (KTL) 
19 18 Nov. 2010 Cho Senior researcher in department of government and management, GRI 
20 18 Nov. 2010 Lee Junior researcher in department of government and management, GRI 
21 18 Nov. 2010 Na KITECH (Korea Institute of Industrial Technology) 
22 18 Nov. 2010 Park Researcher, ATT Co. 
23 23 Nov. 2010 Kwon CEO, SNA Co. 
24 25 Nov. 2010 Lee CEO, ExpressLab Co. 
25 30 Nov. 2010 Lee Researcher, Aoptics Co. 
26 15 Dec. 2010 Hong Researcher in Office of Strategy and Planning, GSTEP 
27 16 Dec. 2010 Jung Researcher in Office of Strategy and Planning, GSTEP 
28 17 Dec. 2010 Park Researcher in Office of Strategy and Planning, GSTEP 
29 18 Dec. 2010 Kim CEO, Unistream Co. 
30 21 Dec. 2010 Kim CEO, Indilinx Co. 
31 23 Dec. 2010 Jun A chair of Economy and Investment Committee, Provincial council 
32 05 Jan. 2011 Moon Senior researcher, GRI 
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33 20 Jan. 2011 Oh Science and Technology Advisor of Governor, Provincial government 
34 14 Jan. 2011 Shin CEO, Verasys Co. 
35 14 Jan. 2011 Yim Manager, Youyang lighting equipment 
36 18 Jan. 2011 Jeon Professor, Sungkyunkwan University 
37 18 Jan. 2011 Lee Head researcher, SCDPHARM Co. 
38 21 Jan. 2011 Jang Professor, Korean Aerospace University 
39 21 Jan. 2011 Yoo Researcher, (KITECH) Korea Institute of Industrial Technology 
40 21 Jan. 2011 Kim Manager, GSBC 
41 26 Jan. 2011 Sung Senior researcher, GRI 
42 28 Apr. 2014 Han  Senior researcher, GSTEP 
* I had twice had the opportunity to discuss with this interviewee.  
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Appendix 2 Interview topic guide 
Introduction. I would like give some questions regarding the following issues.  
 The connection of your organization to the policies of regional and industrial  
development  
 Relationships of your organization with other actors of regional industrial 
development  
 The processes regarding the formulation of strategies and the implementation 
of actions  
 Your views about the level of collaboration and the role of the other actors  
Section 1: Actors and policies of industrial development. We would like to start out 
discussion asking you about the policies of industrial development in Gyeonggi province 
and the relevance of your organization to relevant processes.   
 To begin with, can you explain the role of your organization in regional policy 
making and practice in system of innovation of Gyeonggi province?  
 What do you think the policy-making of regional and industrial development in 
Gyeonggi province? In what areas for you identify changes in comparison with 
the past? What do you think of these changes and their impact on regional 
industrial development in relation also to the regional actors’ role? 
 How do you describe the level of influence your organization has in policy making 
and implementation? How the objectives of your organization correspond to the 
wider policy context of industrial development? 
 Can you suggest how your organization could strengthen in policy role? Are there 
any constrains towards this direction?   
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Section 2: Issues of relations. We have spoken so fat about the activities of your 
organization. In the research area of regional industrial policy making, however, it is 
placed emphasis on the development of partnership as a means of achieving objectives.  
 To concentrate first of all on your organization, when you are undertaking 
initiatives with respect to regional development in Gyeonggi province with what 
other actors do you work? Are there any constrain when you are working with 
other organizations?  
 Can you describe the type of these relationships? Are these relationships 
premised upon formal or informal processes?  
 What are the impacts of these relationships? For examples of positive or 
negative practice?  
 Have any of these relationships been modified in the course of time? For what 
reason? Can you think of cases where past experience has helped the 
organization to adjust its strategies and partnerships?   
Summary.  
 Do you have anything more you want to bring up or ask about, before we finish 
this interview?  
 Finally, who else you think might be an informative choice as interviewee?   
  
 237 
 
Appendix 3 A translated script of one interview   
This appendix 3 contains a translated script of one interview (Lee Won-Young, Interviewee 
No. 1). This interview was held in the director office of GSTEP at 3pm, September 11, 2010. 
The researcher's time with him was limited to one and a half hour by his executive 
schedule. The interview proceeded on a very structured path defined by the preliminary 
question set used by the interviewer to assure coverage of the topics of importance to 
the researcher. He agreed to the voice recording of the interview. 
 
Figure The GSTEP  
 
 
 
Interviewer: Hello, my name is Sangwoo Shin and I am a doctorate student at the 
University of Sussex. I am studying the policies that shape industrial development in 
Gyeonggi province and relationships between national and regional actors. Hence, I would 
like to have a discussion with you about these issues as part of my primary research, which 
includes interviews with representatives from government agencies, regional authorities, 
private associations and non-governmental organizations. Is this ok with you? 
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Interviewer: To begin with, can you explain me the role your organization plays in 
industrial policy-making and practice in Gyeonggi province? 
Interviewee: Let me explain regional economic background first. It helps our fundamental 
role. The Metropolitan Area including Gyoenggi province accounts for 47% of the nation’s 
gross domestic product and 46% of the population. Under the current central regulation, 
central government decided to control over population of capital area. Central 
government is taking measures to decentralize the population around the capital area. 
Because of the dense population in the capital area, the unbalance between regions is 
serious. Since 1994, central government has barred large enterprises from building new 
plants or expanding existing ones in and around Seoul and Gyeonggi to lessen the 
concentration of population and economic power in the country. Thus, central 
government has capped a certain number or a size of facilities to be built in our region 
and enterprises cannot be allowed to build new factories or extend existing facilities in 
this region.  
Our organization, the Gyeonggi Institute of Science and Technology Promotion (GSTEP), 
has been operating since May 2008, under the provincial government of Gyeonggi 
province. Main goals of the GSTEP are the further exploitation of the regional industry 
and the building of common fields of cooperation among the actors of industries in 
Gyeonggi province. We believe that these goals will enable us to promote the 
contemporary our region as an attractive industrial place able to offer technology policies 
of the highest level throughout the year. Within this framework, we are concentrating on 
activities of industrial policy development. We designed a vision of future, strategy and 
programmes and achieve wide awareness this way orienting the local economy and firms 
excluded from active regional networks. Important policies so far have been the staging 
of the Gyeonggi Technology Development Programmes (GTDP) and the IICC as well as the 
promotion of the regional innovation system’s new image. 
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Interviewer: What do you mean when you refer to regional innovation system’s new 
image? 
Interviewee: We think the recent innovation system of Gyeonggi may be characterized 
by the multiplicity of elements and a high degree of complexity. I am referring to all these 
elements and infrastructures that constitute the image of regional innovation system in 
global economy and its key competitive advantages in comparison with other regions. We 
are talking about the upgraded infrastructure, the new network of industry and the fact 
that firms in Gyeonggi province can have easy and quick access to the information. 
Such is the regional innovation system paradox. Today, advanced regions, such as Seoul 
and Gyeonggi, spend more public money for the promotion of innovation for their firms 
than less favoured region do, thus increasing the innovation gap across regions. But, it 
could be misunderstanding that Gyeonggi’s innovation system is stronger than that of 
other regions. In fact, the system is weaker in terms of regional players’ real action. 
Geographical advantage was the biggest factor in great growth of Gyeonggi. At the same 
time, because of locational advantage and political environment, provincial government’s 
role has been weakened. Their role was not significant in local industries.  
For example, the world's largest furniture retailer IKEA will set up shop in Gyeonggi 
province. Once the Dutch company with Swedish origins opens store near the 
Gwangmyeong KTX (High speed train) station by 2014, the local furniture industry would 
be affected in a profound way. In details, as finished furniture is not subject to tariff duties, 
IKEA may import low-cost furniture products from overseas without paying any tariffs. In 
contrast, however, local furniture firms must pay 8% tariffs for raw materials and 
intermediate goods such as particle boards. The furniture industry contends that this is a 
case of “reverse discrimination” and demand abolition or a cut of the tariffs by more than 
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a half. To this, the central government responded negatively as this would affect adversely 
the regional board industry. I can say provincial government’s role is in the here.  
The key question at provincial government is how to provide the relevant conditions for 
generating growth of more knowledge-intensive forms of economic activity within the 
context of dynamic innovation systems. “Benchmarking” was one of the popular ways of 
building infrastructure in South Korea. Thus, it is used to find “best practices” in order to 
promote the regional competitiveness. However, benchmarking as a basis for regional 
competitiveness policy is unsustainable, because any best practice depends on the 
specific context in which it is applied. This implies that imitation of a best practice that 
contributed to success in one region may be detrimental for another region, because of 
the mismatch between the new ways of acting and the existing structures and routines. 
Benchmarking is, however, not useless when it is done correctly? The process of successful 
policy learning and policy perfection needs to combine benchmarking with insights of 
systemic and idiosyncratic characteristics of regional economies. What appears as a good 
practice in one systemic context might be less so in another, but learning from success 
stories might help to design an effective policy for a region. Success stories are NRW of 
Germany, Third Italy, Southern Ease of England of UK and industrial clusters like Silicon 
Valley.   
 
Interviewer: I do not want to move away so soon from your organization’s activities and 
we will definitely return. You have referred, however, to the political environment of 
Gyeonggi province, which is a crucial issue in regional industrial policy. What do you think 
about the Seoul Metropolitan Regulation and the wider planning of balanced national 
development in Gyeonggi province? 
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Interviewee: What is the meaning of the Metropolitan Area Management Plan? No new 
factories should be given. In the case of South Korea, the result was the further expansion 
of Gyeonggi province, so I do not know whether this policy did make any contribution. 
This is an issue that is under discussion for many years. I think that the policy for 
metropolitan area is dated back in 1980s. They had identified then the problem and tried 
to find a solution. But this decision provoked reactions and it came in contrast even with 
subsequent legislation. 
 
Interviewer: One interviewee from central government justified this reaction saying that 
the further development of factory would not facilitate the maintenance of economic 
balance between Gyeonggi province and other regions in South Korea. 
Interviewee: I hope that such issues were examined during the public consultation on the 
plan for balanced development since 2004. You must check it out because it identifies a 
special geographical territory, which deals exclusively with industrial development in 
urban and metropolitan areas. The ratification and implementation of the spatial plan of 
balanced development lead to the withdrawal of other inconsistent laws and provisions. 
It is eventually time for all the different development policies to move in parallel with 
spatial and regional planning.  
 
Interviewer: We will return later on political issues. I prefer now to concentrate on the 
activities of your organisation. We have talked so far about the new image and I want to 
ask you what activities you undertake in order to capitalize on this image. Also, is this the 
only field in which you are active? 
Interviewee: We do not confine ourselves. We put emphasis on our extroversion through 
the searching needs of firms, and planning relevant strategies. Such activities may sound 
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somehow elementary and I know that, for instance, even in several Western regional 
policy makers may be able to undertake this kind of activities. In the case of Gyeonggi 
province, however, it is the first time that a regional policy makers undertakes such 
initiatives. We also aim to the continuous research of regional industry trends as well as 
to the establishment of strategic partnerships at the regional and national levels. The 
truth is that major industrial policy is decided at the national level, and the role of 
provincial government is to implement at the local level the central guidelines and plans 
of responsible central government’s agencies. Provincial government also plays an 
important role in the development, management and promotion of the firms’ products, 
while most regions do not participate very much in these processes. The difference here 
is that Gyeonggi province is stronger than other regional authorities not only because of 
the region’s population but also because Gyeonggi is economic centre of South Korea. 
Nevertheless, this particularity does not relieve us from administrative difficulties, which 
emanate from the centralised structures and the low empowerment of regional 
authorities as a repercussion of the administrative structure. To be honest, the 
development of a long-term partnership between the national leadership of industrial 
development and our organization is a prerequisite for the production of desirable results. 
 
Interviewer: How would you, therefore, describe your organization’s influence? 
Interviewee: The influence of this structure is peripheral so far, because we have less than?
five years as an autonomous agency under the municipality instead of being a simple 
department. The more the organization expands its turnover the more its influence will 
increase. I believe that organizations like ours are the most flexible structures in terms of 
regional authorities. We are open to the prospect of partnerships and have included 
members of industrial committee. Yet, currently the most important step is the 
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organization’s transformation to a development corporation of the provincial government, 
which will start operating from the beginning of 2008. Nevertheless, when in the case of 
Gyeonggi there are numerous existing agencies such as Technopark, the GSBC, GRRC and 
Gyeonggi Bio-centre, the existence of a provincial council could be really influential at 
policy level including the case of industrial planning and development. The existence of a 
GSTEP could compensate for the weak role of provincial government.  
 
Interviewer: Do you therefore consider necessary the convergence of similar policy actors 
for industrial development in Gyeonggi province? 
Interviewee: The national plan for the regional development and balanced development 
classifies our area as a Metropolitan Area. I am afraid that it will be politically difficult for 
this plan first to become a law of the state and then to be implemented. The reason is 
that the enactment of such a plan should lead to very serious regulations. Also, the 
political cost should be very high if you to decide to replace all the existing regional and 
prefectural governments with a new administrative city and innovation cities. We are now 
discussing beyond the realm of development, but such cities should be flexible and strong 
otherwise there is no reason for creating it. It is a fact that there is a fragmentation of 
powers. That is the right word for what is going on not only in regional authority but also 
in the landscape of industrial development. The problem in the case of Gyeonggi province 
is that this phenomenon is more intensive than anywhere else. As long as the area of 
Gyeonggi province does not have an administrative structure on industrial policy, it 
cannot be equally compared with other its international competitors. Under these 
circumstances and due to the fact that even if they decide to create an industrial policy 
structure it will take a long time, the GSTEP typically has a limited scope while 
representing only the Gyeonggi province. We must integrate and exploit all the diverse 
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elements of the agencies in the wider area of Gyeonggi and communicate them with the 
globally famous brand name of Gyeonggi to make economic competitiveness at the 
international level. Such a goal necessitates the existence of metropolitan control tower 
or at least of metropolitan partnerships, even at the simple level of communication 
among the various actors, as a sound option for a strategic approach in regional industrial 
development under a common branding identity. It is irrational for all regional and city 
governments not to promote the wider area of Gyeonggi, which is without doubt the most 
recognizable.  
 
Interviewer: Why do you think there is confusion regarding the industrial policies? of 
Gyeonggi province?  
Interviewee: Because currently each one of the policy actors communicates with its own 
approach the industrial strategy of Gyeonggi province. Confusion is inevitable. I suppose 
that some city-government municipalities undertake similar individual initiatives 
regarding their own areas. Sometimes of course there are partnerships too. For instance, 
we recently signed a Robot industry cooperation memorandum with the Bucheon city 
government, so from now on we will stay in touch and we will examine the –possibility of 
mutual activities. I know you would like to know more about it, but it is a slow process 
which is hindered not only by the current timing after the elections but also by the 
financial problems of the Bucheon.  
 
Interviewer: This sounds ok, but you have identified weaknesses in the role of regional 
actors, especially provincial government. 
Interviewee: They are not simple weaknesses; the problem of the regional administration 
is that it has very few powers especially in policy-making like science and technology 
 245 
 
development. Generally in South Korea we have centralised administrative structures. 
Especially in the case of science and technology development, however, there is a strong 
established perception that science and technology is an exclusive responsibility of the 
central government, probably because of the existence of the Ministry of Knowledge and 
Economy, which has been the key organization since the 1970s. Even the new 
administrative structure that was established in 2004, I mean the Ministry of Education, 
Science and Technology (MEST), has not accomplished so far to undertake initiatives 
because it does not have enough powers. 
 
Interviewer: In the case of your organization, have you faced any constraints because of 
its status as a body of regional administration?  
Interviewee: I think that the new organization will be less susceptible to this kind of 
problems and more productive and flexible because it will have a more concise agenda 
and responsibilities. I can talk to you about all the activities that we hypothetically could 
do, but I think that nobody needs more promises that will never become true. The 
difference with the future scheme is that we are talking about a development of Gyeonggi 
province with a much more flexible innovation system both from the central government 
and provincial government itself. 
Decision-making on regional development and industrial innovation is still highly 
centralized and vertically-integrated at the apex of the National Science and Technology 
Council (NSTC), the ministries, and public research institutions. In November 2010, NSTC 
transformed into a powerful permanent body as ‘the control tower’ of science and 
technology development policy in Korea. This change is based on ‘Plan of constructing 
new national science and technology system and developing research institutes funded 
by the government’ in July 2010 set by a private development committee and sponsored 
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by the central government to allow NSTC to be a permanent organization, strengthen its 
specialty, and reinforce its core functions for improving comprehensive R&D adjustment.  
 
Interviewer: Can you tell me about a reform of the National Science and Technology 
Council and its impacts on this region?  
Interviewee: It is a science and technology control tower. The NSTC was established in 
1999 as the advisory body for science and technology blueprint. However, the NSTC took 
a limited role on decision-making. The Ministry of Strategy and Finance handled 
everything related with R&D strategies suggests budget spending limit and NSTC played a 
advising role under the decided strategies and limited budget. However, the role changed 
to the position of practically allocating and adjusting planning and budgeting.  
As most government ministries have their own research policies and funding programmes, 
co-ordination of the Korean government’s intervention and activities has proven difficult. 
The problem has been compounded by strong rivalries between the main ministries, 
which have resulted in some duplication of policies and programmes and insufficient 
inter-ministerial co-operation. In order to solve such kinds of limited co-ordination, the 
Lee Myung-Bak administration has tried to formulate top-down decision-making process 
since 2008. 
Five functions of NSTC are formulating national science and technology strategies and 
plans; allocating and adjusting national R&D budgets, adjusting science and technology 
policies; managing performance of national R&D in all cycles; and designing NSTC’s 
structure and organizing human resources. The NSTC suggests top science and technology 
direction and mid-term strategy goal to each ministry, and the Ministry formulates mid-
term strategy and plan based on the suggestion. After that, the strategy and plan are 
submitted to NSTC. NSTC reviews the mid-term plan of a department, and MOSF decides 
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all R&D budgets. NSTC suggests budget allocation direction such as national R&D policy 
direction next year, investment ratios of each strategic part, large and small projects, 
infrastructure, competition, and stable budgets. MOSF presents the instruction and 
standard of budget allocation, and each department prepares and submits next year’s 
plan (including budget of each plan). NSTC adjusts the project plan of each department, 
and leads adjusting overlapping projects among departments and linking among projects. 
Each department prepares and submits a concrete project budget based on the adjusted 
plan. Then, NSTC evaluates and adjusts the project budget submitted, and gives the result 
to MOSF. Ultimately, MOSF prepares government budget compilation based on the 
adjusted budget. 
 
Interviewer: Let’s talk about Technopark. Don’t you worry that the Technopark could not 
be very positive about your organization? 
Interviewee: I think they are happier now because they still have the right to participate 
in decision-making. I can imagine that they will tell you all the negative aspects of the 
GSTEP, but I doubt whether they will mention their own mistakes and false practices. 
Before I come here, I was working in KDI (Korea Development Institute) as well as in the 
Blue house (the presidential office), which plays the role of the top decision maker for the 
national development policy but represents the regional policy. When I was working there, 
I had not particular opinion about the Technopark and its imperfections. When I started 
working here, however, I realized that the regional actor in Technopark is mature because 
it has a very narrow way of thinking about the role of the regional policy making.  
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Interviewer: I have to admit that the picture you have given me is much more positive 
than what I was expected. I can also say that your description is much more optimistic 
than what I have been told so far, especially by people in Technopark. 
Interviewee: I am telling you again that we must keep a balance in the allocation of praises 
and criticisms. I will tell you something that I am absolutely sure regional policy makers 
will also tell you. Whatever positive happens nowadays, it does not change the fact that 
Gyeonggi province was absent for many years from the provisions of national and regional 
development policy. If you also take into account a series of serious problems that go 
beyond the realm of industrial development, such as the degradation of urban 
environment, it would not be an exaggeration for somebody to argue that Gyeonggi 
province had been left behind many other regional development policies. The occasion of 
the local election benefited in many ways the whole city and above all through the 
building of important infrastructure. The issue, however, is that we have not still prepared 
and implemented a long-term strategic plan for industrial development, management and 
promotion that will emanate either from a regional partnership or from a agencies under 
the supervision of the central government.  
 
Interviewer: Are you happy with partnership with other agencies?  
Interviewee: We have no complaints. Problems emerge when there are conflicting 
interests of lack of financial resources which is not the case here.  
 
Interviewer: I want to thank you very much for your time and help. We have already gone 
beyond one hour of discussion but there are a few issues I have not covered yet. Would 
you mind to make you a few more questions?  
Interviewee: Go ahead. 
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Interviewer: Thank you very much. It looks like bureaucracy is not an exclusive complaint 
of the regional policy makers.  
Interviewee: You can face bureaucracy everywhere; it is even more intensive between 
levels of the public sector. Regional policy makers have no easier processes in their 
relationships with the central government. We are talking about formal institutionalised 
relationships and processes, which have been decided by our political directors regardless 
we are talking about the MKE, MEST or any other ministerial authority. You have to accept 
it and learn to live with it. Policy makers from the provincial governments or regional 
authorities have at least the right to complaint or moan, although it does not mean that 
they will solve their problems. We cannot for instance issue a complaint press release, but 
I think that we are accomplishing better results through our internal efforts when we are 
dealing with the different levels of the state.  
 
Interviewer: I understand what you are saying but I have the impression that you are not 
complaining for a lack of powers, at least in the case of GSTEP. 
Interviewee: What really matters is not what responsibilities we have but how we can 
improve our performance. This organization is supposed to serve two roles, the first being 
the development of industrial development and the second being both the management 
and promotion of regional industries. These dimensions in other countries and regions 
are not only completely separated and independent but they also belong to different 
organizations.  
 
Interviewer: Balance is the ultimate target but from what we have said I understand that 
you are currently more focused on technological development and management. 
However, if you wanted to focus more on technological development activities, how 
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would it be possible to take powers regarding spatial and territorial planning from other 
actors such as the Technopark? 
Interviewee: This could only happen if an administrative structure was the common 
denominator for relationships between the actors of industrial development in Gyeonggi 
province. The ideal scenario would suggest the existence of a strong organization, in which 
all the responsibilities regarding regional industrial development would be accumulated. 
Such a scenario however is not possible at all if we take into account that even at the 
national level the MKE has not achieved since 2004 to absorb relevant responsibilities 
from other ministries such as the MEST. 
 
Interviewer: Can you think of any other constraints? 
Interviewee: People working at all levels of the public sector have an old-fashioned 
perception about industrial development. And you know better than me that innovation 
system is a very complex phenomenon which is treated nowadays not just like one of the 
sectors of tertiary economy but like a secondary discipline with various connections to 
other scientific fields. In Gyeonggi province this kind of knowledge still exists at a very 
limited level and I am not talking only about policy-making, where the lack of knowledge 
is really disappointing, but also in the fields of technological development and 
management, where at least it would be easier to copy successful examples from other 
countries or regions. We need better education, from people at the macro level who 
decide national industrial policy for the next ten years to each one of us at the micro level 
whose work is to make innovators feel welcomed.  
 
Interviewer: To conclude this discussion, could you give me some suggestions for 
strengthening industrial policies and collaboration in Gyeonggi province?  
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Interviewee: I return once again to the necessity of flexible administrative structures 
which, according to my opinion should have the form of regional partnerships under the 
central government’s supervision. Until then, we need to improve every single aspect that 
affects the value for budget of the industrial policy. Such a task could be facilitated by the 
selection of specialized and well-educated personnel and the further training of existing 
workforce. There are of course many additional activities that could contribute, such as 
the promotion and better utilisation of knowledge infrastructures through the 
employment of high-tech facilities or the organization of important events, but I think that 
the first suggestions are currently the most important ones.  
 
Interviewer: And what about the future of the GSTEP?  
Interviewee: We have to shape the form and role of our organisation within the next five 
years. We already know that the positive will of the municipality and the industrial public 
administration is not enough. The most influential factor is what the will of the national 
government will be, when we will be ready to undertake serious initiatives. It is very easy 
to theoretically discuss what should be done. Nevertheless, we have to be careful. If we 
undertake all these initiatives we must be also ready to receive criticism. The national 
agencies have to decide its own role in these processes, and I am afraid it will take some 
time. At least I am happy because in the case of Gyeonggi the GSTEP has made a difference 
during the last five years. We have to follow the territorial guidelines of the national 
government, but even president have said that regional authorities will be the dominant 
actors in the future. I can remember also a recent researches about the evolution of 
industrial policy and regional innovation systems in the European Union in which the 
European Commission admitted that industrial policy is planned according to the 
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requirements and targets of regional and local authorities in each regions. We must do 
the same, but it will not be easy. 
  
Interviewer: Thank you again for spending so much time with me this afternoon. 
Interviewee: You are welcome. Please, let me know if you need any more help in the 
future.  
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Appendix 4 A summary of participant observation  
This enables the researcher to use a variety of data collection methods like attending 
council meetings, getting access to minutes and files, conducting interviews of different 
kinds just as even a formalised questionnaire survey can be better designed and 
conducted after a period of participant observation.  
 
No. Date  Event (location) and 
Participants (Numbers) 
Contents 
1 09-10 
Sept.  
2010  
Gwanggyo Techno Valley Open 
day (Gwanggyo Techno Valley, 
Suwon) 
The second open day to visitors of what goes on 
behind the gates of the Gwanggyo Techno Valley, and 
an opportunity for others to ask questions and engage 
in discussions with related actors.  
Opportunities to get a close-up look at how Science 
and Technology Valley functions with society and at 
the lives of those who work there. 
2 15 Sep. 
2010 
Public hearing on rebuilding the 
National Science and 
Technology council (NSTC) 
(Seoul Palace Hotel, Seoul)   
Discussion on progress plan and role allotment of 
NSTC and on national R&D projects for mid-tem 
period. Arranging of meeting by the MEST; A part of 
industry development plan and budget allocation 
plan of central government; Examination on expected 
problems 
3 08 Oct. 
2010  
Conference on the Regional 
Innovation Policy (The K Seoul 
Hotel), STEPI (2), GSTEP (5) 
The conference arranged by GSTEP.  
Found some controversial issues on regional interests 
and expected problems on NSTC  
4 13-14 
Oct. 
2010 
Workshop for Regional 
Research Support Units 
(Jaechun, Choongbuk), 
Choongbuk Technopark (1), 
Busan Technopark (1), GSTEP 
(2), KISTEP (1), Jeonbuk 
Technopark (2),     
Discussion on the selection method of strategic 
industries & specialized sectors; Emphasis on 
discussion for the possibility & problems of 
coordination of strategic industries; Consideration in 
the selection of specialized sectors in strategic 
industries   
5 15 Nov. 
2010 
Annual Audit of the provincial 
administration (the GSTEP, 
Suwon) 
Provincial council (10), 
Provincial government (6), 
GSTEP (6)  
Criteria of the GTDP; Discussion on progress plan and 
budgets. Discussion on the budgets to deal with 
conflicts in connection to Technopark; Consideration 
of flexibility of GSTEP in the process of political 
bargaining; Deduction of the budgets to prevent 
conflicts in coordination process of strategic 
industries and in selection process of specialized 
sectors 
6 17 Nov. 
2010 
Project meeting with Ansan 
Science Valley (ASV) (Gyeonggi 
Technopark, Ansan) 
Technopark (4), GRI (3), KTL (1), 
KITECH (1) Hanyang University 
(2) 
Specifications of linkage of strategic industries 
upgrading and strategic clusters; Identification 
measure in Ansan area; Discussion on the selection 
method of strategic industries and specialized 
sectors. Emphasis on discussion for the possibility and 
problems of coordination of strategic industries; 
Consideration in the selection of specialized sectors in 
strategic industries.   
7 23 Nov. 
2010 
Gyeonggi-EU Innovation Cluster 
Seminar, (the GSTEP, Suwon) 
GSTEP (4), Gyeonggi 
Technopark (1), BMBF (1), 
Presentations on development strategies and 
scenarios of specialized sectors by respective 
strategic industry; Comprehensive summary on 
industrial policies in the region  
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Technik GmbH (3), Veneto 
Innovazione spa (1), NRF (4) 
8 08 Nov. 
2010 
Meeting of IICC member firms 
and training on the technology 
funds in Gyeonggi (the GSTEP, 
Suwon) 
Provincial government (5), 
GSTEP (4), Gyeonggi 
Technopark (5) and firms  
Discussion on the basic direction of IICC; 
Comprehensive discussion on expected problems in 
relation to central government; Opportunities of 
regional actors for new inputs to the development 
strategies; Linkage of GRDP upgrading 
9 17 Dec. 
2010 
Gyeonggi Technopark Open day 
(Gyeonggi Technopark, Ansan) 
To promote a more objective and solid scientific 
culture in society, thereby contributing to the 
projection of a positive image of science; 
Presentations on rationales, characteristics, and 
relative merits of a Technopark plans of selection of 
specialized sectors by strategic industry (e.g. Techno 
Doctor) 
10 
10 Jan. 
2011 
Winter conference on 
Innovation Cluster (Daedeok Biz 
Centre, Daejeon)  
Daedeok Science Park officer 
(4), GSTEP (3), University (10), 
Others (20) 
To hear industrial policies of other regions. 
In particular, photonics industry in Gwangju, which 
was introduced as an example of smart specialisation 
strategy of OECD, is considered as an exemplary 
success of regional policy. 
Notes: a. In the process of comprehensive examination, the regional actors are very positive to express their 
opinions and are quite sensitive to some issues such as the selection criteria and direction of each other. 
Interviewees at Gyeonggi Technopark also show similar behaviours to protect their own turfs. They are 
anyway affiliated to certain lines. Nevertheless, they worry about the conflicts with the GSTEP and wonder if 
the interim report of Technopark is quite flexible to deal with the demands of MKE. In addition, there could 
be other conflicts between Daegu Metropolitan Government and other local governments. Professors and 
specialized researchers show relatively neutral positions. The representatives of strategic industries show 
strong attachments to their fields without exception. 
b. Because of time constraints, the whole process is progressed within relatively short period of time. Thus, it 
seems to be quite difficult for the participants to secure enough examination and discussion periods. 
c. The researcher was employed in the GSTEP as part-time researcher between 2 October and 15 December 
2010.       
 
 
  
 255 
 
Appendix 5 Provisions of the local autonomy of South Korea 
This appendix 5 contains a provisions of the local autonomy in South Korea. Local politics 
in South Korea has its basis in the nation’s Constitution, adopted in 1949, which recognises 
local government as essential to democracy and establishes it as part of the nation’s 
system of governance.  
However, it was not until 1960 that the first local elections in Korean history were held. 
However, since the military coup in 1961 local autonomy had been suspended. In the 
wake of democratization in 1987 the Local Autonomy Act was revised in 1988, which 
ultimately led to the gradual restoration of local autonomy. Elections for local council 
were first introduced in 1990 and elections for mayors and governors were later 
introduced in 1995.  
The form of Local Autonomy Act reflects democratic institutional principles such as 
separation of powers. It is helpful to pay attention the legislation by which the devolution 
of political and administrative power from the nation state to the regions has been 
implemented. The fundamental responsibilities of regions are stipulated in the 
Constitution as noted in this appendix.  
The Constitution grants regional authority the power to action that are not explicitly 
prohibited or assigned elsewhere. Article 117 of the Constitution can be seen as a 
fundamental milepost in the relation between central government and provincial 
governments. It notes regional authorities have the right to manage their property, affairs, 
and administration and to enact their own regulations within the law. According to Article 
118 of the Constitution, “the local government shall have a council” and “the organization 
and powers of local councils, and the election of their members; election procedures for 
heads of local governments; and other matters pertaining to the organization and 
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operation of local governments shall be determined by laws.” Every local government 
maintains the same form of government and there is no exception.   
More specific, The Local Autonomy Act assigns responsibilities. The Local Autonomy Act 
was adopted in March 1994. The significant of the responsibilities of region as well as the 
important of public support was indicated in the Article 9 and Article 11.82  
Article 9 also states that the following are local public services: 1) regional administration; 
2) public services that enhance residents’ welfare; 3) industrial development of 
agriculture and commerce; 4) regional development and environmental facilities; 5) 
public services that promote education, sports, culture, and the arts; 6) environmental 
protection, including pollution prevention; and 7) civil defence and fire protection. These 
are the inherent functions of provincial governments (Table in below). 
 
Table. Expenditure reponsibilities of regional government 
 
Core task Details 
Regional Administration Ordinance, regulation, personnel management, budgeting 
Residents’ Welfare Welfare facilities; support for seniors, low-income people, and the disabled; public hospitals; garbage collection 
Agriculture and Commerce Irrigation, distribution of agricultural products, forestry, dairy business, small and medium businesses 
Regional Development City planning, construction and civil engineering, local roads, residential environment, housing, local economy 
Education, Culture, etc. Elementary and junior high schools, libraries, museums, art galleries, stadiums, local culture, and art 
Environmental Protection 
Water supply, sewage treatment, historic preservation, city parks, 
supervision of regional rivers, disaster protection, traffic utility 
systems 
Civil defence and Fire 
Protection Management of civil defence system, fire fighting 
Sources: Article 9, the Local Autonomy Act. 
 
Article 11 stipulates that the following public services should be outside the domain of 
provincial government’ responsibilities: 1) crucial to national defence (foreign policy, 
                                                          
82 For the full text of the Local Autonomy Act, please refer to Korea Legislation Research 
Instute (http://elaw.klri.re.kr).  
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military defence, administration of justice, and national tax); 2) uniformly provided 
(monetary policy, financial policy, and trade policy); 3) managed nationwide (supply 
control of agriculture, fishery, and livestock, as well as trade); 4) provided nationwide 
(national development plans and management of national forests, national rivers, 
highways, and national parks); 5) subject to uniform standards (labour and survey 
standards); 6) coordinated nationwide (postal systems and railways); and 7) related to 
inspection, testing, research, navigation management, meteorological management, and 
nuclear engineering development, which require high technologies. 
 
 
 

